University of North Dakota
UND Scholarly Commons

Theses and Dissertations
Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects

12-1-1977

The Buell Military Commission: A Microcosm of the Union Command Problem

Mark Peine

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses

Recommended Citation

Peine, Mark, "The Buell Military Commission: A Microcosm of the Union Command Problem" (1977). *Theses and Dissertations*. 2676.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/2676

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

المنارة للاستشارات
www.manaraa.com

THE BUELL MILITARY COMMISSION:
A MICROCOSM OF THE UNION
COMMAND PROBLEM

by
Mark Peine

Bachelor of Arts, College of St. Thomas, 1972

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the

University of North Dakota

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota

December
1977

T1977
P352

This Thesis submitted by Mark Allan Peine in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done.

Richard E. Beringer
(Chairman)

Mary Ellen Caldwell

Stanley N. Murray

A. William Johnson
Dean of the Graduate School

THE BUELL MILITARY COMMISSION: A MICROCOSM OF THE UNION COMMAND PROBLEM

Mark Peine, M.A.

The University of North Dakota, 1977

Faculty Advisor: Dr. Richard E. Beringer

This paper is a study of Union military philosophy during the American Civil War. Its specific purpose is to identify and establish clearly what is classified here as the Union command problem. Simply stated, the command problem was due to the fact that there were two schools of generalship, both inadequate; this meant that top leadership was usually mediocre since, for different reasons, Union commanders had an incomplete idea of war.

The procedure used to study this command problem is, first, to examine its origins in eighteenth century European military theory and then to study its appearance on the battlefield of the Civil War. Second, this paper observes the proceedings of the Buell Military Commission, a military trial, obsolete in form, that provides the major focus of this paper by offering a microcosm in which the two differing Union philosophies come to a dramatic, head-on clash.

Eighteenth century European theory is revealed in the experiences and writings of Baron Henri Jomini and Marshal Maurice comte de Saxe. Both presented a "natural art plus science" theory of war that prescribed a balanced formula needed in any general in order to conduct

efficient warfare. The ideas of Jomini and Saxe are used as a benchmark against which to judge Union generalship.

On the field of battle, Jomini's and Saxe's "art-science" theory demonstrate the existence of the two incomplete types of Union general. One type includes Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, Philip Sheridan, and John Pope, who were "natural artists" of war in their originality, audacity, and initiative; yet they consistently failed to consider correctly what Jomini and Saxe also stressed as the "textbook" side of war. The result was a lopsided combination of ideas in these generals that produced a brand of warfare that was effective in hurting the enemy but inefficient and bloody. Audacity and élan replaced close adherence to the basics of science in warfare.

In contrast to this "Grant-Sherman" Union general was a second type, represented by Don Carlos Buell, George B. McClellan, William Rosecrans, and George Meade. This other kind of general followed a philosophy that properly stressed the science of war, but failed to combine it with the natural artistry of a Grant or Sherman. As a result, type two was often efficient in preparing for battle but in little else--engaging and defeating the enemy almost became secondary objectives.

These "natural art" and "science oriented" schools of generalship in Union command are examined in the courtroom proceedings of what was known during the Civil War as the Buell Military Commission. Behind its doors this Commission served as a microcosm of the command problem, with the two sides of the court, the defense and prosecution, representing in their contrasting lines of argument an extension of the two types of generalship found on the field of battle. The courtroom illustration of the command problem represents the climax of this paper.

Permission

Title THE BUELL MILITARY COMMISSION: A MICROCOSM OF THE UNION COMMAND PROBLEM

Department History

Degree Master of Arts

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the Library of this University shall make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work or, in his absence, by the Chairman of the Department or the Dean of the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this thesis or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.

Signature Mark [illegible]

Date 11/15/77

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Sincere gratitude is extended to Dr. Richard E. Beringer for displaying the assistance and guidance and most of all, the patience, expected but not always found in one's teachers.

Appreciation is also extended to Dr. Stanley N. Murray and Professor Mary Ellen Caldwell for their general interest and helpful suggestions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv

ABSTRACT v

PREFACE 1

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION: THE BUELL MILITARY COMMISSION AND ITS RELATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DOCTRINE OF HENRI JOMINI AND MARSHAL MAURICE COMTE DE SAXE 2

II. THE BUELLS AND THE McCLELLANS: THE SCIENCE AND RULES OF WARFARE 25

III. THE GRANTS AND THE SHERMANS: THE ART AND RISK OF WARFARE . 57

IV. THE BUELL MILITARY COMMISSION AS A MICROCOSM OF THE UNION COMMAND PROBLEM 77

CONCLUSION 123

APPENDIX A: MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY UNDER BUELL, JUNE 10th-AUGUST 21st 1862 134

APPENDIX B: THE OPERATIONS OF BRAGG AND BUELL IN KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE, AUGUST 21st-OCTOBER 8, 1862 135

APPENDIX C: THE OPERATIONS OF BRAGG AND BUELL IN KENTUCKY, OCTOBER 8-NOVEMBER 2, 1862 136

APPENDIX D: GENERAL BUELL'S ORDER 13A 137

BIBLIOGRAPHY 139

ABSTRACT

This paper is a study of Union military philosophy during the American Civil War. Its specific purpose is to identify and establish clearly what is classified here as the Union command problem. Simply stated, the command problem was due to the fact that there were two schools of generalship, both inadequate; this meant that top leadership was usually mediocre since, for different reasons, Union commanders had an incomplete idea of war.

The procedure used to study this command problem is, first, to examine its origins in eighteenth century European military theory and then to study its appearance on the battlefield of the Civil War. Second, this paper observes the proceedings of the Buell Military Commission, a military trial, obsolete in form, that provides the major focus of this paper by offering a microcosm in which the two differing Union philosophies come to a dramatic, head-on clash.

Eighteenth century European theory is revealed in the experiences and writings of Baron Henri Jomini and Marshal Maurice comte de Saxe. Both presented a "natural art plus science" theory of war that prescribed a balanced formula needed in any general in order to conduct efficient warfare. The ideas of Jomini and Saxe are used as a benchmark against which to judge Union generalship.

On the field of battle, Jomini's and Saxe's "art-science" theory demonstrate the existence of the two incomplete types of Union general. One type includes Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman,

Philip Sheridan, and John Pope, who were "natural artists" of war in their originality, audacity, and initiative; yet they consistently failed to consider correctly what Jomini and Saxe also stressed as the "textbook" side of war. The result was a lopsided combination of ideas in these generals that produced a brand of warfare that was effective in hurting the enemy but inefficient and bloody. Audacity and élan replaced close adherence to the basics of science in warfare.

In contrast to this "Grant-Sherman" Union general was a second type, represented by Don Carlos Buell, George B. McClellan, William Rosecrans, and George Meade. This other kind of general followed a philosophy that properly stressed the science of war, but failed to combine it with the natural artistry of a Grant or Sherman. As a result, type two was often efficient in preparing for battle but in little else--engaging and defeating the enemy almost became secondary objectives.

These "natural art" and "science oriented" schools of generalship in Union command are examined in the courtroom proceedings of what was known during the Civil War as the Buell Military Commission. Behind its doors this Commission served as a microcosm of the command problem, with the two sides of the court, the defense and prosecution, representing in their contrasting lines of argument an extension of the two types of generalship found on the field of battle. The courtroom illustration of the command problem represents the climax of this paper.

PREFACE

This paper is actually an intellectual history of one aspect of Union command during the Civil War, for its focus is on the qualms, patterns of perception, and distinguishing ideas characteristic of two schools of thought. The two schools, both individually and collectively, compose the Union command problem.

The command problem which characterized Union generalship was responsible for the inadequate leadership that determined the destiny of several hundred thousand Union soldiers. This intricate and abstract subject is examined on three levels. The first defines the command problem, a task that requires a re-interpretation of two important military theorists of the eighteenth century, Baron Henri Jomini and Marshal Maurice comte de Saxe. Both Jomini and Saxe prescribed a flexible strategy that was desperately needed and that highlights the faults of both schools of Union command. The second level of observation examines the problem in terms of battlefield effects, a procedure that goes beyond the general Civil War narrative by tracing and analyzing specific incidents of inadequate higher command. The third level associates the command problem with an obscure military commission that serves as a microcosm of Union military philosophy. This part of the paper represents the climax of the study, for in the atmosphere of a courtroom the two deficient philosophies of Union battlefield command are forced into bold relief.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE BUELL MILITARY COMMISSION AND ITS RELATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DOCTRINE OF HENRI JOMINI AND MARSHAL MAURICE COMTE DE SAXE

On November 27, 1862, the Buell Military Commission convened in Cincinnati. The purpose of the Commission was to inquire into the operations of the Army of the Ohio under General Don Carlos Buell, operations that took place in Kentucky and Tennessee from late 1861 to late 1862. The actual investigation concerned itself with the summer and early winter months of 1862. The official verdict of the Commission was that mistakes had been made by General Buell but that no further action should be taken.[1] The President and Secretary of War agreed, and the matter was dismissed.

In the history of the Civil War, the Buell Commission has been relatively forgotten. Few people today know its name, much less the reasons for its creation. When mentioned at all, references to the Commission are brief but usually unenlightening. This obscurity of today is founded in the obscurity of yesterday, for in its own time the significance of the Commission did not seem much greater. In form the Commission was only one of inquiry or preliminary investigation, and thus it did not provide the excitement in the public mind that would have been found in the more penetrating investigation of a court-martial. The Commission never allowed its proceedings to be publicized in newspapers or its doors to be opened to the public. In its secrecy the Commission virtually guaranteed its obscurity; people could not relate to it as they could to the Fitz-John Porter Court-Martial, or the McDowell Court of Inquiry, both of which convened at that same time with open proceedings. In the first few days of the McDowell Court for example, the public was treated to a sensational discussion of whether McDowell was seen drunk on the streets of Washington immediately after his defeat at Manassas when the Northern capital was considered subject to the possibility of a rebel army marching against its door.[2] In contrast, the only information the public received from the Buell Court was the names of the witnesses and when sessions started and ended. Sometimes, in desperation, newspapers would try to find more to report, but it was rare when they could. Even then their stories were not particularly interesting: "The Commission appointed to inquire into the Campaign of General Buell, have removed their quarters from the rooms lately occupied in the Custom House, to a more spacious apartment in Pike's Opera House."[3]

On occasion the public was treated to a glimpse of the proceedings, as when The Murfreesboro Rebel Banner printed letters found in the captured baggage of General McCook after the Battle of Stone's River. One letter contained his brother Daniel's impressions as a witness before the Buell Commission.[4] But such occasions were, as would be expected, few and far between. The Commission probably had little meaning for a public that was unable to follow its proceedings, and when no further action was taken against Buell the matter was easy to forget.

The insignificance of the Commission seemed to have reached even into the offices of the War Department where its records achieved their own special symbol of oblivion. In the first few months after arriving at the War Department they were shuffled between the Judge Advocate General's office and the Adjutant General's office, then came to rest for a few years in a black trunk in one corner of the Judge Advocate General's private office. Finally they were put in a proper place of storage, but the records were lost by 1870, when a former quartermaster of volunteers requested them for his own records. What became of them is a mystery. Congressional investigation, moreover, revealed that they were the only records of the war years received by the War Department whose whereabouts were unexplained. Fortunately loss of these original records was less serious than at first thought, for the clerk of the Buell Court still retained his own copy of the proceedings.[5]

The unimportant position that history has assigned to the Buell Commission is only understandable to a degree. As a representative example of military investigation the Commission cannot and does not deserve to be given much consideration in comparison with other events in the Civil War. Nevertheless, a closer analysis of the content of the Commission's proceedings will show that it offers a significant contribution to Civil War history, a contribution found in the understanding that it conveys of the Union command problem.

The command problem revealed by the Buell Commission varies from that which historians usually perceive, and involves a re-interpretation of the military history of the war. This re-interpretation revolves around one of the most important elements of this paper, namely the military thought of Henri Jomini and Marshal Maurice comte de Saxe, two prominent eighteenth century European theorists on the subject of war. Jomini's theories were found in his Précis de l'art de la guerre . . . , originally published in 1838, and translated into English by O. F. Winship Mendall and E. E. McLean in 1854. (However, Jomini's ideas were absorbed into American military thought by the commentaries of Henry Halleck, whose Elements of Military Art and Science, published in 1846, was almost plagiarized from Jomini.) Saxe's influence came via his 1756 publication, Les reveries, ou Memoires sur l'art de la guerre de . . . , translated into English by J. Davis in 1811. The theories of these two commentators represent the antithesis of Union strategic thinking, as revealed by the Commission, and accordingly are used in subsequent chapters as a standard by which to judge the opinions of General Buell, his like-minded colleagues, and their opposite-minded counterparts of Union command.

Both interpretations of the Union command problem are based on the writings of Jomini and Saxe, but the dissimilarity between today's conventional interpretation and that of the commission pertains to the perception of a flaw in the military philosophy of the leading members of the Union general officer corps--a flaw that meant a narrow-minded attitude toward any strategic or tactical requirements that contradicted prejudices.

For the historian who accepts the current standard interpretation, the command problem applies to a group of Union generals that included such notables as George McClellan, George Meade, Don Carlos Buell, and William Rosecrans. These generals represented an apparent philosophical adherence to the discredited eighteenth century theory of

Jomini, and to a lesser degree Saxe, which seemed inappropriate to the Civil War situation. In effect this group of Union generals shared a professional attitude towards war, attributed to Jomini and Saxe, that was unreal and extreme--an attitude that stressed war as only a science of plans, diagrams, and textbook rules, and that did not include such unsavory realities as bloodshed, chance, or risk. This customary view of the command problem also includes another group of generals, who, being disassociated from the Jominian past, represented a "modern" generalship appropriate to the Civil War situation. This group included Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, among others.

T. Harry Williams is perhaps the most outstanding exponent of this standard view of the command problem, and he offers a primary example in his article on Civil War generalship in *Why the North Won the Civil War*.[6] For Williams, Jomini was the typical eighteenth century general, submerged in a blackboard world of geometric diagrams, operational lines, plans, and rules meant to permit one to wage war without risk; such an approach, thought Williams, set back the science of war a full century.[7] For the purpose of promoting systematic study of wars, Jomini put into each of his plans "a theater of operations, a base of operations, a zone of operations, and so forth. . . . Essentially his purpose was to introduce rationality and system into the study of war."[8]

The science-orientated military past (as we shall call it) of Jomini, and of Saxe as well, inspired Williams to imagine white-gloved generals playing a nearly bloodless game of war in a gentlemanly fashion, with objectives achieved and grievances satisfied by the book, and little harm done in the process:

> Jomini confessed that he disliked the destructiveness of the warfare of his time. "I acknowledge," he wrote, "that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English guards courteously invited each other to fire first as at Fontenoy. . . . " He said that he preferred "chivalric war" to "organized assassination," and he deplored as particularly cruel and terrible what he called wars of "opinion," or as we would say today, of "ideas." War was, as it should be, most proper and polite when it was directed by professional armies for limited objectives. All this is, of course, readily recognizable as good eighteenth-century doctrine. This could be Marshal Saxe saying: "I do not favor pitched battles . . . and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one." Eighteenth-century warfare was leisurely and its ends were limited. It stressed maneuver rather than battle. . . . Most important of all, war was regarded as kind of an exercise or game to be conducted by soldiers.[9]

Williams applies this eighteenth century military philosophy to Union command, examining a culprit group of Union generals who, being disciples of Jomini and Saxe, were textbook addicts in their conduct of warfare. These were generals who, like Jomini, "proposed to conduct it [war] in accordance with the standards and the strategy of an earlier and easier military age,"[10] and who "hoped to accomplish their objectives by maneuvering rather than fighting."[11] One such general, according to Williams, was George B. McClellan, who thought that Manassas and Yorktown were his "brightest chaplets" because he seized them by "pure military skill" and without "loss of life," even though he failed to hurt the enemy in both cases.[12] Williams also ridicules McClellan's squeamish reaction after the Battle of Fair Oakes, as he went "mooning around the field anguishing over the dead," and wrote his wife that the "charms from victory" were replaced by the "sickening sight" of the battlefield. As Williams notes, such a squeamish reaction "may seem strange to the modern mind, but Jomini would have understood."[13] Another member of this out-dated class of Union generals who understood only an impotent warfare of the past, was Don Carlos Buell, whom

Williams compares to the inane "spirit of Marshal Saxe." Just as Saxe is quoted as absurdly stating "that campaigns could be carried out and won without engaging in a single battle," Buell contended that "war has a higher purpose than that of mere bloodshed."[14] General Meade's weak-kneed confession of shame "for his cause when he was ordered to seize the property of a Confederate sympathizer,"[15] parallels Williams' quotation of Chesterfield's mocking statement that eighteenth century warfare was "pusillanimously carried on in this degenerate age; quarter is given; towns are taken and people spared; even in a storm, a woman can hardly hope for the benefit of a rape."[16]

Completing what is now the conventional interpretation of the command problem, Williams also examines the new breed, the so-called "modern" Union commanders, whose generalship was produced by the American Civil War, and whose ideas were in direct contrast to the European military tradition of Jomini and Saxe. Grant is Williams' primary example of this new model of general, for he displayed an original spontaneity towards combat that reflected war as a natural art, entailing risk, in which elements such as "character of will" and "common sense" rose above the "dogmas of traditional warfare."[17] Williams underlines Grant's contention that "if men make war in slavish observance of rules, they will fail. . . . War is progressive, because all instruments and elements of war are progressive,"[18] which was an obvious reference to Jominian theory. Williams ends his article with Lincoln's evaluation of Grant's strategy late in the war, which the President summed up: "Those not skinning can hold a leg." Williams concluded that "at least for the Civil War" Lincoln's observation "had more validity than anything written by Baron Jomini."[19]

These eighteenth century militarists were, however, much more complex than Williams and others like him tend to believe. In their interpretation of the ideas of Jomini and Saxe these historians have over simplified to the point of misrepresentation. Close examination of Jomini and Saxe reveals that they were not bound to rules. Instead, contrary to strict regimentation, their thought included an important degree of flexibility and reason. They were not simple, narrow-minded, white-gloved theorists, who saw war as something to be conducted in a bloodless, prim, and proper manner, closely regulated by the restrictive rules of military science. In his famous Fontenoy statement, for example ("I acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English guard courteously invited each to fire first at Fontenoy"),[20] Jomini did not necessarily present the image of a general who, as Williams puts it, shriveled away from "the destructiveness of the warfare of his time," and preferred instead warfare that was "most proper and polite."[21] Jomini was more reasonable than these remarks may indicate. His statement on Fontenoy, placed in context, was a comparison of two opposite extremes. Of the two he preferred Fontenoy over a civil war atmosphere that meant mob rule. The latter method of warfare he had personally observed in Spain during the Napoleonic wars: " . . . a frightful epoch when priests, women and children plotted the murder of isolated soldiers." That Jomini did not really prefer either method is found in his search for a middle road between "these contests between the people [mob warfare] and the old regular method of war between permanent armies [Fontenoy]."[22]

Williams' basic idea that Jomini looked to the past and preferred a more regulated warfare had some truth to it. However, Jomini looked to the past for its ability to provide the rules he had hoped to see in the warfare of Napoleon. This did not mean that he totally disapproved of the warfare of his day, for he could become very excited about Bonaparte:

> To be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lighting upon his center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he could move more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his forces,--such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very best.[23]

Yet Napoleon's method, although "one of the very best," was not complete for Jomini: "Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of the adjoining states."[24] He thus leaned toward a conservative philosophy of warfare, not as an escape from military reality, but as a necessary ingredient needed to make Napoleon's system more structured and complete.

In a summary statement on Napoleon, Jomini proposed a compromise between the system of wars of position, which he recognized as outdated ("It is probable that the old system of wars of position will for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much modified and improved"), and Napoleon's method, which he felt would be disastrous for society if adopted completely. The latter, he stated, was not "materially different from the devastations of the barbarian hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries." His plan was to utilize the best qualities of both systems, which meant " . . . a mixed system of war,--a mean between the rapid incursions of Napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century." In the end, however, Jomini realized that his ideas belonged to the future. The present was still Napoleon's and had to be accepted, regardless of the need for a little more attention to the military past. "Until then" he remarked, "we must expect to retain this system [Napoleon's] of marches, which has produced so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion."[25]

Marshal Saxe also displayed flexibility in his understanding of war. Williams uses Saxe's famous quote ("I do not favor pitched battles, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one"[26]), as an example of eighteenth-century military aversion to fighting.[27] But this greatly oversimplifies our impressions of Saxe, who has been described as a leader of new ideas, a great "innovator" who discovered new ways to defeat and destroy one's enemy.[28] Placed in context, Saxe's statement did imply that he did not like battle, but this does not necessarily mean that he was against fighting when properly prepared. Williams fails to mention that in the same paragraph Saxe talked about "frequent combats, to dissolve so to speak the enemy"; "when one finds the opportunity of crushing the enemy"; and "after a victory a general should not be content with having gained a battlefield." These words hardly describe a general with a lethargic attitude towards battle. This is not to say that Saxe was another Napoleon. He was conservative on the battlefield, but Williams went too far in defining this conservatism. Saxe's dislike of battle only applied to those that were fought hastily, without being prepared. For the one clear theme in Saxe's statement is not an unwillingness to fight, but, on the contrary, the demand that war is to be prepared "without putting anything to chance; and that is the perfection and ability in a general."[29]

This more complex, flexible, and reasonable theoretical interpretation of these two generals represents the antithesis of the Union command problem as reflected in the Buell Commission. The writings of Jomini and Saxe actually support not only the science-and-rules philosophy of generals like Buell and McClellan, but also the art-and-risk philosophy of men like Sherman and Grant. At the same time, the eighteenth century past, as reflected in Jomini and Saxe, refuted the ideas of both schools of warfare. In short, Jomini and Saxe recognized that war was not a white-gloved game regulated by science and rules, nor was it simply a matter of art in knowing what risks to take. Rather war was a balance between a flexible science and natural art, with the commander needing equal proportions of both to be successful.

For Jomini and Saxe the science of war consisted of numerous rules, principles, theories, and systems. The subjects of these dictums ranged from maintenance of soldiers' health to strategy and tactics. In this latter category, Jomini had no problem devising eleven lines of operation, Doubles lines of operations, Interior lines, Exterior lines, Concentric lines, Divergent lines, Accidental lines, and the like.[30] He also proposed twelve Orders of Battle, including Simple parallel order, Parallel order with a crotchet, Parallel order reinforced upon one wing or upon center, Oblique order, Order concave in the center.[31] Some rules were more or less permanent, such as the need for speed, mobility, concentration, awareness of time, initiative, achieving the decisive point in battle, and engaging the masses of one's army against the fractions of the enemy. These were rules that indicated standard regulations, the basics to be used always in moving efficiently against the enemy.

But most of the rules, principles, and systems of Jomini and Saxe were not permanent in the sense implied by Williams. They did not prevent war by reducing it to a meticulously regulated game. Instead, the rules laid down by Saxe and Jomini were intended to increase flexibility by permitting effective engagement of the enemy while simultaneously offering possible means to prevent the madness of war from reaching a point comparable to mass murder. In this sense, the theories and rules of Jomini and Saxe reflected not a static warfare of interwoven designs and geometric exercises, but rather a sense of flexibility indicating numerous ways one could efficiently and effectively engage the enemy with a minimum of risk. After listing his twelve orders of battle, (which Williams used as proof of a fond regard for disciplined warfare[32]), Jomini observed that "these different orders are not to be understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A general who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be likely to suffer defeat." And, as if sensing the criticism of future historians like Williams, he added, "I repeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and when such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it can only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by the use of a known symbol."[33]

When he was specific about the flexibility of the rules of warfare, Jomini discussed the objective point of an army, carefully distinguishing between the "geographical objective" (capital or province), and the "objective point of maneuver" (which relates to the destruction of the hostile army).[34] Jomini's own preference between these two objectives, so opposite in nature, is hard to judge. The war of invasion ("geographical objective") is a key point in his writing, yet he also reacted favorably to Napoleon and his use of the "objective point of maneuver." "The best means of accomplishing great results," wrote Jomini in quoting Napoleon, "was to dislodge and destroy the hostile army--since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no organized force to protect them."[35] His final choice seems to have been a combination of both, except in the event of special circumstances:

> In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,--such as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory. In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the hostile army, as did Napoleon.[36]

Other rules were of the same flexible nature. Jomini's famous maxim of "interior lines" was not excluded from his assertion that "every maxim has its exceptions" or his statement that great possibilities were never exploited against Frederick's use of the "interior line" maxim in the Seven Years War.[37] Describing rules for the supply of armies in the field, he included all the obvious and not-so-obvious needs of an army, from the rations to be carried to the relationship of an army with the inhabitants of a country. But these rules suddenly become less meaningful when one reads this summary remark:

> I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon which may appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. He said that in his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops were in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy to procure everything in abundance. This is a remark upon which it would be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains the success of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war differs from narrow theory.[38]

One should not conclude that since the rules of war were flexible therefore they were not important in eighteenth century warfare. Jomini also pointed out that

> a system which is not in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and were applied by Caesar, Scipio and the Consul Nero, as well as by Marlborough and Eugene.[39]

But "in accordance with" did not necessarily mean strict adherence to one set of rules. Saxe perhaps best sums up the flexible attitude, showing the science of war to be a means of engaging the enemy and not an end in itself:

> Many commanders in chief have been so limited in the ideas of warfare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and two rival armies have been drawn out for action, their whole attention has devolved upon a straight alignment, an equality of step, or a regular distance in intervals of column.[40]

Science was not the only part of war recognized by Jomini and Saxe, for war also required the less tangible quality of natural art. This natural art applied to the general himself, to the inward genius that could not be taught but was reflected instead in intuitive qualities that were born in him. It is this aspect of war that T. Harry Williams praised in the modern generalship of Grant, in contrast to the eighteenth-century scientific approach of the Buell-McClellan type of general. This is noted in Williams' contention that the qualities of "character or will" and "common sense" were the essence of Grant's success.[41] He proceeded to attribute the greatness of a commander to intangibles like "mental strength" and "moral power," and quoted Napoleon's remark that "the personality of the general is indispensable, he is the head, he is the all of an army. The Gauls were not conquered by Roman legions, but by Caesar."[42]

It was a mystical, imprecise, artistic quality that Williams thought was directly related to the intuitive level of war. Here war went beyond science and textbook tools, and included the risk, danger, chaos, and tribulation that Clausewitz referred to as the decisive moments of war,

> when things no longer move on of themselves, like a well-oiled machine, but the machine itself begins to offer resistance, and to overcome this, the commander must have great force of will. . . . By the spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the light of hope, must be kindled afresh in all others.[43]

Marshal Saxe and Jomini understood well this natural art, the qualities needed in a commander to deal with war's unpredictability. For Saxe the natural art of war meant that "unless a man is born with a talent for war, he will never be other than a mediocre general." He describes this "talent" as an inborn, self-assuring quality. "The general," he wrote,

> ought to possess a talent for sudden and happy resources. To have an art of penetrating into other men, and of remaining impenetrable himself; he should be endowed with a capacity prepared for everything, with activity accompanied by judgment, with skill to make a proper choice upon all occasion, and with an exactness of discernment; to be a stranger to hatred, to punish without mercy, and especially those who are most dear to him.[44]

Saxe came closer to grasping the essence of the art of war when he observed that "war is a science covered with darkness, in the obscurity of which one can not move with assured step; habit and prejudice make up its base, the natural result of ignorance."[45] It is in dealing with this "darkness," hinted at here by a need for originality, that Saxe discerned the natural artistry of war.

Jomini was more direct in discussing the natural art of war. He described the risk of war that science and rules could neither predict nor prevent:

> Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of positive sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned as often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. The passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their commanders, the spirit, more or less marital, of nations and epochs--in a word, everything that can be called the poetry and metaphysics of war,--will have a permanent influence on its results.[46]

In dealing with the risk of war, Jomini, like Saxe, acknowledged that something more than textbook principles was required by a general, that a "special talent," a quality of artistry, was also needed:

> In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient substitute for that intuitive coup-d' oeil imparted by experience in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness. . . .
>
> I will repeat what I was the first to announce:--"that war is not an exact science, but a drama full of passion; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders . . . have a great influence upon it . . . " I appreciate thoroughly the difference between the directing principles of combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that special talent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst the noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men co-operating toward the attainment of one single object.

This "special talent" was

> the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating mind which distinguish the practional man from the one who knows only what others teach him. I confess that no book can introduce those things into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature.[47]

The flexible theories of both Jomini and Saxe represent the antithesis of the military philosophies of both schools of thought (science-and-rules versus art-and-risk) among Union commanders. In this sense, both Union philosophies (though quite opposite from each other) are seriously flawed, as the conflict in the Buell Military Commission indicates. Like Jomini and Saxe, the "Buell-McClellan" generals recognized the science of war, but in failing to recognize and accept the risk of war, this science becomes not the flexible adjustment to inevitably unforeseen conditions of combat ("every maxim has its exceptions"),[48] but an extreme and rigid end in itself to prevent war and combat, blood and risk. And in an opposite but equally tragic reflection of inadequacy, the "Grant-Sherman" generals illustrate the natural art of war when confronted with what Clausewitz referred to as the decisive moments in war "when things no longer move of themselves,"[49] and which Saxe stated was a time when "war is a science covered with darkness."[50] However, in their inability to recognize correctly the science (rules) of war, these generals doomed their troops and their country to suffer needlessly bloody encounters which reflected a callous disregard of ways to minimize risk. This type of general had as inadequate a conception of war as his textbookish, rule-oriented counterpart.

This, then, was the command problem illustrated by the Buell Military Commission. Both groups of Union generals had an incomplete conception of military strategy that goes beyond the conventional interpretation of T. Harry Williams and other historians. The command problem was too complex to blame one group of generals or another. Northerners looked with the same amount of wonder and disbelief at their generals in 1864 and 1865 (Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan), as they had in 1861 and 1862 (Buell, McClellan, and Rosecrans); the difference was that in the later years their discontent was increasingly focused on the bloodbaths created by victory instead of the limited results achieved by defeat. On the battlefield, under pressure, the two schools of thought emphasized opposing philosophical values which, if brought together, would have meant a combination of the natural art and science of war necessary to produce the complete general.

The Buell Commission represented a microcosm of this command problem. The rule-orientated conservatism of the Meades, McClellans, and Buells was found in the role of the Commission defense (Buell and his witnesses). The original, artistic but impetuous, hazardous, unscientific attitude of generals such as Grant and Sherman was found in the role of the prosecution (Commission Board and witnesses).

This microcosm is incomplete, however, without a better understanding of the wider world it explains. In order to observe the defense role in the Commission as a microcosm of the conservative military thought of generals such as Don Carlos Buell, it is first necessary to understand why McClellan considered war to be an endless game that consisted only of grand strategy and preparation, or why Meade was satisfied with a defensive policy at Gettysburg that allowed Lee to escape. We must also recognize and understand widespread Northern frustration with this type of general, for that too becomes part of establishing the conservative tone of his ideas.

By the same token, the prosecution will be fully understood only by recognizing and understanding why (for example) Grant in the Vicksburg Campaign and at Cold Harbor, and Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain, threw away strategy and resorted to suicidal attacks, hoping that great numbers would bring victory against a well entrenched enemy. At the same time, we must understand the growing desire in Northern society for total war that was associated with this type of general. This atmosphere surrounded him, and established him, and therefore becomes necessary to understand his boldness. The wider world of this microcosm, these two groups of Union generals, will be examined in Chapters Two and Three. Only then can the value of the Commission as a microcosm of the Union command problem be judged.

The Buell-McClellan generals were prominent early in the war. While the Grants and Shermans were still getting their bearings, Buell and other commanders like him were already in the thick of the confusion and combat which the war created. The activity of the conservative generals was therefore the first indication that a command problem existed.

CHAPTER ONE FOOTNOTES

[1] Material from the Buell Commission Transcript summarizing the court's purpose and verdict is found in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (70 vols. in 128, Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 1-12; hereinafter cited as O.R.

[2] Louisville Daily Journal, 5 December 1862.

[3] Cincinnati Enquirer, 23 February 1862. This failure of the Buell Commission to open its doors to the public seems to have been an unusual act at the time. According to a statement in the Fitz-John Porter Court-Martial, the procedure of open doors was a custom of military trial: "The court, having considered the application of General Porter, decided it will sit with open doors, in accordance with the custom of the Service." O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. II, Supplement, 824.

[4] The Murfreesboro Rebel Banner, quoted in Cincinnati Enquirer, 4 February 1862.

[5] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Records in the Case of Major General Don Carlos Buell, H. Rept. 97, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1872, pp. 1-72.

[6] Other examples of this standard view include Stephen E. Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962); David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956); Bruce Catton, "The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant" in Grant, Lee, Lincoln and the Radicals, ed. Grady McWhiney (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964); and J. F. C. Fuller, Grant & Lee (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957). These historians are not usually as explicit as Williams is, but all give the definite impression of sharing the same view. David Donald, for example, in Lincoln Reconsidered, may not be as direct as Williams in attacking the philosophy of Jomini and eighteenth century European warfare, and using it in comparison to denounce the early group of prominent Civil War generals and praise the later Grants and Shermans, but such implication is still plain in conclusions that "Jomini thought of war as an affair for professionals, not for politicians or for the people" (p. 94); "Buell was a general who was concerned with objectives in war that were professionally and morally defensible" (p. 86); Grant and Sherman were progressive generals, who understood that "Each age has its own views about the nature of warfare" (p. 86). Such judgments are contrasted to Grant's simple statement that "the art of war is simple enough, find out where your enemy is, get at him as soon as you can, strike at him as hard as you can, and keep moving on" (p. 107).

[7] T. Harry Williams, "The Military Leadership of North and South," in Why The North Won The Civil War, ed. David Donald (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1960; reprint ed., New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 39-40.

[8] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

[9] Ibid., p. 40.

[10] Ibid., p. 44.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[16] Ibid., p. 40.

[17] Ibid., pp. 50-52.

[18] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

[19] Ibid., pp. 53-54.

[20] Baron Henri Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendall and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862), pp. 34-35.

[21] T. Harry Williams, "The Military Leadership of North and South," p. 40.

[22] Henri Jomini, The Art of War, pp. 34-35.

[23] Ibid., p. 90.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., pp. 137-38.

[26] Maurice comte de Saxe, The Art of War (London: J. Davis, 1811), pp. 148-49.

[27] T. Harry Williams, "The Military Leadership of North and South," p. 40.

[28] Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 42-60.

[29] Maurice comte de Saxe, The Art of War, p. 95.

[30] Henri Jomini, The Art of War, pp. 100-104.

[31] Ibid., pp. 188-97.

[32] T. Harry Williams, "The Military Leadership of North and South," p. 39.

[33] Henri Jomini, The Art of War, pp. 195, 199.

[34] Ibid., pp. 88-89.

[35] Ibid., p. 89.

[36] Ibid., p. 90. Archer Jones, in "Jomini and the Strategy of the American Civil War: A Reinterpretation," Military Affairs 34 (December 1970):127-128, further explains how Jomini was able to combine these two opposite objective points, stating that one may be the primary objective according to circumstances, but that the other is always there: "exhaustion and annihilation are generally together, armies are rarely destroyed in the open field, territory is rarely captured by operations that seek to ignore the enemy's army." (Jones felt that the army itself happened always to be Jomini's primary objective, acknowledging that Jomini did not feel that realistically it could be destroyed, and that exhaustion of territory became only a means to effect this objective).

[37] Henri Jomini, The Art of War, p. 84.

[38] Ibid., p. 146 (italics mine).

[39] Ibid., p. 128.

[40] Quoted in Henry W. Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science, 3d ed. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1863), p. 252.

[41] T. Harry Williams, "The Military Leadership of North And South," p. 50.

[42] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[43] Karl Von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans. by O. J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), p. 36.

[44] Marshal comte de Saxe, The Art of War, p. 92.

[45] Ibid., p. 1.

[46] Henri Jomini, The Art of War, p. 321.

[47] Ibid., pp. 203, 344-45.

[48] Ibid., p. 84.

[49] Clausewitz, Principles of War, p. 36.

[50] Marshal Saxe, The Art of War, p. 1.

CHAPTER II

THE BUELLS AND THE McCLELLANS: THE SCIENCE AND RULES OF WARFARE

In the Civil War world of the North, the "Buell-McClellan" archetype, who represented half of the Union command problem, was a common entity, easy to identify and label; he was slow in movement and short on results.[1] Public opinion generally held such commanders in low esteem; this sentiment was shared by Lincoln, who referred, in what were some of his best colloquial gems, to McClellan as a general who "has got the slows,"[2] to Rosecrans after Chickamauga as "stunned like a duck hit on the head,"[3] and to Meade after Gettysburg as "an old woman trying to shoo her geese across a creek."[4]

This condescending characterization of McClellan, Buell, and their fellows was based upon their reputation as commanders who always presented a neutral image. They attained neither high achievement nor suffered catastrophic failure. They achieved consistent results but never outstanding results, and their fates were often due less to the enemy than to unfavorable circumstances such as weather or supplies. Such was the color in which the campaigns of Don Carlos Buell were seen (see Appendices A-C in reference to Buell's campaigns). Buell's first major campaign, for example, resulted in the capture of Bowling Green and Nashville, both important strategic positions in the West. But the bells of victory[5] rang for Grant, for he also had been on the move, and in capturing Fort Henry and Fort Donelson he had cracked the center of widely extended Confederate lines from Columbia, Missouri, to the Cumberland Mountains, and had opened the Mississippi, Cumberland, and Tennessee Rivers for movement south. It was victory by Grant that made Buell's achievement look pale, for it threatened the flank of Albert Sidney Johnston's Confederates, forcing them to evacuate Bowling Green and Nashville before Buell's arrival.

Yet, if the bells of victory did not ring for Buell in his first major campaign, nevertheless such qualified success did not mean failure; instead it was achievement with strings attached. This was indirectly revealed by the nature of attacks on Buell by Northern newspapers, which, as if trying to make up their minds, decided to be negative. These attacks were not the vicious kind reserved for catastrophe, nor were they marked by ridicule that was never forgotten. Rather, they were chiding remarks produced by the frustrating realization that something had been accomplished but not enough.

The newspaper criticism seemed to be centered around two rather meaningless themes. One was the suggestion that Buell could have made Grant's victories easier. This is typified by the New York Daily Tribune's statement that Buell, in not moving simultaneously with Grant, had allowed the rebel force at Bowling Green to "evacuate that position unmolested and at leisure and send a large portion of its force to strengthen the defenders at Fort Donelson."[6] This line of reasoning was tenable but somewhat out of place amid the celebration of the Fort Henry and Fort Donelson victories and the fact that Grant captured any troops that were sent to reinforce his adversaries. The other critical theme was even more meaningless, reflecting excessive concern for what the rebels at Bowling Green and Nashville had managed to get away with in their evacuation. Buell acquired the somewhat negative reputation as a commander whose laxity of movement meant allowing the Confederates to "dismount the siege-guns, and carry them away, with all the munitions and baggage for an army of thirty thousand."[7]

After taking Nashville and Bowling Green, Buell also achieved his objectives in a second campaign that required him to move west to meet Grant at Pittsburg Landing and then move south with him to capture Corinth. These objectives were met only after confusing incidents which underlined his mediocre reputation. One of these was the battle of Shiloh, which took place on April 6 and 7, 1862. Shiloh was more puzzling and confusing than most battles of the war because of green troops, a surprise attack by the enemy, and devastating slaughter that was still a new experience for both sides. Buell's association with Shiloh only added to its confusion and puzzlement. His reinforcement of Grant on the first day of battle was a major factor in saving the Union forces and was clearly recognized as such:

> General Buell with General Nelson's division arrived at 4'oclock and turned the tide of battle. . . .
>
> . . . Had General Buell's force not been seen just at hand, our army might possibly have been stampeded and destroyed. But Buell came in sight before nightfall, crossed the river as rapidly as possible, was in battle array when the second morning dawned, and then, it was our turn to advance.[8]

In contrast to this recognition, was the generally acknowledged incompetence of Northern commanders at Shiloh, which was tersely described in the New York Daily Tribune as "mismanagement and criminal weakness."[9] Add to this editorial judgment the inescapable fact of Buell's delay before the battle due to the destruction of the Duck River Bridge, which prompted the accusation that, although Buell had indeed saved Grant, Grant would not have needed so much saving had not Buell displayed a "delatoriness" [sic] that "nearly inflicted disaster at Pittsburg Landing."[10] Buell's helpfulness to Grant was also considerably diminished by the dolorous mood that possessed even the victor following such a bloody end result as Shiloh. It was a mood that, as the Cincinnati Enquirer correctly stated, found the "feeling of rejoicing over victory . . . painfully mingled with the sadness of so extensive a national bereavement."[11]

After Shiloh, Buell's Army, along with the armies of the Tennessee and Mississippi, moved forward under General Henry W. Halleck and captured the Confederate stronghold at Corinth, Mississippi. This movement showed that lessons learned at Shiloh had been learned too well. The failure to take precautionary steps, which had led to the problems at Shiloh, persuaded Halleck to make a series of carefully entrenched movements in which the Union forces moved only twenty-five miles in thirty days. And in moving too far in the direction of caution Halleck's strategy produced only the facade of victory. The strategic situation remained basically the same as after Shiloh. The North scored a victory, but again it proved to be dubious; although it resulted in the capture of Corinth without a fight, it was also without an enemy army, for, almost as if tired of waiting, the rebels had slipped away.

This movement placed Buell in a position that was similar to that he had occupied after Bowling Green and Nashville, with much the same public response. Corinth was an extremely important strategic position that commanded communications to Memphis, the Gulf, and the seaboard states; but its capture caused dismay among Northerners, who watched an entire Confederate army march away without loss. And Buell, although not alone, was again associated with mediocre achievement. Northern newspapers again made harsh, chiding criticisms of Union generals who displayed in their sluggishness a consistent uncertainty as to whether "to attack or be attacked," and whose achievement allowed the enemy "quietly and at leisure to transfer themselves elsewhere" only to "fall upon our lines with superior force in the future."[12]

The second half of Buell's final year as a major participant in the Civil War was little different from the first. His campaigns still seemed indecisive. From Corinth he moved on his own to capture Chattanooga, but the movement resulted in nothing substantial. It only proved again an already proven common-sense theory, most obviously reflected in Napoleon's fatal march from Moscow in 1812, that a march through unfriendly territory without adequate means of supply could never be successful. Buell had insufficient cavalry and more than three hundred miles of supply lines in generally hostile countryside to protect against such foes as John Hunt Morgan and Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Aside from these "natural" problems, Buell was also burdened by more than his share of incompetent subordinates. His small cavalry force was destroyed in the Battle of Hartsville on August 20, 1862, after he had specifically warned its commander, General R. W. Johnson, of the need to consider reinforcements and support before moving to meet the enemy.[13] There were also officers like Colonel Rodney Mason who at Clarksville unhesitantly surrendered 175 to 200 well-entrenched men to a rebel force that was not much larger, and in the process gave up desperately needed supplies which "were accumulating at that point to a considerable amount."[14] So serious was this offense that four days later Colonel Mason was "by order of the President of the United States, cashiered for repeated acts of cowardice in the face of the enemy."[15] Another incompetent officer lost an extremely important position at Gallatin, Tennessee, on the major supply line to Louisville, when he failed to build ordered stockades and set out adequate pickets. The result was the destruction of a valuable tunnel and several bridges.[16] Facing such problems, Buell, not surprisingly, failed. His failure was not very great, but certainly little praise was in order. The problems that engulfed Buell caused him to seem uncommonly slow, a fact that struck a negative note in the North. "His campaign in Alabama is so much wasted time, utterly wasted,"[17] stated one newspaper, while another remarked that "an army that simply holds its ground in an enemy's country is on the high road to speedy dilapidation."[18] But slowness and delay were not any real disaster, and although it took two months of repairing bridges and roads, and frequent resort to half rations, Buell still managed to arrive before Chattanooga. Unfortunately, an unexpected event, which was to lead him into his last campaign, prevented him from capturing this coveted objective, forcing him once again to give the public an impression of indecisive success.

Arriving before Chattanooga, Buell found that the Confederate force led by Braxton Bragg had decided to invade Union-occupied middle Tennessee. Buell's answer to this rebel invasion was a series of inconclusive counter moves that resulted in accomplishing primary objectives that proved to be of secondary importance. Bragg's invasion of Tennessee, and eventually his turn north into southern Kentucky, caused Buell to move to protect Nashville, Bowling Green, and Louisville, all of which were important points. But Buell's moves, although important, did not resolve the major problem: Bragg's army. Buell mistook his immediate objectives, which became clearly evident when Bragg was allowed to capture Munfordsville and its garrison of four thousand Union troops, while Buell was on the watchful defensive at Nashville.

After arriving at Louisville, and receiving reinforcements and supplies, Buell finally moved against Bragg and met him in the Battle of Perryville on October 8, 1862. It was a battle that proved to be even more inconclusive than most during a war in which the victor usually suffered equal or greater casualties than the vanquished.[19] Perryville also offered its own inconclusiveness, due to an oddity of weather and geography that enabled only one third of the victorious Union forces to participate against almost the entire rebel army.[20] It was a special inconclusiveness that once again dimmed the glory of Don Carlos Buell. The enemy had retreated; the threat to Kentucky was repulsed; but the battle was not much of a victory. As Horace Greeley sarcastically observed in the New York Tribune,

> Bragg starts on his backward march, and, in order to make things easy, falls with nearly his whole force on a portion of Buell's near Perryville, and handles it pretty roughly. Of course, he retreats when our reinforcements come up, and our folks raise a shout of victory. Where are its trophies? What arms, baggage, prisoners have we taken?[21]

After Perryville, Buell followed Bragg's retreating army and, consistent with his indecisiveness, ended both his uninspiring campaign and his Civil War career at one stroke by failing to engage or seriously hurt the Confederate force; instead, he simply nudged it back from whence it came. It was a last act that proved hard to understand even for the pro-Buell Chicago Daily Tribune, which, trying to establish a positive tone, instead seemed to provide an unconvincing epitaph: "Bragg came here with the intention of permanently occupying Kentucky and capturing Louisville and Cincinnati. Buell has defeated him in his cherished plans. The defeat is Bragg's not Buell's."[22] Put in academic terms, Don Carlos Buell's performance ranged from B minus to C plus.

The partial successes which marked Buell's career also typified such Union generals as McClellan, Meade, and Rosecrans, who had their Perryvilles on the Peninsula, at Gettysburg, Iuka, and Stone's River. The explanation for the inconsequential achievements of Buell and this group of generals was found in surrounding circumstances such as Buell's misadventures with weather (rivers, mud, desolated areas for supply) and his indirect and direct involvement with fellow officers. Yet such circumstances are not enough to explain the ineffectiveness of these conservative generals. It is also a question of attitude. The reason for the hollowness of Buell's victory at Bowling Green and Nashville was not only that Grant's victories at Forts Henry and Donelson removed the rebel obstacle (Albert Sidney Johnston's army), but also that Buell hesitated when first asked to move against Bowling Green simultaneously with Grant's movement. This pause betrayed the attitude that war must be a sure thing. Buell conjectured to his superior that Bowling Green was "strongly fortified behind a river, by obstructions on the roads [and] . . . by the condition of the roads themselves."[23] Such doubts caused one of his subordinate officers to exclaim in frustration, "it rains a little, then snows a little, then freezes a little, then thaws a great deal, and finally everything on the surface of the ground seems liquid earth. All of this from being compelled to remain in the same spot."[24]

In the next movement, to Nashville, Buell's doubts extended to logistics. Authorities in Washington kept reminding Buell of the need for speed:

> If I can send you motive power and cars to Bowling Green by way of Green River, can you not at once advance on Nashville in force without waiting for repairs of road? Time is now everything . . . Leave tents and all baggage. If you can occupy Nashville at once it will end the war in Tennessee. . . .
>
> The advance on Nashville is the greatest importance. If you can make it by the line of the Cumberland more rapidly than by Bowling Green at once change your line of operations.[25]

Buell consistently showed a preference for everything but the enemy and Nashville as he thought of methods to gain supplies:

> I hope to facilitate our progress materially by throwing boats above the broken lock while the river is up, which by transhipment will enable us to get many of our supplies that way, and give us that as well as the railroad. Boats will start up today.[26]

The strong relationship between attitude and result extends throughout other phases of Buell's campaigns. His decision to build a permanent frame bridge across the Duck River was a major factor in his tardy arrival at Shiloh.[27] His prerequisite consideration of honor and the well-being of loyal citizens on his march to Chattanooga, when added to his numerous other troubles, created the delay that allowed Bragg to reach the coveted city and secure it before him.[28] And in the march to Corinth, Buell again displayed an attitude proportionate to the final result by his failure to keep up with the more aggressively led, faster moving armies of Sherman and Pope. This attitude may be observed in the telegrams sent between Halleck, Pope, Sherman, and Buell concerning a planned simultaneous movement to Seven Mile Creek during the advance on Corinth. Buell, on the Union center, sought perfect safety and was unconcerned with delay as he informed his commander that he could "advance whenever it suits you, though," he added, "perhaps better after tomorrow. . . . I will have further examination made of the ground beyond by scouts." The need for "further examination" produced a somewhat forlorn reaction from Pope on the left wing. "General Buell," he complained,

> was unwilling to move this morning until he examined the ground he was to occupy, and I have been out with him ever since this morning. Is it not too late to reach and occupy properly the designated positions before dark? . . .
>
> . . . I trust I need not say that I am always ready to move, and only delayed this morning because I understood yesterday that my movement depended on General Buell."

For Sherman's army, which had moved forward on the right as planned and engaged the enemy, Buell's timidity meant, as Halleck stated in a telegram reprimanding Buell, embarrassing withdrawal: "Your not moving this morning, as agreed upon, has caused great embarrassment. General Thomas reports, that his left has no support from you, and I have been obliged to draw back General Sherman on the right." Beyond this disconcerting need for retreat were the lives sacrificed due to Buell's delay, a consideration that certainly did not escape Sherman, who complained that the affair "cost us some pretty hard fighting and some lives and will cost more the next time."[29]

In order to understand Buell's attitudes one must understand the philosophy of war which he and other generals supported. This involves recognition that the science-and-rules commanders shared a common temperament which formed the basis of their common military philosophy--a philosophy which, because it was not fully developed, helped to create the Union command problem.

The common temperament of the Buell-McClellan generals is characterized by their intellectually disciplined, methodical, scientific manner of thinking. Such men had a strong preference for and understanding of organization. This common temperament is easily observed by comparing the West Point experience of some of the notable members of this group, Halleck, Buell, McClellan, Meade, and Rosecrans, with three of their future opposites in Union command, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan.

West Point in the 1840's was a world that, as Stephen B. Ambrose states, "was designed to stifle all imagination," and that, according to Senator John Sherman, produced impractical graduates, who were only fitted "to discipline, to mold, to form lines and squares, to go through the ordinary discipline and routine of a camp."[30] It was ideal for men with systematic ways of thought. Buell, for example, was remembered as "studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him."[31] Meade, who before West Point had attended the West Point-structured American Classical and Military Lyceum, was "naturally studious and found no difficulty in maintaining his studies."[32] Halleck and McClellan graduated high in their classes, both in scholarly achievement and conduct. And the speculation by students concerning Rosecrans was that he was "good at everything, his studies, his military duties, his deportment"; he was classified as the "brilliant Rosy Rosecrans."[33] In contrast, West Point was anything but agreeable for the North's three most prominent Civil War generals, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. Grant later recalled his cadet days and admitted "I did not take hold of my studies with avidity, in fact I rarely ever read over a lesson the second time during my entire cadetship."[34] Sherman frankly stated that he "was not considered a good soldier, I was not a Sunday school cadet."[35] And Philip Sheridan had anything but an easy time at West Point, graduating thirty-fourth in a class of fifty-three, and being continually threatened with dismissal for his conduct: "In every one of his cadet years Sheridan came close to being expelled for demerits, most of them collected for fighting. . . . At graduation he was within five demerits of expulsion."[36]

After West Point, Buell, McClellan, Meade, Halleck, and Rosecrans branched out into careers that favored their common inclination towards discipline, rules, science, and organization. Meade surveyed river basins and railroad routes as an engineer in the Topographical Corps of the Army.[37] McClellan was first an instructor at West Point, later an American observer in the Crimean War, and still later an engineer and then vice-president of the Illinois Central Railroad.[38] Buell was an assistant to the Adjutant General for thirteen years.[39] Halleck was briefly an instructor at West Point, a recognized authority in military science, an author of a book on tactics, Secretary of State to the Military Governor of California, and a highly successful lawyer, belonging to a firm that was "one of the most respected and wealthy in California."[40] William Rosecrans was a professor of engineering at West Point, worked ten years in the Army Corps of Engineers, and, after becoming a civilian, organized the Preston Coal Oil Company in Cincinnati, and became a successful pioneer in the refining of petroleum.[41] In contrast, Sherman, Grant, and Sheridan lived a less elite existence. All three were officers in the infantry, which was the last choice of service for most cadets. Grant eventually resigned the service to become a second-rate farmer and storekeeper.[42] Sherman, after the army, wandered from job to job, being at various times an investor, banker, farmer, and finally the commandant of a Louisiana military school just before the Civil War broke out.[43] After West Point Sheridan was sent to the far west, where his zeal for fighting was countered by isolation and hostile Indians.[44]

The first months of the Civil War placed a premium on the temperament associated with Buell, McClellan, and similarly oriented generals. Although the period was confusing to the rest of society, it was congenial to methodical minds. They were then at their best, for their success was not based on victorious clashes with the enemy but instead on administrative ability, the managerial thinking they knew so well. The enemy was truly a secondary problem until an army could be raised and organized.

Buell's early days as commander of the Army of the Ohio offers an example of this sort of success during the early stage of the war. When he accepted this command in November, 1861, the North was still in turmoil. The Lincoln Administration was in a whirlwind of confusion; Secretary of War Simon Cameron was wringing his hands over deficiencies in supply and military leadership (not necessarily in number, but increasingly in poor quality); and as head of the Treasury Department, Salmon P. Chase was equally in the dark, "operating with untested assistants to meet uncertain demands from uncertain resources."[45]

But administrative confusion was not the only sign of Northern inexperience in this early stage of the war, for most people did not comprehend the realities of warfare itself. It is true that Bull Run dissolved much of the romanticism that was associated with war; it was then recognized as more than cheering crowds, new uniforms, and exciting charges in which the enemy quickly turned and ran. But the North still had not experienced extensive casualties. A tinge of romantic illusion still survived, reflected in sham battles, graphic newspaper descriptions, and bombastic battle reports that people actually believed--the most obvious being McClellan's Rich Mountain Proclamation, which earned him the position of Commanding General of the Northern Armies.[46]

Buell, with his systematic temperament, was at ease in this naive and disorganized world of the North. He quickly provided the organizational talent that was so desperately needed, and at the same time he correctly turned away from the small, sporadic threats offered by an equally disorganized enemy. This adaptability was specifically illustrated by the strong contrast he offered to generals around him and to his predecessors. Arriving in the west in 1861, Buell was immediately faced with administrative problems such as a lack of supplies, undisciplined officers and men, the political influence of governors, and the like, that had plagued Fremont in Missouri and Sherman in Kentucky before him. They were problems that at times seemed ready to claim another victim in Buell's next door neighbor in Missouri, Halleck, who in his first days of command wrote in a despairing note to Lincoln that he was "in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a bridge with a dull axe, a broken saw, and rotten timber."[47] Buell quickly took hold under such chaotic conditions. His first orders established a long list of rules that centralized authority under his command:

> . . . return of troops were to be made on the 10th and 20th of each month; no women were to be allowed in camp; all official correspondence was to pass through proper channels (intermediate commanders to chief of staff), all volunteer officers were to be examined before a military board in order to determine their qualification to command; officers were to report by letter to headquarters, stating the duty they were engaged, and by whose orders. . . .[48]

Along with his authority, Buell also displayed a noticeable confidence in dealing with the specific problems of building a new army and department. While his neighbor Halleck was complaining about mutinous German troops[49] Buell, with a similar problem, wrote with quiet assurance that "this condition of things, I feel assured, is changing. I have found it necessary to make some summary examples, and have instituted courts-martial and board of examination. . . . "[50]

The great demand placed on the insufficient supply of regular officers meant steady complaints from local commanders. Halleck, echoing Sherman, claimed that "some of the brigadier-generals assigned to this department are entirely ignorant of their duties and unfit for any command."[51] Buell offered authorities in Washington a plan; it was an obvious plan, calling for authorization to "appoint, subject to confirmation," officers under his command, "dropping those who do not turn out well."[52] In short, instead of complaining, Buell proposed to rotate officers under his personal observance continually until positions were filled by competent men.

The overbearing influence of state governors was another common problem that commanders had to face in the early days of the war. In one of his first letters to McClellan in Washington, Buell wrote that "the Governor [David Tod of Ohio] evidently looks upon all Ohio troops as his army. He requires, I am told, morning reports from them, and their quartermasters to forward their returns to him." In the same letter he reported that an Ohio regiment had "been diverted by our officious Governor to Galipolis, where its colonel is telegraphing mysteriously to unauthorized persons for cavalry for his 'expedition to J.'" This problem, as others, Buell simply took in stride. "I stop these things when they come to my knowledge," he wrote, "and after awhile will be able to correct them entirely."[53]

But confidence and ability in administration and organization were not the only attributes that Buell displayed in the early months of the war. He also possessed an uncommonly cool attitude toward and accurate estimate of the enemy. Unlike Sherman, his predecessor, Buell never considered the enemy a major threat, but only the insignificant hinderance that he actually was.[54] An attack by Confederates near Bacon Creek, Kentucky, brought forth the somewhat indifferent response that "we are beginning to be a little animated. The other night a party of the enemy came within some 10 miles of us and burned a small bridge over Bacon Creek, which will be repaired in three or four days."[55] One week later, an attack on the Union force at Munfordsville (8 Union, 33 Confederate killed), produced the flippant remark that the affair was " . . . really one of the handsomest things of the season. Our neighbors in part begin to show signs of being interested. They are destroying the railroads and receiving some reinforcements; not, I think, to any great amount yet."[56] The various skirmishes common in this early stage of the war were treated with a contemptuous air. Buell even welcomed them: "We are now 'lying around somewhat loose,' and I shall not care much if some of our fragments have to look sharply after themselves."[57] Major concentrations of the enemy also did not bother Buell. Although Sherman had found Buckner's and Johnston's force at Bowling Green an unbearable nightmare,[58] Buell complacently remarked that:

> I do not place high estimate on Buckner's force at Bowling Green, and have no such thought as that he will attempt to advance. His position is purely defensive, and he will be quite content if he can maintain that. . . . As for his attacking, though I do not intend to be unprepared for him, yet I should almost as soon see the Army of the Potomac marching up the road.[59]

The ability to discern enemy intentions was not due to any natural genius that allowed Buell to stand back and see what others could not. Instead, it was directly related to his scientific ability, interest, and temperament, combined with the need for organization in his department. The enemy was only another inconvenience in Buell's concentration on organization and administration. Excessive interest in organization coupled with minimal interest in the enemy, which is the hallmark of this type of Union general, is exemplified in Buell's letter to General George B. McClellan explaining his concern over Confederate General Zollicoffer's invasion of Eastern Kentucky with six thousand men:

> I do not mean to be diverted more than is absolutely necessary from what I regard as of the first importance--the organization of my forces, now little better than a mob. I could fritter the whole of it away in a month by pursuing these roving bear bugs.[60]

The preparatory stage of the war was of course temporary. The administrative confusion that was at first a primary consideration became in time secondary, being overcome by a combination of Northern industriousness, a more experienced President, and the increased military threat posed by the South. With better organization, fighting the enemy became the major concern, for war entered a new, horrid phase, in which the occasional skirmish was replaced by devastating Shilohs. Armies were no longer scattered bands of inept and inexperienced men. They were now well trained and supplied, large and concentrated, and able to produce maximum slaughter.

But this change did not affect generals like Buell, for the perception of war that was appropriate in the preparatory stage, which emphasized organization and administration instead of fighting, developed into their permanent philosophy. In the minds of such commanders, war was a systemized science of rules that acted as a wall of defense against the increased power of the enemy, a creed which sharply contrasted with the flexibility that had been outlined in the writings of Jomini and Saxe.

This strict adherence to the creed of science and rules meant that there was a group of Union generals who tried to make war proper, orderly, and--most of all--safe. In doing so, they offered efficiency on one hand. Yet, on the other hand, they failed to understand the art and risk of war and were temperamentally unable to deal with or accept the unpredictable intangibles of war.

This lopsided combination of efficiency (science) without risk created the image of indecisive mediocrity in these generals which the North knew so well, and which represented half of the Union command problem represented in the Buell Commission. An efficiently waged war meant a calculated war, a slow war, and a bloodless war, in which every move was pondered, and consideration was given primarily to logistics, administration, and contingencies that left little to chance. But scientific efficiency alone was not enough, for the risk, the unpredictability, and the natural art of war always remained. Clausewitz referred to these latter items as "war proper":

> Who would include in the conduct of war proper the whole catalogue of things like subsistance and administration? These things, it is true, stand in a constant reciprocal relation to the use of troops, but they are something essentially different from it. We have, therefore, the right to exclude them as well as other preparatory activities from the art of war in its restricted sense--from the conduct of war properly so called.[61]

Generals like Buell simply did not have a proper appreciation of "war proper." When it was necessary to face risk, such Union generals did not seek ways to meet the unpredictability of combat but instead sought means to avoid the risk of war. Science became an end in itself, a permanent line of defense against combat and bloody war and an illusion that war could be made scientifically safe. In short, while Jomini and Saxe used science and flexibility to move toward the enemy more efficiently and to engage in combat ("war proper"), this group of Union generals, when faced with inevitable combat and risk, used their standards of efficiency as excuses for not fighting. This transformation largely explains why such a commander was never able to gain great success. During the Second Battle of Manassas, for example, efficient attentiveness to detail and administration became George B. McClellan's justification for not moving troops (incurring risk) until "properly" supplied. While Union authorities were realistically concerned about forthcoming disaster for John Pope and his army, McClellan refused to send aid, claiming the two corps ordered to be sent were not completely equipped: "Franklin's artillery has no horses except for four guns with caissons. I can pick up no cavalry." Even Halleck sent an urgent telegram to forget details and move toward Manassas, pointing out that the needed troops "must go tomorrow morning ready or not. If we delay too long there will be no necessity to go at all." But this failed to convince the administrative McClellan, who never did send troops in time, and who had to ask in response, "do you wish Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation."[62]

Meade offered a similar example of this administrative inclination immediately after Gettysburg. Instead of moving rapidly to pursue the defeated Confederate forces south before they crossed the Potomac, he became bogged down with supply problems that could have been overlooked in the urgency of the moment:

> A large portion of the men are barefooted. Shoes will arrive at Frederick to-day, and will be issued as soon as possible. The spirit of the army is high; the men are ready and willing to make every exertion to push forward. The very first moment I can get the different commands, the artillery and cavalry, properly supplied and in hand, I will move forward."[63]

The desire of such generals to avoid bloodshed was highly commendable, but it often led to a world of conjecture that meant premeditated defeatism and immobility. Meade's actions after Gettysburg are some of the best examples of this particular imaginative world, for in his dilatory pursuit of the defeated Lee he reflects the gamut of this conjecture and defeatism. Two days after Gettysburg Meade was already thinking of his possible defeat, but was still seriously considering battle:

> If I can get the Army of the Potomac in hand in the Valley, and the enemy have not crossed the river, I shall give him battle, trusting, should misfortune overtake me, that a sufficient number of my force, in connection with what you have in Washington, would reach that place so as to render it secure.[64]

Two days closer to the enemy his defeatism was more pronounced and his willingness to consider battle diminished in proportion. "I expect to find the enemy in a small position," he wrote, "well covered with artillery, and I do not wish to imitate his example at Gettysburg, and assault a position where the chances were so greatly against success."[65] Four days later, and eight days after Gettysburg, he was still considering an attack on Lee, but was desperately looking for an excuse not to. "It is my intention to attack them to-morrow," he informed his generals, "unless something intervenes to prevent it, for the reason that delay will strengthen the enemy and will not increase my force."[66] But Meade did not attack and Lee escaped south across the Potomac. The excuse had been found the next day in the opinions of his corps commanders.[67] Five weeks after Gettysburg, Meade ended further pursuit. The reason, given in a statement to Lincoln, betrayed a defeated commander who was not really defeated, for it was his attitude and not the fortunes of battle that slowed him down and now stopped him completely:

> I do not deem it necessary to discuss the contingencies of a failure, as they will, of course, present themselves to your mind. The whole question, however, in my judgment, hangs upon the advantages to be gained and the course to be pursued in the event of success. . . . In fine, I can get a battle out of Lee under very disadvantageous circumstances, which may render his inferior force my superior, and which is not likely to result in any very decided advantage, even in case I should be victorious.
>
> In this view I am reluctant to run the risks involved without the positive sanction of the Government.[68]

On other occasions the science-and-rules oriented Union generals were perfectly willing to move toward the enemy, but only if risk could be eliminated by ideal conditions and an absolute assurance of success. This unreal attitude is reflected in McClellan's explanation for his refusal to attack Lee the day after Antietam, thus allowing Lee to slip quietly across the Potomac. "I should have had a narrow view of the condition of the country," he explained, "had I been willing to hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success."[69] The same attitude was found during the Peninsular Campaign in McClellan's statement to his wife that Yorktown would be attacked, but slowly, after the possibility of failure was eliminated: "I can't tell you when Yorktown is to be attacked. . . . It shall be attacked the first moment I can do it successfully. But I don't intend to hurry it; I cannot afford to fail."[70] This sort of timid hesitation is perhaps best underlined by Rosecrans as he explained his long sojourn in Nashville, an explanation that argued for perfect safety in war:

> Any attempt to advance sooner would have increased our difficulty both in front and rear. In front, because of greater obstacles,

> enemies in greater force, and fighting with better chances of escaping pursuit, if overthrown in battle. In rear, because of insufficiency and uncertainty of supplies, both of subsistance and ammunition, and no security of any kind to fall back upon in case of disaster.[71]

Such an attitude also caused the besieged Rosecrans to refuse to do anything against Bragg at Chattanooga, even though he developed a good plan of operation that surprised Grant only because it was not carried out.[72]

The common distaste for risk which these generals illustrated also meant that they would be more likely than other generals to follow a conciliatory policy toward enemy civilians under their control. War could be kept clean by keeping civilians out, and if one did not antagonize civilians one would also be protecting one's army from the wrath of the rebel countryside. The conciliatory policy, however, was not always practical. Thus Meade was upset by the need to dirty war by taking rebel property: "It made me sad to do such injury, and I was really ashamed of our cause, which thus required war to be made on individuals."[73] In a parallel incident, during his march to Chattanooga Buell was concerned about payment to the rebel citizenry for the little inconveniences expected in war: "There are cases where fences have been used as fuel, and fields destroyed by grazing animals."[74] Elsewhere he even ordered his subordinates to have estimates made "of the amount of damage done to the property of the persons on whose plantations your camps are established, and that you have payment made for all the property, such as wood, rails used for fuel, standing crops, from which our troops have derived benefit."[75] This tender consideration was expressed while he was marching through a naturally desolate countryside, infested with guerrilla forces recruited largely from the locality, and with an army that was in a very real position to "starve unless there is more activity and success in throwing forward supplies."[76] This was also a time in which Buell's own need of horses was desperate,[77] yet he was still reluctant to take them from rebel citizens. "In taking horses," he cautioned, "it must be done in such a way that orderly persons shall not be deprived of what may be necessary for their ordinary work."[78]

This distaste for risk also extended to politics, for the political pressures of the day upset this type of Union general's efficient, safe world. Almost as if facing enemy armies, these generals displayed a haughty contempt for the politician. Examples are plentiful: it becomes evident in Buell's refusal, in late February, 1862, to upset his plan to move towards Nashville instead of East Tennessee despite tremendous urging from Washington. "You have no idea of the pressure brought to bear here upon the Government for a forward movement," McClellan informed Buell. "It is so strong that it seems absolutely necessary to make the advance on Eastern Tennessee at once. . . . It is no time now to stand on trifles."[79] Buell even refused to listen to Lincoln's personal plea for movement into East Tennessee, although the President indicated his distress "that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now I fear are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. . . . I do not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely as intimated before, to show you the grounds of my anxiety."[80] Rosecrans' similar contempt for the politician is most readily found in his retort that he would not move until he was ready, when requested by Washington to move from his position at Stone's River in December of 1863.[81] However, the best example of distaste for politicians by a general who would not dare is McClellan's insubordinate telegram to Lincoln during the Peninsular Campaign, in which he told his Commander-in-Chief that "if I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."[82]

The rule-oriented general was thus half of the Union command problem, to be demonstrated more fully below in the microcosmic arena of the Buell Military Commission. He was a general who offered only a picture of indecisiveness because of a personal temperament that leaned towards organization and rules and failed to consider the balanced talents needed in a commander as reflected in the writings of Jomini and Saxe. He was a commander who was not able to reflect both the natural art and science of war while maintaining flexibility in both. He was a commander who could only consider a strict science of war. This meant that the Buells and McClellans would be efficient, organized, and well prepared for battle but nothing more, for this was all there was to war. "War proper," as Clausewitz expressed it, was distasteful and to be avoided. In the Buell Commission this philosophy is found in a setting that seems to make it a little clearer.

The Buell Commission also served as a stage for the other half of the Union command problem. If the defense represented the science-and-rules school of generalship, the prosecution represented the opposite world of art-and-risk as typified by the careers of generals Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Pope. The latter were generals who eventually enjoyed greater public confidence than rule-oriented leaders like Buell and McClellan. Like their counterparts, however, the art-and-risk generals were not complete, for in their own way they also reflected an imperfect understanding of war and of the ideas of men like Jomini and Saxe.

CHAPTER TWO FOOTNOTES

[1] This group of generals included Meade, McClellan, Buell, Halleck, and Rosecrans, although its membership extended throughout the Army. In this chapter Buell will typify this group, not only because he allows concentration on common aspects found in all, but also because it establishes a direct familiarity not only with his campaigns but with his manner of thinking that will serve as an introduction to his role in the Commission.

[2] T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: McMillian, 1952), p. 177.

[3] Ibid., p. 285.

[4] Saint Paul and Minneapolis Pioneer Press, 7 December 1884, p. 17.

[5] This victory celebration was described by the New York Daily Tribune as bells ringing, guns booming, people marching, bonfires roaring in "Auburn, Burlington, Providence, Greenport, Detroit, Albany, Troy, Philadelphia." February 18, 1862, p. 4.

[6] New York Daily Tribune, 22 February 1862, p. 4.

[7] New York Daily Tribune, 26 February 1862, p. 4.

[8] New York Daily Tribune, 10 April 1862, pp. 4, 8.

[9] New York Daily Tribune, 21 April 1862, p. 8.

[10] Cincinnati Enquirer, 2 August 1862.

[11] Cincinnati Enquirer, 10 April 1862.

[12] Cincinnati Gazette, 2 June 1862.

[13] The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (70 vols. in 128, Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. II, 388; hereinafter cited as O.R. Buell wrote to Halleck on August 22, 1862, two days after the Battle of Hartsville, that "I was apprehensive that his force [Johnson's] was insufficient to cope with the force he was likely to meet, and sent instructions to him to strengthen himself with artillery and infantry and keep more within support. I have no means of knowing how it happened that he did not do so."

[14] Report of R. Mason on the Clarksville surrender, August 27, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 863.

[15] General Order 115, August 22, 1862, ibid., p. 865.

[16] For reports of various officers concerning the capture of Gallatin, Tennessee, see ibid., pp. 843-57.

[17] Indianapolis Journal, 22 September 1862.

[18] New York Daily Tribune, 12 July 1862, p. 4.

[19] The Battle of Perryville cost the victorious Union forces 806 killed and the defeated enemy roughly 500 killed. O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 1108, 1112, 1033-1036.

[20] Buell offers a description of these phenomenal occurrences: "Not a musket-shot had been heard nor did the sound of artillery indicate anything like a battle. This was probably caused by the configuration of the ground, which broke the sound, and by the heavy wind, which it appears blew from the right to the left during the day." Report to Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, May, 1862, ibid., p. 51.

[21] New York Daily Tribune, 13 October 1862, p. 1.

[22] Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 October 1862, p. 4.

[23] Buell to McClellan, February 5, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 584.

[24] F. A. Mitchel, Ormsby Knight Mitchel (New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1887), p. 242.

[25] McClellan to Buell, February 16 and 21, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 626, 646.

[26] Buell to McClellan, February 16, 1862, ibid., p. 67.

[27] Don Carlos Buell, "Shiloh Reviewed," in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Buel, 4 vols. (New York: Century Co., 1887), Vol. 1: From Sumter to Shiloh, 491.

[28] Buell to Halleck, July 11, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. II, 122.

[29] O.R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, 189-198 (Buell p. 191), (Pope p. 196, 197-98), (Halleck p. 198), (Sherman p. 198).

[30] Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, & Country (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 184-85.

[31] Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, 2 vols. (New York: C. L. Webster & Co., 1885), 1:358.

[32] George Gordon Meade, Life & Letters of George Gordon Meade, 2 vols. (New York: Scribners & Sons, 1913), 1:1-10.

[33] William M. Lamers, The Edge of Glory: A Biography of General William Rosecrans (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1961), p. 15.

[34] Grant, Memoirs, 1:38. McClellan was second in his class, while Grant was twenty-first among thirty-nine.

[35] Quoted in Lloyd Lewis, Sherman Fighting Prophet (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), p. 56.

[36] Thomas J. Fleming, West Point: The Men and Times of the United States Military Academy (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1969), p. 137.

[37] Meade, Life, 1:15-25.

[38] George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1887), pp. 1-24.

[39] Report on the Career of Don Carlos Buell, June 12, 1894, "The Generals Papers," Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Appointment, Commission, and Personal Branch, File #2055ACP1886, Military Records Division, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[40] Stephen E. Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), pp. 2-8.

[41] Lamers, The Edge of Glory, pp. 15-20.

[42] Grant, Memoirs, 1:160-222.

[43] W. T. Sherman, Personal Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, 2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1891), 1:100-43.

[44] Philip H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of Philip H. Sheridan, 2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1888), 1:14-125.

[45] James G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 2d ed., rev., (Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1969), p. 353.

[46] Battles fought in this early period (Balls Bluff, Wilson Creek, and the like), were often only skirmishes in which relatively few were killed and uncommon emphasis was placed on equipment captured. A somewhat typical report was that of an engagement " . . . at Bowness twelve miles from Cheat River Bridge yesterday," in which "seven men, among them the lieutenant of the Company, were lost by the Confederates,

and, loss on our side N. O. Smith, Fifteenth Regiment, who was buried here today." New York Daily Tribune, 2 July 1861. Another example was a report by a Colonel Bramulette to General George H. Thomas, describing the result of a fight with fifty rebels near Columbia, Kentucky. This time Union soldiers got "one fine horse wounded in the hind leg, and some blankets." O.R. Ser. I, Vol. VII, 459. The graphic descriptions offered by newspapers of these early "battles" were comparable to the romantic world of the future dime novel, with the same ardent zeal for detail: "Colonel Johnson while riding at the head of his command, was pierced by nine balls and instantly killed. Three balls took effect in his head, two buckshot in the neck, one bullet in the left shoulder, one in the left thigh, and one in the right hand, and one in the left." Indianapolis Daily Journal, 24 September 1861. Added to this minute detail was an inclination to romanticize all action: "Rebel cavalrymen in making their dash displayed a careless volley from their shotguns; there was almost hand to hand conflict; the enemy unmasked their battery and opened fire, the first ball passed between the adjutant and major of the regiment, who occupied positions not many feet apart; the square remained unbroken." The final result was an enemy who "hit the dust" and "retired discomfited." Cincinnati Gazette, 21 December 1861. In his congratulatory speech to his troops after Rich Mountain McClellan stated: "You have annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, entrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns, twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thousand prisoners, including more than forty officers--You have killed more than two hundred and fifty of the enemy, who has lost all his baggage and camp equipage." George B. McClellan to the Army of Occupation, Western Virginia, July 16, 1861, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. II, 236. General Rosecrans and Captain Benham, the two principal officers controlling Union forces on Rich Mountain, had different figures. Rosecrans' calculations found 12 Union killed, roughly 135 Confederate dead, and 63 prisoners, in a battle that involved 1,192 Union troops and 800-1,200 of the enemy. Report of General Rosecrans to Major S. Williams Asst. Adjt. Gen., U.S. Army, Hdqrs. Army West Virginia, July 19, 1861, ibid, pp. 214-218. Benham listed 15-20 Confederate killed, two Union killed, and 50 prisoners on his part of the line. Report of Captain H. W. Benham to General T. A. Morris, Commanding U.S. Forces, July 13, 1861, ibid, pp. 222-23. There was no "annihilation," no "1000 prisoners."

[47] Halleck to Lincoln, January 6, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 532-33. Halleck was as capable an administrator as Buell, and belonged to the same methodical, systematic group of generals as the latter. His complaints in the first days of organizing his department, before he settled down to display his organizational ability, reflected a brief period of despair that offers an excellent contrast to Buell.

[48] Cincinnati Enquirer, 5 December 1862.

[49] Halleck to Lincoln, January 6, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 532-33. Halleck stated that "a large portion of the foreign troops organized by General Fremont are unreliable; indeed, many of them are already mutinous."

[50] Buell to Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., December 23, 1861, ibid., pp. 511-12.

[51] Halleck to Lincoln, January 6, 1862, ibid., pp. 532-533. Sherman had earlier made an identical remark: "They have not sent me a single regular officer from Washington, and so engrossed are they with Missouri [Fremont] that they don't do us justice. The more necessity for us to strain every nerve." Sherman to subordinate Colonel Jackson, October 8, 1861, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 298.

[52] Buell to McClellan, December 8, 1861, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 482.

[53] Buell to McClellan, November 22, 1861, ibid., p. 443; December 8, 1861, ibid., p. 482.

[54] Sherman followed a then-common practice on both sides of fighting a war that was largely found in his own mind, a war that consisted of unrealistic, exaggerated probabilities based on administrative problems. On both sides this exaggeration usually took the form of fear of attack by what was always believed to be a better equipped, more numerous army. A typical example is found in Sherman's November 12, 1861, letter to General George H. Thomas: "I am convinced from many facts that A. Sidney Johnston is making herculean efforts to strike a great blow in Kentucky; that he designs to move from Bowling Green on Lexington, Louisville, and Cincinnati . . . his force is not far short of forty-five thousand men, with a large portion of artillery." O.R., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 353. Four days before Sherman's letter, Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding at Bowling Green, had written Judah Benjamin, the Secretary of War for the Confederacy, complaining that Sherman had twenty thousand troops, and that his own troops were considerably diminished by sickness (measles). Ibid., p. 528. Johnston's forces around Bowling Green were roughly 15-20,000 on November 8, 1861. An October 19, 1861 report showed 10,000. Ibid., p. 349.

[55] Buell to McClellan, December 8, 1861, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 483.

[56] Buell to McClellan, December 23, 1861, ibid., p. 511.

[57] Buell to McClellan, November 27, 1861, ibid., p. 451.

[58] In one of his last letters to Lorenzo Thomas before being relieved, Sherman referred to Bowling Green. "Do not conclude, as before, that I exaggerate the facts. They are as stated, and the future looks as dark as possible. It would be better if some more sanguine mind were here, for I am forced to order according to my convictions." Sherman to Adjutant-General L. Thomas, November 6, 1861, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 341.

[59] Buell to McClellan, November 22, 27, 1861, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 444, 450. Buell's attitude, although correct, was still braggart. His forces were larger in the vicinity of Bowling Green and Louisville

than Johnston's (40-50,000 versus 30,799). But as Buell fully admitted, Johnston could easily be reinforced with Zollicoffer's 6000 troops in East Tennessee and Polk's 12,000 at Columbia. The aggregate total in December, 1861, saw Buell with 70,000 versus Johnston's 60,000. Both are rough estimates but accurate proportionally. Ibid., pp. 824, 813, 511.

[60] Buell to McClellan, December 8, 1861, ibid., p. 483.

[61] Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. O. J. Matthizis Jolles (Washington D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1950), p. 63.

[62] U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, S. Doc. 108, pt. 1, 37th Cong., 3rd sess., 1862, pp. 32-34. Halleck later learned that Franklin's supply problem was exaggerated by McClellan: "Moreover I learned last night that the Quartermaster's Department could have given him (Franklin) plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria." Ibid., p. 35.

[63] Meade to Halleck, July 8, 1863, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. I, 84.

[64] Meade to Halleck, July 6, 1863, ibid., p. 80.

[65] Meade to Halleck, July 8, 1863, ibid., p. 84.

[66] Meade to Halleck, July 12, 1863, ibid., p. 91. Meade had 89,000 troops (September 1863), versus Lee's 57,251 (October 1863). O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. II, 239, 811.

[67] "In my dispatch of yesterday I stated that it was my intention to attack the enemy today, unless something intervened to prevent it. Upon calling my corps commanders together and submitting the question to them, five out of six were unqualifiedly opposed to it. Under these circumstances, in view of the momentous consequences attendant upon a failure to succeed, I did not feel myself authorized to attack until after I had made more careful examination of the enemy's position, strength, and defensive works." Meade to Halleck, July 13, 1863, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. I, 91.

[68] Meade to Halleck, September 18, 1863, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. II, 201-202.

[69] George McClellan to Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas, August 4, 1863, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XIX, Pt. I, 65.

[70] McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, p. 312.

[71] Rosecrans to Halleck, December 4, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XX, Pt. II, 118.

[72] Grant, Memoirs, 2:28.

[73] Meade, Life and Letters, 1:234.

[74] Buell to General Rousseau, July 15, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. II, 156.

[75] Buell to General Crittenden, June 23, 1862, ibid., p. 53.

[76] James B. Fry, Buell's Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, to Colonel Swords, Quartermaster at Louisville, July 15, 1862, ibid., p. 155.

[77] Buell's shortage of horses is revealed in a letter to Colonel Swords, his quartermaster in the Louisville-Nashville area: "How many horses have you at Louisville, how many at Nashville, and how fast are you sending them? They are wanted in all directions." Buell to Colonel Swords, August 7, 1862, ibid., p. 283.

[78] Buell to General George H. Thomas, August 8, 1862, ibid., p. 290.

[79] McClellan to Buell, January 13, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 547.

[80] Lincoln to Buell, January 6, 1862, ibid., pp. 927-28.

[81] Quoted in T. Harry Williams, "The Military Leadership of North and South," in Why the North Won the Civil War, ed. David Donald (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1960; reprint ed., New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 45.

[82] McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, p. 425.

CHAPTER III

THE GRANTS AND THE SHERMANS:
THE ART AND RISK OF WARFARE

For the people of the North, the archetypal Grant-Sherman general represented the replacement of the mediocre Buell-McClellan generals who had been prominent in the first half of the war. More specifically, they were a sign of the times, representing the North's conversion to a philosophy of total war by late 1862 and early 1863. This national conversion became apparent in Union command as John Pope,[1] Grant, and Halleck,[2] the successful generals of 1862, were placed in control of Union armies. Such changes gradually included Sherman, Sheridan, and others of the type.

Evolution of civilian ideas about total war represented the preliminary change that eventually led to the promotion of these generals. In Lincoln, the evolution to a philosophy of total war may be seen in the difference between his earlier conservative attitude toward slavery ("I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so"),[3] and the new attitude that Lincoln showed in late September 1862, after Antietam, Perryville, and the Peninsular and Chattanooga campaigns. The slave, as he then told Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, had become "a military necessity absolutely essential for the salvation of the Union,"[4] a necessity that would make emancipation inevitable.

To Edwin Stanton, the new Secretary of War in 1862, total war meant going beyond the old Buell-McClellan cautious need for science and rules. Instead, he explained, war was to be vigorous, less traditional, and dependent upon such intrinsic qualities as fortitude, courage, and spirit:

> Much has recently been said about military combinations and organizing victory. I hear such phrases with apprehension. . . . Who can organize victory? Who can combine the elements of success on the battlefields? We owe our victories to the spirit of the Lord, that moved our soldiers to rush into battle, and filled the hearts of our enemy with terror and dismay. Patriotic spirit, with resolute courage in officers and men, is a military combination that never failed. We may well rejoice at the recent victories for they teach us that battles are to be won now and by us in the same and only manner that they were ever won by any people or in any age since the days of Joshua, by boldly pursuing and striking the foe. What, under the blessing of providence I conceive to be the true organization of victory and military combination to end this war was declared in a few words by General Grant' message to General Buckner "I propose to move immediately upon your works."[5]

In Congress, the idea of total war served as a stimulant for colorful radicals such as Zachariah Chandler, who had earlier defied the Washington Peace Conference of 1861 by asserting that "without a little bloodletting this Union would not be worth a rush."[6] Commenting on the slowness of the Union Army in the Fall of 1861, he also wrote that "if we fail in getting a battle here now all is lost, and up to this time a fight is scarcely contemplated. Washington is safe . . . therefore let the country go to the devil."[7] This ideological tonic also applied to such frustrated moderates as John A. Gurley, who stated before the House on January 29, 1862:

> What means this long delay in attacking the rebellious forces? Sir, our army has long been anxious to fight, our soldiers burn with desire to strike at the traitors, our subordinate officers

> are chafing and panting for the battlefield. Why not fight? What lion is this that stands in the way? Far better is it to meet with occasional reverses and defeats than to remain in the inglorious and passive condition of the past. . . . The War has reached a point where kid gloves, pleasant words and gilded promises are of no further use.[8]

Total war, such as that allegedly waged by Grant at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, and by the victorious John Pope at New Madrid and Island No. 10, fit in well with the new outlook towards war in Congress. The new viewpoint seemed to be gaining adherents about the time of Thaddeus Steven's famous outburst against the South: "If their whole country must be laid waste, and made a desert, in order to save this Union from destruction, so let it be . . . I do not say it is time to resort to such means; but I never fear to express my sentiments."[9] For the time being this sentiment seemed to culminate in the Second Confiscation Act, an act that signified an attempt, as Senator Diven pointed out, to go beyond war's own laws by fighting the enemy with civil enactment.[10]

For many common citizens of the North this transition to total war meant hardened resolution towards war. One example may be found in the words of one Henry Aten, relating to a trip he made with his friends in 1862 for the purpose of enlisting in the army:

> They had met men returning from the great battles of the previous year, wounded and maimed for life. The pride and pomp and circumstance of glorious war had disappeared, and all knew that war meant not only wounds and death, but hunger, hardship and privation. The people fully appreciated the gravity of the situation.[11]

On a more general level, this same personal resolve produced a widespread response to Lincoln's call for volunteers in the Fall of 1862, a call that established a new enthusiasm towards the war and that was more credible than the sunshine patriotism of early recruitment. Illinois contributed 58,689 volunteers at this call, second only to New York, a feat that was noted by the Provost Marshal at the end of the war as the greatest single example of volunteering during the conflict.[12] The summons also brought a "well done Indiana" from Stanton to the Hoosier State; the Indianapolis Journal underlined the impressive fact that "4,000 men have been organized and sent to the field in four days."[13] This recruiting surge was not only found in Illinois and Indiana, for the Middle West contributed two-fifths of the 509,053 men enlisted under the call.[14]

This new total war philosophy in the North; the harsher policies of Lincoln and Congress; the hardened outlook and determination recognizable in the common citizen; and the bold, spirited warfare introduced by Stanton, were all part of a new way of looking at war that also expressed a need for another type of general, a need that men like Grant, Sherman, and the temporarily successful John Pope, could fill:

> A new man has risen on the Potomac, and he was waging war, not scientific starchy, gilded war, but enterprising dashing, fearful war--he did not stop to dig and build fortifications but pushed ahead. Pope is always ready for a fight. If the enemy prove too strong for him he will give and fall back, and if there is an opening for him ahead, he will pop into it.[15]

On the field of battle, however, these new generals created conflicting impressions. On one hand they were the type of general expected by Northern society, for they did not share the lack of imagination of their predecessors. On the other hand, their concept of war still left much to be desired, if the ideal commander specified by Jomini and Saxe had any validity. These commanders had their flaws, and among them was a lack of balance between the art and science of war. In that sense Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan were incomplete generals, despite their famous victories.

The shortcomings of this type of general were not immediately apparent in comparison to the Buell or McClellan counterpart he replaced. First, unlike this counterpart, he achieved important results--as Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and the Wilderness campaigns testify--that were beyond the administrative talents of Buell, Rosecrans, or McClellan.

The different results were based on a temperament and a philosophy of total war that was more spontaneous and innovative than that of the well-trained science-and-rules oriented generals. As briefly reflected by Grant's and Sherman's West Point recollections, these new generals were not intellectuals or textbook professionals such as Buell or McClellan. Instead, generals like Grant and Sherman displayed an attitude towards war that was remarkably simple and uncomplicated. They accepted war as it really was, as it appeared on a day-by-day basis, instead of following a maze of rules for a perfect, safe, proper conflict. Unlike Buell, this new general understood and accepted the element of risk inherent in war, the part Clausewitz stated was action which "must be directed, to a certain extent, in a mere twilight, which in addition not unfrequently--like fog and moonlight--gives to things exaggerated size and grotesque appearance."[16] Grant recognized the unavoidable risk of war at Vicksburg, when he cut away from his supplies south of the city and accepted the danger of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's army, which operated in his rear. John Pope recognized this need for risk on the Rappahannock, when he grudgingly maintained an advanced, exposed position ("the line of the Rappahannock offers no advantage for defense, but you may rely upon our making a very hard fight in case the enemy advances upon us"), in order to stem the tide of Lee's invasion.[17] Risk was also accepted by Sherman when he decided to march to the sea. Years after the war, he still contemplated the uneasiness that was associated with this maneuver:

> There was a "devil-may-care feeling" pervading officers and men, that made me feel that full load of responsibility, for success would be accepted as a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, this "march" would be adjudged the wild adventeur [sic] of a crazy fool.[18]

In accepting war on its own terms, these generals also understood that war was bloody, not clean. They would have readily comprehended Sherman's statement to his superior, Halleck, during the Atlanta campaign when bloodshed was at a minimum, reminding him that this situation was unusual and that things would become livelier: "I think everything has progressed and is progressing as favorably as we could expect; but I know we must have one or more bloody battles such as have characterized Grant's terrific struggles."[19] What a contrast to Buell, who--during his first major movement to Bowling Green in December, 1861--maintained that "the object is not to fight great battles and storm impregnable fortifications, but by demonstrations and maneuvering to prevent the enemy from concentrating his scattered forces. In doing this it must be expected there will be some fighting."[20]

These generals' clear perceptions of military realities also allowed them to accept the politicians, whereas earlier Union commanders placed the politician only one step above the enemy. The political side of war for these Grant-Sherman generals was as real and important as the enemy. They saw the powerful role that politics plays in a peoples' war, which is inherently based on the attitude and ideals of the common man. Grant saw politics as a major factor behind the Battle of Iuka, which was caused by Confederate General Sterling Price's possible move into, and the North's concern for, Tennessee:

> I was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops into Tennessee to reinforce Bragg. . . . The authorities at Washington, including the general-in-chief of the army, were very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in East and West Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account as for any danger threatening my command.[21]

Recognition of the political side of war also played a primary part in Grant's movement towards Vicksburg. After disastrous raids on his supplies, he decided not to retreat to Memphis to form a new line, but to continue on, relying on the countryside for supplies, because of what he described as "political exigencies":

> Such a withdrawal as would have been necessary--say to Memphis, would have had all the effects in the North of a defeat. This was an ever present consideration with me; for, although I took no open part in politics, and was supposed to be as much of a Democrat as a Republican, I felt that the Union depended upon the administration, and the administration upon victory. . . . The move backward would further discourage the loyal North and make it difficult to get men or supplies. Already the elections had shown discouragement. I felt that what was wanted was a forward movement to a victory that would be decisive. In a popular war we had to consider political exigencies.[22]

This political common sense contrasts sharply with McClellan's famous outburst to Lincoln: "If I save the army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."[23]

By the same token, these two types of Union general favored different policies towards rebel citizens. Unlike Buell, who stringently followed a traditional moral code in his protection of Confederate property, even though that meant suffering serious setbacks from Confederate partisans at the same time, generals like Grant or Sherman changed their policy toward the enemy as the situation changed.[24] Grant, for example, showed a wide variation in his policy toward rebel civilians. Before the Battle of Shiloh, with good enough supply lines and little concern for the enemy, he protected the property "of the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether Union or Secession."[25] Immediately after Shiloh and the recent sting of battle, however, he decided "to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies."[26] Later, moving without a base of supplies through the countryside of secessionist Mississippi, he threatened the citizens with a promise to "desolate their country for forty miles around"[27] everywhere that guerrilla forces were found. The willingness to abandon a conciliatory policy was more sudden in the fiery tempered Philip Sheridan who, after finding an officer murdered in the Shenandoah Valley, "in hot fury ordered every house, barn, and outbuilding within five miles burned to the ground."[28] John Pope also displayed an often none-too-tender concern towards rebel civilians, the most outstanding example being a proclamation to the people of northern Virginia that promised indiscriminate punishment for everyone who simply happened to live in the area of any guerrilla disturbances:

> The people of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and throughout the regions of operations of this army, living along the lines of railroad and telegraph, and along the routes of travel in the rear of United States forces, are notified that they will be held responsible for any injury done the track, line or road, or for any attacks upon trains or straggling soldiers, by bands of guerrillas in the neighborhood.[29]

Taken as a whole, the differences between the Grant-Sherman general and his Buell-McClellan counterpart, relative to seeing war from a realistic perspective, produced a vengeful, uninhibited, total war attitude on the field that brought results. While a commander like Buell operated on a level which found him taking the time to regulate work party time tables, and criticize officers' mistakes in filling out forms,[30] a general like Sherman kept his mind turned only towards the enemy. Buell would never have written, as Sherman did during the Atlanta campaign, "we intend to fight Joe Johnston until he is satisfied, and I hope he will not attempt to escape. If he does, my bridges are down, and we will be after him."[31] Nor would Buell ever have told his superior, as Sherman did before the Battle of Atlanta, that he was tired of defensive war, that the offensive increased war twenty-five percent.[32] And McClellan gave speeches to his troops, reflective of his greater interest in procedure and administration than action:

> For a long time I have kept you inactive but not without a purpose. You were to be disciplined, armed and instructed, the formidable artillery you now have had to be created. I have held you back so that you might give the death blow to the rebellion. These preliminary results are now accomplished. The Army of the Potomac is now a real army, magnificent in material, admirable in discipline and instruction, and excellently equipped and armed.[33]

John Pope, on the other hand, gave speeches calling for action against the enemy:

> I have come to you from the west where we have always seen the backs of our enemy; from an army whose business has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them, of lines of retreat and losses of supply. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier can desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable line of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of itself. Let us look before us and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance, while disaster and shame lurk in the rear.[34]

But the total war general, with his realistic perception of war and his great achievements, was still as lacking in his own way as the counterpart he replaced. The flaws become apparent when one returns to the flexibility and the military philosophy of Jomini and Saxe. For in the light of these two eighteenth-century generals' perception of war as a delicate balance of art and science, the new Union general still lacked balance. This was not because such a commander failed to understand the art of war, for Grant and Sherman, and others like them, would have been accepted by Jomini and Saxe as natural artists of war. Grant at Vicksburg, accepting the danger of Joe Johnston's army in his rear, or Sherman's acceptance of bloodshed during the Atlanta campaign and later of the risky march to the sea, reflected nicely what Jomini referred to as the inborn "special talent which is indispensable to the individual who has amidst the noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men cooperating toward the attainment of one single object," and "the special executive ability which distinguishes the practical man from the one who knows only what others teach."[35]

The artistry and risk which Grant and Sherman illustrate, however, is in sharp contrast to their failure to recognize and understand properly what we have called the science of war. Jomini and Saxe thought science was as important as natural art in a commander. This was the part of war that, as outlined in these eighteenth century theorists' numerous rules (eleven lines of battle, twelve orders of battle, distinction between objective point of maneuver and geographical objective), was to be a flexible tool aiding the commander's natural artistic understanding and acceptance of war's risk, bloodshed, and tribulations. The science of war was thus a means of preventing military conflict from degenerating into mass murder.

The failure of the total war general to recognize this science and to maintain a reasonable balance between art and science (to understand and accept war's risk and bloodshed yet still try to regulate and prevent it), betrayed a paradox. Although such a general was a natural artist who accepted the reality of war with little hesitation, he was also a general who--tending to disregard the regulatory process of science--often displayed indifference and apathy towards these realities. He then became the bloody insensitive fighter who understood realities (blood and risk) only in a superficial sense, to the point of disregarding them--even no longer understanding them.

In the field such a general was ready to accept strategy and tactics however bloody, if they promised the quick result. Barbara Tuchman, referring to the philosophy of war reflected some forty-nine years later in early World War I French generals, called this attitude élan, a romantic concept of war which meant, as explained in the French Regulations of 1913, an impulsive war of momentum that considered only the factors of spirit, feeling, morale, and will:

> Battles are beyond everything else struggles of morale. Defeat is inevitable as soon as the hope of conquering ceases to exist. Success comes not to him who has suffered the least, but to him whose will is firmest and morale strongest.[36]

The tendency to replace science with élan may readily be perceived in Grant. The first time he sent his troops into battle he clearly displayed Jomini's and Saxe's artistry in his reaction towards battle, bloodshed, and risk. "From that event to the close of the war," he wrote, "I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his."[37] However, immediately after this, his first battle of the war, Grant's understanding of risk and bloodshed seemed little more than indifference. Disregarding science for élan, he decided to attack the precarious position at Belmont, heavily protected by a concentrated rebel force across the river at Columbus, Kentucky, for the simple reason that his men seemed to possess the élan which made them want to fight:

> I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National troops, nor did I intend anything of the kind when I started from Cairo; but after we started I saw that officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country.[38]

At Vicksburg Grant was the natural artist of war who correctly and brilliantly understood, accepted, and challenged the reality of war. By night he ran his boats past the city's guns; he lived off the country instead of turning back when supplies were sparse; and he accepted the presence of Joseph E. Johnston's army at his rear. However, emerging before the city of Vicksburg, he seems to have been callous and indifferent to reality. Overlooking the precautions of military science, he temporarily adopted the warfare of momentum (élan) and accordingly ordered one attack and then another on a Confederate entrenchment that Sherman declared was more difficult than Sevastopol.[39] Grant ordered the slaughter because he thought it was necessary to maintain the morale of the men: "The troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works."[40]

Grant is only one example of how Northern total war generals understood and accepted the savage facts of war to the point of being desensitized to the bloody results. For John Pope this paradox was nicely reflected in his most trying experience of the war, the Battle of Second Manassas. His uninhibited acceptance of the risk of war is illustrated by his letter to Halleck, after retreating from the battlefield in defeat. His comments are not excuses, nor do they blame the government, as was typical with a general like McClellan. Instead, they combine unhappy facts with sporadic assurances that everything would turn out for the best. "Both horses and men have been two days without food," he informed his superior,

> and the enemy greatly outnumber us. . . . Do not be uneasy. We will hold our own here. The labors and hardships of this army for two or three weeks have been beyond description. We have delayed the enemy as long as possible without losing the army. We have damaged him heavily. . . . Be easy; everything will go well.[41]

Yet, as with Grant, Pope's understanding and acceptance of war's hardships developed at times to the point of indifference to science. Warfare became only a question of spirit, morale, and momentum. For Pope this élan was found in his decision, oblivious to bloodshed or risk, to attack a force that was "so greatly superior in number . . . that, whilst overpowering us on our own left, he was able to assault us also with very superior forces on our right. . . . Every movement of delay increased the odds against us, and I therefore advanced to the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action."[42] Élan was also reflected in Pope's romantic, impulsive last stand mentality prior to his retreat before Lee: "Our troops are all here in position, though much used up and worn out . . . but you may rely on our giving them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. . . . I shall fight as long as a man will stand up to the work."[43]

Sherman probably offers one of the best examples of the total war generals' tendency to disregard science for élan. Reporting to Halleck after directly attacking Joe Johnston's position on Kenesaw Mountain, a position he had previously described as "one vast fort . . . fully fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished batteries,"[44] Sherman showed that like Grant and Pope he was prone to disregard science for spirit, momentum, and morale:

> I perceived that the enemy and our officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked to me to outflank.
>
> An army to be efficient must not settle down to a single mode of offense, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I wanted, therefore, for the moral effect to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks.[45]

The immediate result of this type of warfare, which placed energy and spirit (art) above rules and theories (science), was the long casualty lists of the Union armies. Sherman hinted at this art-versus-science discrepancy and its results at the very end of his Kenesaw Mountain letter to Halleck:

> On the 27th of June the two assaults were made . . . and both failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker and McCook, Colonel Rice and others badly wounded, our aggregate loss being nearly 3,000, while we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed breastworks.[46]

The discrepancy and high casualty count was more graphically reflected in Grant's strategy at Cold Harbor. Here was a battle which presents the picture of troops being pushed forward to break the Confederate line and end the war with élan, with spirit, with energy, without first being given the benefit of the reconnaissance of a rebel position that Catton described as

> . . . no simple line of breastworks that the army was going to attack in the morning. From the Chickahominy swamps all the way to the Totopotomoy, the Confederate line on the morning of June 3 was cunningly and elaborately designed to take advantage of every ravine, knoll, and hillock, every bog and water course, every clump of trees and patch of brambles, so that unending cross fires could be laid on all possible avenues of approach. . . . There was hardly a spot on the front which could not be hit by rifle fire and artillery from dead ahead and from both sides.[47]

This disregard for the normal precautions dictated by the science of war resulted in 5,617 Union casualties, in a battle in which "the actual advance was not more than eight minutes"--and for the entire five-week campaign Grant lost 52,789 (killed, wounded, and missing)![48]

The tendency of the North's total war general to ignore Jomini's and Saxe's prescription for flexible rules to prevent high casualties is only part of this type of Union generals' overall portrait. This flaw, taken together with the benefits of his special talent to understand and accept war's risk ("poetry and metaphysics"),[49] produced a creditable, yet incomplete general. He satisfied the North's conversion to a philosophy of total war; he acted the part of the uninhibited, citizen general; his philosophy kept the war moving; he was not afraid of the enemy; and, most important, he produced victories. These results, however, reflected low efficiency, and were unnecessarily bloody because of a disregard of science in war.

At best the total war generals were only partial successes; although they may have been more successful than their Buell-McClellan counterparts, the two groups are more complementary than contrasting. While one type of general was characterized by a temperament which accepted only the science of war, the other was characterized by a temperament and talent for understanding only the art of war. Generally speaking, the defense in the Buell Commission reflected the former viewpoint. The latter attitude illustrated the prosecution.

Thus the stage was set for the clash of views which epitomized the differences in strategic ideas found throughout the Union Army. The commission itself marks a turning point. After it met, though not necessarily because of it, the bolder generals took increasingly important roles in achieving the eventual Union victory. A perceptive observer, in November 1862, might well have discerned the shape of future events from the progress and outcome of the Buell Commission deliberations.

CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES

[1] John Pope's inclusion in this Grant-Sherman group relates to his philosophy and not his success in war. He had many of the same ideas as Grant or Sherman, but he did not achieve the same results.

[2] Halleck was promoted to General-in-Chief in the summer of 1862, but he was not actually a member of this group type, belonging instead to the group type represented by Buell and McClellan. His promotion was actually based on Grant's Fort Henry and Fort Donelson victories and the dismal "victory" at Corinth, Mississippi.

[3] The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, 8 vol. (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 4 (1860-61):263.

[4] The Diary of Gideon Welles, ed. Howard K. Beale, 3 vols. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1960), 1 (1860-61):70.

[5] New York World, 6 September 1862, quoted in the Chicago Daily Tribune, 10 September 1862.

[6] Zachariah Chandler to Montgomery Blair, February 11, 1861, quoted in Mary Karl George, Zachariah Chandler: A Political Biography (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1969), pp. 36-37.

[7] Zachariah Chandler to his wife, October 27, 1861, quoted in Allan Nevins, The War for the Union, vol. 1: The Improvised War 1861-1862 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. 304.

[8] U.S., Congress, House, Senator John A. Gurley speaking on the conduct of the war, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., pt. 1, 29 January 1862, Congressional Globe 32:552.

[9] U.S., Congress, House, Senator Stevens speaking in regard to the Confiscation Act, H. Bill no. 25, 37th Cong., 1st sess., 12 August 1861, Congressional Globe 31:414-15.

[10] U.S., Congress, House, Senator Diven speaking against the Confiscation Act, H. Bill no. 25, 37th Cong., 1st sess., 2 August 1861, Congressional Globe 31:413.

[11] Henry J. Aten, History of the Eighty-Fifth Regiment, Illinois Volunteer Infantry (Hiawatha, Kansas: Regimental Association, 1901), p. 16.

[12] The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (70 vols. in 128 Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. III, Vol. V, Pt. 1, 647-48; hereinafter cited as O.R.

[13] William Dudley Foulke, The Life of Oliver P. Morton, 2 vols. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1899), 1:185, 188.

[14] O.R., Ser. III, Vol. IV, 1264-70. While one may consider the favorable response to Lincoln's call as a reflection of hardened patriotism, one has to remember that besides the renewed fervor of the orator in his heart, the volunteer who came tramping in from the countryside or from the streets eager to join up also had the jingling money of the bounty in his pocket. Patriotic consciousness and money generally seemed to be about equal considerations early in the war: " . . . as many as 2000 came into Jonesboro last Saturday cursing the Republicans, and wanted to volunteer--volunteer for nine months and get the bounty." Rock River (Rockford, Illinois) Democrat, 23 August 1862, as quoted in Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads (New York: Viking Press, 1942), p. 85.

[15] Cincinnati Daily Times, 22 July 1862. This is a contemporary description of Pope after he went East to take over the Army of Northern Virginia.

[16] Karl Von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans. by O. J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), p. 75.

[17] Pope to Halleck, August 20, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. III, 603.

[18] W. T. Sherman, Personal Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, 2 vols. (New York: Charles W. Webster & Co., 1891), 2:179.

[19] Sherman to Halleck, May 17, 1864, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. IV, 219.

[20] Buell to McClellan, December 10, 1861, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 488.

[21] Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, 2 vols. (New York: J. J. Little & Co., 1885), 1:407.

[22] John Russell Young, Around the World with General Grant, 2 vols. (New York: Subscription Book Dept. The American News Co., 1879) 2:616.

[23] George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1887), p. 425.

[24] The War Department order on rebel confiscation, quoted in the New York Daily Tribune, 23 July 1862, seemed to fall inbetween the policies of these two types of generals, with military needs taking precedence over the rights of rebel citizens, but not to the point of

vengeance: "Military commanders are allowed to seize and use any property, real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands, for supplies or for other military purposes. While property may be destroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness or malice. The military and naval commander shall employ as laborers within and from said states as many persons of african descent as can be advantageously used for military purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor."

[25] Grant, Memoirs, 1:368-69.

[26] Ibid., p. 369.

[27] Young, Around the World with General Grant, 2:309.

[28] Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomatox (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), p. 304.

[29] Cincinnati Gazette, 19 July 1862.

[30] Buell to General Alexander McCook, June 16, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 28 (concerning work party); James R. Chumney, "Don Carlos Buell, Gentleman General" (Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1964), p. 41, (concerning officers' mistakes in filling out forms). Rosecrans offers another example of administrative obsession in his continuous badgering of the War Department in the Spring of 1863 for unobtainable revolving rifles, horses, and other items as a prerequisite for movement towards the enemy, a badgering that finally brought the testy response that Rosecran's frequent telegrams were costing the government enormous expense, "as much or perhaps more than that of all the other generals in the field." Halleck to Rosecrans, April 20, 1863, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXIII, Pt. II, 255-56.

[31] Sherman to Halleck, May 15, 1864, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. IV, 189.

[32] Sherman, Memoirs, 2:153-54.

[33] Cincinnati Enquirer, 16 March 1862.

[34] Chicago Daily Times, 15 July 1862.

[35] Baron Henri Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendall and W. P. Craighill (Philidelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862), pp. 344-45.

[36] Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: McMillian Company, 1962; Dell Books, 1969), p. 51.

[37] Grant, Memoirs, 1:250.

[38] Ibid., p. 271.

[39] Sherman, Memoirs, 1:328.

[40] Grant to Colonel J. C. Kelton, Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D.C., July 6, 1863, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXIV, Pt. I, 55-56.

[41] Pope to Halleck, August 30, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. II, 79.

[42] Pope to General G. W. Cullum, Chief of Staff and of Engineers, January 27, 1863, ibid., p. 42.

[43] Pope to Halleck, August 31, 1862, ibid., p. 80.

[44] Sherman to Halleck, June 23, 1864, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. IV, 572-73.

[45] Sherman to Halleck, September 15, 1864, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. I, 68-69.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Catton, Appomattox, pp. 158-59.

[48] "Return of Casualties in the Union forces, commanded by Lieut. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, from the Rapidan to the James River, May-June, 1864," O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXVI, Pt. I, 119-88; J. F. C. Fuller, Grant & Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship (Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 221 (eight minute attack at Cold Harbor).

[49] Jomini, The Art of War, p. 321.

CHAPTER IV

THE BUELL MILITARY COMMISSION AS A MICROCOSM OF THE UNION COMMAND PROBLEM

Years after the war, former Union Major General Lew Wallace wrote in his autobiography that when he was ordered to preside over the Buell Military Commission in 1862, he considered it a privilege that was "only a little less acceptable than field duty." Field duty at the time was something Wallace wanted very badly. After the Battle of Shiloh, two months before, and his controversial failure to reinforce Grant during the first day of fighting, his military career seemed to be degenerating into a series of menial tasks devised by what he called "my bad angel at headquarters," referring to his commander, Henry Halleck. After finishing the petty duty of organizing paroled prisoners at Camp Chase, Missouri, for a trip to Minnesota to deal with the Sioux Indian outbreak, Wallace was so anxious to return to the real war that at the time he received his orders to head the Commission he was going behind his superior's back to see Grant: "possibly he might be prevailed upon to give me something to do," wrote Wallace, before Halleck could "devise an interference for me."[1]

The high value Wallace placed on his new position as a member of the Buell Commission was a natural consequence of being a professional soldier and perpetual student of war. He recognized the court proceedings to be an education in the conduct of war. One of the schoolmasters was Buell, an officer of the "Old Army," in the role of defendant, "a professor with daily lectures giving the movements of his army and the reasons for them." There was another educational advantage that supplemented the first one. As he considered the other witnesses, such as General George H. Thomas, whom he likened to a "majestic lion in repose," Wallace concluded that

> . . . there was another factor scarcely less contributive--it was the number of men of military distinction called before us as witnesses. . . .
>
> I cannot recall another commission or any military court assembled during the war honored with the presence of so many officers of distinction.

As president, he was also well aware of the fact that he was in perfect position to take advantage of this distinguished gathering, noting with delightful smugness that when he wanted the elaboration of a point for his own personal satisfaction "it would always be in my power to have things rendered explicitly."[2]

Wallace's metaphor of the Buell Commission as a military school reflected the basic components that made its proceedings a microcosm of the Union command problem. What he quaintly referred to as "Old Army" represented the careful but ultra-conservative philosophy of war of the Buells and McClellans. This philosophy underlay Buell's defense. The observation that the court would hear an exceptional number of "officers of distinction" referred to the prosecution, consisting of a six-man board of officers and their witnesses who represented the Grant-Sherman type of Northern general. This prosecution advocated a vibrant, uninhibited, yet impetuous philosophy of warfare which promised results and victories--however inefficient and bloody they might be.

These two distinctive philosophical positions, representing the separate roles of prosecution and defense, did not alone make the proceedings a microcosm of the command problem; they only supplied the necessary ingredients. The structure of the court also has to be considered. In format it was classified by Secretary of War Stanton's order as a "Military Commission,"[3] a term not found in either the 1846 or 1861 editions of military laws and statutes published by the government, which prescribed revisions to the Articles of War. The only two forms of military court recognized by these regulations were trial by court-martial and court of inquiry.[4] The military commission was actually a special, unofficially recognized court, introduced by Lieutenant General Winfield Scott during the Mexican War to serve the vague purpose of supplementing military law.[5] Specifically, it was concerned with the problem of military jurisdiction, in Mexico, over offenses committed by American troops against the civil population:

> Many offenses, and some of them of the gravest character, may be committed by our troops and persons connected with the army, which are not by express provisions of law within the jurisdiction of any military tribunal. Such offenses, when committed within the limits of the United States, are referred to the federal or state courts, and the offenders are turned over to them for trial and punishment; but when perpetuated in the enemy's country, temporarily in possession of our army, it is very doubtful whether there is now any mode of punishing the criminals. There may not be any civil tribunal to which the cases can be referred, and the military courts decline to take cognizance of them, under the belief that they have no legal right to do so. Without some authority to punish such crimes, great injury will necessarily result. . . . I therefore recommend that court-martial, or some military tribunal to be organized by the general in command, should be invested, by express provisions of law, with authority to try offences committed beyond the limits of the United States, and within the district of country in the actual occupancy of our military forces, where there are no civil or criminal courts, or none but those of the enemy, to which the offenders can be delivered up for trial and punishment.[6]

This original purpose of the commission was forgotten by the time of the Civil War. Instead of serving as a supplementary arm of military law to protect the civil population in enemy territory, it was a form of mock trial, used by the Government against an unpopular military commander for political intent. Yet it is this divergence from original form and purpose that is important here, for it reflects the value of the Buell Commission as a microcosm of the command problem. The court-martial and court of inquiry were very formalized military structures under the Articles of War. Well-defined roles were required, including that of president, judge advocate, a certain number of members for the prosecution, defendent, and witnesses for the prosecution and defense.[7] Each role had a specific purpose and rights defined under a maize of rules. The President of court-martial, for example, was officially listed in the Articles as "the organ of the court to keep order and conduct its business. He speaks and acts for the court in each case where the rule has been prescribed by law, regulation, or its own resolution."[8] The Judge Advocate was an objective prosecuter; he prosecuted for the government but at the same time was instructed to be counsel for the accused:

> The Judge Advocate shall prosecute in the name of the United States, but shall so far consider himself as counsel for the prisoner, after the said prisoner shall have made his plea, as to object to any leading question to any of the witnesses, or any question to the prisoner, the answer to which might tend to incriminate himself.[9]

Both bodies were very structured, with a singular purpose, specific charges, and specific objectives. The court-martial, for example, was intended to deal with misconduct that usually involved two or three specific allegations to be proved or disproved. One Jacob P. Wilson, coming before a trial by court-martial, found himself faced with three charges relating to his conduct on a particular day during the Peninsular Campaign:

> Charge I.--Misbehavior before the enemy.
>
> Specification.--In this: That he, Jacob P. Wilson, a major in the Fifth Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry, in the service of the United States, while on duty with his regiment at or near Williamsburg, Va., did misbehave himself before the enemy, and did shamefully abandon his post and command and run away. This at or near said Williamsburg, and between Williamsburg and Yorktown, Va., on about the 9th day of September, 1862.
>
> Charge II.--Speaking words inducing others to misbehave themselves before the enemy and to run away and to shamefully abandon the post which he or they were commanded to defend.
>
> Specification.--In this: That he, said Jacob P. Wilson, major as aforesaid, being stationed with his regiment at or near said Williamburg, which post he and they were commanded to defend, did speak words inducing members of his regiment, or some of them, to misbehave themselves before the enemy, to shamefully abandon said post, and to run away. This at or near Williamsburg on or about September 9, 1862.
>
> Charge III.--Cowardice.
>
> Specification.--In this: That said Jacob P. Wilson, major as aforesaid, while stationed with his regiment at or near said Williamsburg, and before the enemy, did, in a cowardly manner, misbehave, abandon his post and command, and run away. This at or near Williamsburg, Va., on or about the 9th day of September, 1862.[10]

Union General Fitz-John Porter faced trial by court-martial on only two specific charges relating to two orders that were allegedly disobeyed during a three day period: one order on the 27th of August, 1862, at Warrenton Junction, Virginia, and another two days later during the Battle of Second Manassas. Concise specifications of these charges included quotations of telegrams from General Pope to Porter.[11]

Unlike a court-martial, a court of inquiry was not a trial. Yet it was still a rigidly structured body with very apparent although not specific charges. According to the Articles, it was concerned with " . . . the nature of any transaction, accusation, or imputation against any officer or soldier."[12] This purpose seems vague but, as typically outlined in court orders, it meant the investigation of a specific occurrence or incident that was of a questionable nature:

> The court will investigate and report on the action and conduct of General Scully in the matter of one of the regiments (Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers) of his brigade refusing to do duty on or about the 1st of May, and express their opinion as to his conduct at that time.[13]

Another order for a court of inquiry specified an investigation pertaining to the evacuation of Saint John's Bluff:

> At the request of Lieut. Col. C. F. Hopkins, late commander at Saint John's Bluff, a court of inquiry is hereby ordered, to convene at this post at 10 a.m. on tomorrow, to take evidence of the facts relating to the evacuation of the post at Saint John's Bluff, with its armament and stores.[14]

This type of court did not always have a defendent, although it usually did; but even then its purpose and investigation, as witnessed by an order concerning the failure of the Petersburg mine explosion, remained singular and concise:

> By direction of the President, a Court of Inquiry will convene in front of Petersburg at 10 a.m. on the 5th instant, or as soon there after as practicable, to examine into and report upon the facts and circumstance attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's position on the 30th of July, 1864.[15]

Compared to these two officially recognized courts, the Buell Commission was only half as structured in format and purpose. It was not a military trial or court of inquiry but, as General Wallace stated during proceedings, something much less formal:

> . . . it is not a court-martial or court of inquiry; but a court of investigation. To show the distinction: General Buell is not charged with anything before the court; there is no charge, no specification. It is simply an investigation of general operations which certain officers of the Army are charged to make.[16]

To a degree, the court of investigation followed the basic format of the two courts under the Articles. It had a president, judge advocate, and a board of officers and witnesses. But these positions were only imitations of those found in the court-martial and court of inquiry. Since the court of investigation was an unofficial investigative body, there were no specific charges, no officially recognized accused, and no precedents to follow. As a result, the president, instead of being the "organ of the court," as under the court-martial, was a mere figurehead. The Judge Advocate's role was also considerably diminished from that prescribed under the Articles. Instead of being both a prosecutor and a counsel for the accused, he was actually neither, for there really was no one to prosecute, and no one to protect.

Beyond specific structure, the Buell Military Commission also bore only a faint similarity to the court-martial and court of inquiry in its objective. As a general investigative body, this objective tended to be much broader in scope than that found in either of the official courts under the Articles. Stanton's order convening the commission indicated a purpose that (although precise as far as naming Buell as the topic of investigation) was quite uncertain, for it included neither specific charges related to singular points of misconduct as in a court-martial, nor the questionable event characterized by orders for courts of inquiry. Instead, the Buell Commission order was intended to direct the investigation toward questionable events over a span of time that covered the year or more of operations of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee. "You will please organize," Stanton ordered,

> a Military Commission to inquire into and report upon the operations of the forces under command of Major-General Buell in the States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and particularly in reference to General Buell suffering the State of Kentucky to be invaded by the rebel forces under General Bragg, and in his failure to relieve Munford-

> ville and suffering it to be captured; also in reference to the battle of Perryville and General Buell's conduct during that battle, and afterward suffering the rebel forces to escape from Kentucky without loss or capture; and also to inquire and report upon such other matters touching the military operations aforesaid as in the judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to the service.[17]

This last clause illustrates best both the open-ended nature of the desired investigation and the extra-legal purposes for which it could be used.

The broad investigative authority of the Buell Military Commission made it a potentially sinister tool in the hands of the government for appeasing politicians and public and for "convicting" a military officer. In its investigative form it was ideally suited to satisfy public clamor--especially from powerful politicians--for immediate court action against an unpopular military commander when there were no specific charges or basis for action. Extending from this purpose, it was also a court of investigation that probed the controversial actions of a commander that did not appear definite or serious enough to bring about charges, to see if charges could be made after all.

The formation of the Buell Commission was actually due to animosity directed towards Buell by two influential politicians: Oliver P. Morton, Governor of Indiana, and Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee. Morton's feelings could be traced back to the early days of Buell's command, when the governor found the general to be an opponent who successfully limited his influence in military affairs, influence which Morton so covetously enjoyed in the early days of the war when the state governments were largely responsible for meeting the burdens of preparing the nation for conflict.[18]

Andrew Johnson's hatred of Buell was a little more complex. Braxton Bragg had been allowed to invade Johnson's home state of Tennessee, the capital of Nashville was threatened, and Buell had engaged in a steady backward movement away from the invading enemy toward Kentucky. There was also the matter of Buell's refusal to move into and liberate unionist East Tennessee, a refusal that continually gnawed at Johnson:

> In my opinion Buell never intended to move into East Tennessee, notwithstanding his fair promises to the President and others that he would. He could have met Bragg and whipped him with the greatest of ease. . . . It seems to me General Buell fears his own personal safety and has concluded to gather the whole army at this point as sort of a body guard to protect him instead of East Tennessians. General Buell is very popular with the rebels, and impression is that he is more partial to them than to Union men. May God save the country from some of the generals who have been conducting this war.[19]

Both politicians had been instrumental in having Buell relieved of command. Both had sent numerous letters to Washington asking for his removal and had even made a special trip to see Lincoln personally concerning the matter.[20] Their influence in the formation of the Buell Commission was nicely summarized by Major Donn Piatt, the Judge Advocate, who related his experiences in obtaining the order for the proceedings:

> Those fierce War Governors, O. P. Morton and Andrew Johnson, had stuffed the ears of Secretary Stanton with stories of Buell's incompetence and disloyalty. He was a traitor, they charged, and claimed to have conclusive proof of his treachery. I did my best to get charges and specifications from the War Department on which to base my investigations, but was met with an order to report to Messrs. Morton and Johnson for them. I did so, and got from these gentlemen assurances of proof, and earnest requests to proceed. The proofs were never produced.[21]

In forming a court that probably would not have been formed but for the need to fulfill political obligations and to appease vengeful politicians, Secretary of War Stanton pursued an unofficial objective, using the court to find concrete fault with and to convict Buell. This objective was, as Wallace stated in his autobiography, bluntly blurted out to the other board members by Judge Advocate Piatt as the proceedings began:

> He [Piatt] gave us to understand at an early period of our sessions that we were "organized to convict," meaning, as we took him, that Secretary Stanton and General Halleck were desirous of getting rid of General Buell, and had selected us to do the work.[22]

The political motive behind the government's formation of the Buell Commission was directly responsible for an essential factor that made its proceedings a microcosm of the Union command problem. For in deciding that the commission was to be used to convict Buell in order to appease politicians, Stanton also unexpectedly decided, perhaps with a certain degree of remorse, that Buell should be present to undertake his own defense.[23] This unusual act meant introducing a foreign element into the commission that was never meant to be--of course much of the whole affair was most unusual. By definition, the Buell Military Commission was never meant to have a defendent present, since no one was being charged with anything. As Wallace had stated in defining the commission's purpose, there were no definite charges or accused; it was " . . . simply an investigation of general operations which certain officers of the Army are charged to make."[24] Stanton's order did list five objections against Buell, but these were not official charges to be investigated. The unusual character of Stanton's action was underlined by the curious scene that followed on the first day of the proceedings when Buell appeared at the courtroom door seeking entry. The board members, because of an uncertainty of definition, were simply unable to deal with him. First they decided to allow him to enter, but only after being sworn to secrecy concerning the proceedings. Apparently they classified him simply as an observer. When Buell objected to this they refused to allow him to be present at all. They finally decided to allow him to enter--without having to be sworn in--but only on the condition that he could not cross-examine witnesses but could only introduce and examine witnesses for the defense. Buell again objected and was again refused entry. Finally, after unsuccessfully trying to have Buell define his own position, the board members admitted temporary defeat and adjourned for the day without further decision, leaving Buell waiting outside the closed doors.[25] Shortly after, the court allowed him to enter, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to assume the role of defendent, but under the stipulation that he was not to be recognized officially as the defendent:

> Under the correct reading of the order General Buell is permitted to attend, not to answer specific charges, but rather for the purpose of assisting in the investigation. General Buell has elected to appear in the light of a defendent, but it does not follow that all the belongings, attributes, and privileges pertaining to a person in that position are to be granted to General Buell.[26]

Aside from causing disconcertion among board members, Stanton's unexpected decision to add the position of defense to a proceeding that was neither a trial nor court of inquiry but an investigative court, completed a setting which produced a microcosm of the Union command problem. This investigative structure, involved as it was with broad objectives under a general topic, together with a prosecution and a defense that represented, as Wallace inadvertently pointed out, the two different philosophical schools of Union command (Grant-Sherman versus Buell-McClellan), resulted in one of the few times during the war that these two groups came together in a formal clash of military philosophy. Both groups had of course met and displayed their contrasting ideas on the battlefield in the two years before the commission convened and would continue to meet in the two years after. However, their meetings on the field always remained cushioned by the war or by some intervening factor such as rank that prevented the direct confrontation of their philosophical positions. This clash behind commission doors is the microcosm of the Union command problem which is the heart of this study.

This view of the command problem is due specifically to the fact that the prosecution and defense represented the separate sides of Jomini's and Saxe's "art (risk) versus science (rules)" philosophy of war, and in this regard reflected, by their contrasting attitudes, an illuminating example of the lack of balance that was the command problem. Throughout the commission, the "Buell-McClellan" defense, as would be expected from viewing its battlefield counterpart, was primarily concerned with the science of war needed to achieve the objective. But it often lost sight of the objective itself. In contrast, the "Grant-Sherman" prosecution, representative of total war attitudes, was primarily concerned with the objective but often had little regard for the means (science) necessary to fight the enemy and achieve the objective efficiently. Each side supplemented the shortcomings of the other.

To observe this microcosm we will examine first one side and then the other, then bring prosecution and defense together in order to note in their clash the lack of balance that was the command problem. This procedure will cover four of the specific events included under Stanton's order convening the proceedings: I.) the march to Chattanooga, II.) the invasion of Kentucky. III.) the pursuit of Bragg, and IV.) Buell's conciliatory policy.[27]

I. The March to Chattanooga

The march of the Army of the Ohio to Chattanooga and East Tennessee in June 1862 proved to be a messy affair, for it involved all the horrors that can be related to logistics. Buell marched on a route three hundred miles long, through enemy countryside and with little cavalry (see Appendix A map). His obstacles included long lines of communication, troops embarrassingly spread to protect these lines, major rivers to cross, and large bands of rebel cavalry roaming at will. If these were not difficulties enough, it was a march that had to be made quickly. Buell was actually in a race to Chattanooga, attempting to beat Bragg's rebel army moving on a parallel course to the south.

The importance and purpose of the march was equal to its problems, for Chattanooga and East Tennessee contained railroad connections that were vital to the South. Chattanooga was described by the Western Citizen as

> the great railroad center of the South . . . and the point of convergence for railroads already constructed from all the principal cities on the lower Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico, and the Southern Atlantic, around the whole semicircle from Memphis, Tenn., including Little Rock, Ark., Vicksburg and Jackson, Miss., New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, Savannah, Charleston, Beaufort, N. Carolina; to Norfolk and Richmond.[28]

East Tennessee contained the important Virginia-Tennessee Railroad, which connected Richmond and Manassas in the East with Atlanta and Montgomery in the South.

Discussing the march, which fell under Stanton's fifth point ("to inquire and report upon such matters touching military operations above specified as in the judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to the service"),[29] Buell and his various witnesses saw only the positive side associated with the science of war. Specifically, this point of view considered the affair a victory in view of the logistical problems the army had to face--even though Bragg reached Chattanooga first. The defense witness, Judge G. W. Lane (a resident of Huntsville, Alabama, for forty-five years), for example, presented the harsh facts which reminded everyone that Buell's army successfully survived in an area that was both naturally and unnaturally bare of supplies:

> It is inhabited by the rich planters I have already described, who are satisfied to make merely enough to carry on the operations of their plantations and look to cotton as the source of their revenue. . . .
>
> I should say that 1861 was what was termed a bad year, for the grain crop was very short in North Alabama. Independent of that, in the month of February or March the Confederate army that fell back from Bowling Green and Fort Donelson passed through North Alabama and levied contributions upon the country as they passed through. These two facts, of a short crop and the Confederate army levying upon the people, made the supplies less than usual.[30]

Lack of subsistence became a constant theme upon which the defense relied. General William Sooy Smith added weight to this testimony, emphasizing another theme to be encountered repeatedly: the poor lines available to Buell's forces, in this case the major West-East, Charleston-Memphis railroad between Corinth and Chattanooga:

> The road had been greatly damaged by the destruction of its bridges and trestle work, both by our own troops and the troops of the enemy. . . .
>
> There were seven locomotives captured to the Westward of Corinth, immediately after the evacuation of Corinth by the enemy, in a damaged condition; besides those there were perhaps half a dozen locomotives in and about Corinth, also in bad condition, but still in running order. Almost every one that was sent upon that part of the line under my charge broke down and became utterly worthless; scarcely any use could be made of them on our line. There was a very limited number of cars available, and not over a dozen were employed at any time on the line between Corinth and Decatur during my superintendence there.[31]

Bleak facts concerning communication troubles and scarcity of supplies were only part of the defense's claim for the logistical success of the Union Army, and they tended to serve as a basis for another category of countless examples that glorified the army's reaction to these problems. As typically found in defense witness General Thomas L. Crittenden's description of the forage problem, this response showed a genuine pluckiness in the Union Army that was admirable and winning in itself:

> Afterwards, on the very day I got to Stevenson, we received the news of the taking of Murfreesborough, and the interruption there made the supplies very scarce for a long time. We lived on half rations for, I should think, a month from the time I reached Battle Creek. . . .
>
> I found the supply of forage quite scarce. I had expected some forage, had been notified that I might look for some, but none was ever supplied me. I supplied myself with a great deal of difficulty, taking forage where I found it. I made every possible exertion. General Nelson was in command there, and I remember having some little quarrel because I thought his animals were living a little better than mine were. I thought he obtained it from the supply train; and I remember his telling me that I would have to work for myself--there was no other way of getting it; and I made every possible exertion to obtain forage. I moved my camp once during the few days I remained at Athens in order to get forage or to get nearer to it.[32]

This plucky reaction of the Army of the Ohio to logistics problems was perhaps best illustrated by Buell himself, with the result that he was portrayed as possessing an admirable degree of administrative tenacity. A case in point was supplied by a defense witness, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Darr, who explained Buell's difficulties with river captains and the seemingly impossible problem of supplying troops by way of the Tennessee River in their march to Chattanooga:

> It was at first considered impossible to so supply the troops on account of Colbert's Shoals. By General Buell's orders all the river pilots acquainted with those waters and living in the surrounding country were seized one night at midnight, and kept under close guard to run our steamers, because Union pilots then in the employ of the general were unwilling to undertake running boats to Tuscumbia.

> So difficult was the navigation that I went up on the first boat myself from Eastport to Tuscumbia. We stuck for half a day on the Shoals, and no boat went up the river without sticking there and having considerable trouble. Every boat had to be sent up by force, and threats were made against the captain and the crew.[33]

The Grant-Sherman prosecution in the commission (the President Judge Advocate, board members, and their various witnesses), was unimpressed by the defense position that the march was logistically successful. Displaying the total war philosophy that recognized only the art (risk) of war with little regard for science, Buell's adversaries instead chose to view the tribulations of the march as secondary and a matter of course. They were primarily concerned with results, stressing the objectives of Chattanooga and East Tennessee. In a typical prosecution response, Wallace talked about "making everything bend" in moving toward Chattanooga and questioned whether a temporary solution to the subsistence problem would not have allowed the Army of the Ohio once in Chattanooga to stage a raid against the railroad in East Tennessee: "Was not the country at least capable of subsisting the army while on its march, without any reference to supplies ahead, supposing you had gleaned it thoroughly, making everything bend to be subsistence of your army?" He also wondered whether,

> With Chattanooga in General Buell's possession, with his supplies collected from East Tennessee and all the region commanded by Chattanooga, could not the Army of the Ohio have been subsisted long enough at that point to have covered expeditions and detachments sent to destroy that railroad [Virginia-Tennessee] as far east as Jonesborough?[34]

Wallace's concentration on the objective of Chattanooga with little regard for means also caused him to question whether the Union troops did not become mere observers--as far as their ability to concentrate and fight--in their widespread protection of supply lines; this legitimate question defense witness General Crittenden found somewhat hard to answer:

> I cannot say that. General Buell might have undertaken some other enterprise that he considered feasible if he thought he could not take Chattanooga. If the army had remained in that position and undertaken no other enterprise, I should have considered it posted just to watch the movements of Bragg.[35]

For his part, the Judge Advocate offered another example of the prosecution's viewpoint, stressing the relatively undefended condition of Chattanooga, and the unimportance of logistical concerns, when calculating the time necessary to reach East Tennessee:

> General Buell, in command of what has since been known as the Army of the Ohio, was sent in the direction of Chattanooga, with instructions to seize that place and through it East Tennessee. It has been proved on the part of the Government and not denied by the defense that the rebels were not in force at that time in either place, and had General Buell pushed on he would have taken the more important strategic points almost without resistance. . . .
>
> The lack of supplies cannot justify a delay of a month or six weeks for repairs when that time would have enabled the army to seize and occupy a country rich as was East Tennessee, and inhabited by a friendly, loyal population. . . .
>
> If the army had supplies enough to justify the long delay for the purpose of reconstructing lines, which were cut almost as rapidly as they were connected, I hold that he had sufficient to seize and hold East Tennessee.[36]

The prosecution witnesses naturally agreed with this stress on objective. J. B. McElwee, a resident of Thea County in East Tennessee, stated that Chattanooga was lightly defended, that the rebels were ready to surrender, and gave the impression that the Union forces could have walked into the city:

> I left Chattanooga and went down to Dalton, and part of the rebel force came there that night. My understanding was that they were taking the sick and wounded away. They stopped all the rolling stock of the road; they brought down all the rolling stock that was at Chattanooga and stopped any from going up. My understanding from rebel soldiers and others was that they were going to surrender Chattanooga. . . .

> I cannot tell what the number was, but it was not very large. . . .
>
> There were not more than 1,000 or 1,500 men.[37]

Both defense and prosecution were right in their views of the Chattanooga March, for their contrasting views represented the two sides of Jomini's and Saxe's balance of art and science in war.

However, both sides of the commission failed to understand the natural, complementary balance needed between art (risk) and science (rules). The numerous logistical problems (science) were very real, and had to be met in order to attain the objective of Chattanooga and East Tennessee; an army did move on its stomach. At the same time, however, the logistical difficulties were so numerous, and so frequently unsolvable to full satisfaction, that a commander could become so engrossed in their details that he lost sight of his objective. To prevent this from happening he had to keep logistical problems in proper perspective, accepting them as inconveniences that somehow had to be overcome without fear or undue involvement, and as cheaply as possible. The failure of the two sides of the court to achieve the proper intellectual balance on this point of dissension was specifically illustrated by the clash between the Judge Advocate and General Thomas L. Crittenden, a witness for the defense. Both were unable to recognize fully the other's viewpoint as they attempted to balance considerations of objective and dash versus various "contingencies."

> Question, [Judge Advocate, Prosecution] You said the distance from Stevenson [Battle Creek] to Chattanooga was 40 miles. How many days' provisions would have been necessary to have made a dash at Chattanooga?
>
> [Answer, General Crittenden, Defense.] That would depend upon so many contingencies that I scarcely know how to answer. To have marched to Chattanooga with no opposition and with forced marches it might have been done in two days, but to have marched there and

> encountered such obstacles as an enemy could have interposed in that country I think it would not have been prudent to start with less than eight or ten days' provisions, and unless we were quite sure of succeeding when we got there it would be unsafe with that.
>
> Question. Was not a movement on Chattanooga with ten days' subsistence as practicable as Bragg's movement across the Tennessee with ten days' and only three wagons to a brigade?
>
> [Answer.] I think that Bragg's movement was a very extraordinary one certainly, and that the other movement would have been a very extraordinary one. As far as I understand the movement, I think that Bragg's was more feasible than the movement on Chattanooga with eight or ten day's supplies. Bragg had a railroad behind him. [Buell also did.] Bragg knew that he could avoid the enemy. Bragg had a people who sympathized with him very much through whose country he was to march, and I suppose he had an accurate knowledge, for I suppose that he obtained all such information possible of all our forces and our strength.[38]

This same lack of balance was even more notable in the questioning of General Thomas J. Wood concerning the march to Chattanooga. Thinking in the Grant-Sherman tradition, the prosecution again displayed only a total war concern for the objective of Chattanooga, while the defense again showed the equally limited emphasis on means and science, as typified the Buell-McClellan generals:

> Question [Prosecution]. Supposing within a week or ten days after the evacuation of Corinth by the enemy the Army of the Ohio had as rapidly as possible, considering the necessity of supplies and the transportation furnished that army, pushed on to Chattanooga, by the route you have specified, what in your opinion would have been the result?
>
> [Answer, General Wood.] I think we could have taken Chattanooga. . . .
>
> In the early month of July, when I got as far as Decatur and Huntsville, I considered it certainly within the range of the capability and power of the Army of the Ohio to have taken Chattanooga; moveover, I supposed the object of our movement in that direction was for that purpose. . . .
>
> Question [Defense]. Suppose the Army of the Ohio had marched to Chattanooga without meeting a man last summer, how long do you think it could have remained there with an enemy not more than 30,000 strong on its communications?

> [Answer, General Wood.] I should think only a few days; perhaps long enough to have broken up some important links in the railroad communications in the way of bridges, and then it would, in my opinion, with 30,000 men acting on its communications, have been compelled to fall back. . . .
>
> Question [Defense]. Would a force that might be sufficient to hold Chattanooga and cover its communications be sufficient to advance toward Cleveland, Dalton, also, and especially to advance further toward the south and east? [The defense implies here that the capture of Chattanooga would not have allowed movement into East Tennessee.]
>
> [Answer, General Wood.] No sir; I do not think it would. . . .
>
> Question [Defense]. Do or do not the railroads converging upon it [Chattanooga] from the east and south make it an exposed point for our troops?
>
> [Answer, General Wood.] I should say so, unquestionably.[39]

II. The Rebel Invasion of Tennessee

Bragg's invasion of Western Tennessee, moving from Chattanooga, across the Cumberland Mountains, the Tennessee River, and into the Sequatchie Valley toward Nashville (see Appendix B map), was the first topic of importance mentioned in Stanton's order convening the Court, although in the sequence of events it followed the march to Chattanooga.

For the Buell-McClellan defense, with its primary concern for the science and rules of war over the art and risk involved in securing the military objective, this invasion meant not the possibility of battle but the necessity of retreat. Specifically, the defense emphasized the necessity of the Army of the Ohio's steady retrograde movement west away from the enemy and towards Nashville in order to protect its lines of communication and supply. The two arguments most persistently used to justify the retreat were, first, the water shortage and the general inability of the Union army to subsist on the countryside ("It is a very poor country indeed; land thin, little cultivation, and almost impossible to obtain any forage for animals in that locality for any length of time"),[40] and second, the shortage of Union cavalry and the almost wanton destruction of bridges, railroads, and supply depots behind Union lines by large-scale rebel cavalry raids. The problem of the Confederate cavalry, noted here in a discussion between Buell and defense witness General James B. Fry, was one of the most effective used by the defense to support the contention that the Union force had to retreat in order to save its lines:

> Question [Buell, Defense]. While the rebel army was advancing in front were the communications of the Army of the Ohio unmolested. If not, how were they interfered with and what cavalry force had the commander of the Army of the Ohio to guard against the danger from that cause?
>
> [Answer, Defense Witness Fry.] As heretofore stated, the communications of the Army of the Ohio were molested by the rebel cavalry while the main army advanced. The cavalry force of the Army of the Ohio was insufficient to guard against the dangers to which the Army was exposed by the operations of the rebel cavalry. The commander of the Army of the Ohio was able to concentrate only eight regiments of cavalry, and this was done by stripping the divisions; the regiments were much reduced in number, were run down by having been overworked, and in some cases not well managed and cared for, and in most cases having been insufficiently well armed, equipped, or instructed.[41]

The general attitude displayed here by the defense in justifying retreat in the face of an invading army if all logistical details were not satisfactorily taken care of was nicely summarized by Buell, who recited a "sphere of offensive" doctrine while questioning one of his witnesses, General J. T. Boyle. It was a doctrine that drew a neat logistical boundary line on the field of battle, with the enemy considered a kind of secondary consequence:

> Question. Do you understand, general, that in all military operations the sphere of offensive movements is limited by certain circumstances, such as the amount of supplies and the distance to which you can carry supplies with the means available, and perhaps by other considerations also? Does it not follow, then, that an

> army may be on the defensive for everything beyond the sphere which is limited by these circumstances, and that within that sphere it may assume the offensive if an enemy should come within its reach?[42]

In contrast to the defense, the Grant-Sherman prosecution weighed only the opportunity of fighting the invading rebel force, with little regard for the problem of how it was to be done. In the minds of these total-war generals, troops were readily placed on half rations;[43] rebel attacks on railroad lines and bridges were considered a minimal concern in comparison to the enemy;[44] and the desolate countryside of Tennessee and Kentucky was not considered quite so desolate, offering a significant source of supply:

> Question [Prosecution]. Do you not know that the published statistics, such as those of 1850, made by the Government, show that the counties of Middle Tennessee and East Tennessee give a very large surplus in grain and produce of that sort?
>
> [Answer, Defense Witness, Lieut. Col. Francis Darr.] I am not aware of that fact; but the fact of a region raising more produce than is requisite for the supply of the inhabitants thereof does not involve that it should be impossible for that region to import large supplies. . . .
>
> Question [Prosecution]. Would not a country that would furnish provisions to a rebel army no more loyal than the States of Tennessee and Kentucky, under proper military management, furnish at least half rations for an army of the same size as that of Bragg's? [Reference is to the fact that the rebel army subsisted without supply lines in two states whose population was neither strongly unionist or secessionist but equally divided in its stand.]
>
> [Answer, Prosecution Witness, General George H. Thomas.] Yes, I suppose it would.[45]

All this was supposedly proof that the Army of the Ohio could have met Bragg instead of moving to Nashville to safeguard its supply lines. This line of reasoning also served as the basis for the more ominous question of Buell's loyalty, which was often repeated by the prosecution in its stress on Bragg rather than problems of science.

> Question [General Dana, Prosecution]. What was supposed in the army to be the reason why General Buell did not wish his army to fight that of the rebel Bragg?
>
> [Answer, General J. B. Steedman, Prosecution.] Various reasons were assigned. Some ascribed it to timidity, some to prudence. There were all sorts of reasons; some went so far as to impugn the loyalty of General Buell. For myself I never doubted his loyalty, though I have heard considerable said on that point--that General Buell did not desire to whip Bragg.
>
> Question. On account of his disloyalty?
>
> [Answer.] Yes; I have heard charges of disloyalty against him.
>
> Question. Were these charges of disloyalty made against General Buell by officers in high rank?
>
> [Answer.] I have heard officers of the rank of brigadier-general, colonels, and lieutenant-colonels charge General Buell with disloyalty.[46]

The anti-Buell element of the Commission also contended that Buell's logistical problems were equal to Bragg's, thus supposedly reducing the importance of the problems themselves and increasing the responsibility of Buell to have made a stand against his equally afflicted adversary. General Tyler, together with a prosecution witness, discreetly implied that if Bragg could invade without water Buell could defend without water:

> Question [General Tyler, Prosecution]. You say General Bragg's army passed out of the Cumberland Mountains at Pikeville; was it in General Buell's power to have concentrated forces enough at or near that point to have resisted successfully Bragg's advance or to have whipped him?
>
> [Answer, J. B. Steedman, Prosecution Witness.] From what I have heard of the topography of the country and the scarcity of water I do not think that General Buell could have massed his troops near that point and given Bragg battle without a great deal of suffering because of the scarcity of water.
>
> Question. Did not Bragg with his whole army pass over that ground and find a supply of water?
>
> [Answer.] I have no doubt but what he did, though his army was stretched out very much.[47]

The Judge Advocate, Donn Piatt, also implied that there was a degree of timidity involved in Buell's failure to meet the enemy. He pointed to the rebel supply situation if Bragg had been met and forced to stop in the mountains and questioned, "Which army would have had the advantage in the matter of supplies, one drawing from McMinnville and Nashville and the other from Chattanooga?"[48] The implication was that Buell had the better position and hence was negligent in his decisions.

In a series of questions that implied criticism of the defense's "sphere of offensive" (logistics first) doctrine the Judge Advocate offered a nice summary of the overall attitude of his side of the commission toward the invasion of Kentucky:

> Question. Are not the actual circumstances attending a campaign so varied and expanded and the maxims of war so numerous that a supposable case gives little light? . . .
>
> Was not Bragg's extraordinary march in and out of Kentucky in violation of the more important maxims of war; and was not the attempt to meet him by the strict adherance to such maxims of war a hinderance to our success? . . .
>
> Are not the rules of prudence, caution, and so forth, as applicable to an enemy invading a country and moving in the same direction as the opposing force of superior numbers; and was not the success of the inferior invading army to be attributed to the wholesale disregard of those rules?[49]

The differences of opinion between the prosecution and defense about the dangers posed by Bragg's invasion represented the two sides of the delicate, balanced, natural art-versus-science philosophy of war, and thus represented a courtroom extension of the Union command problem. Inadequate balance is more graphically illustrated by the relation of the discussion of the invasion to the disposition of Buell's army at Sparta to meet Bragg. Sparta was a small town seventy miles southeast of Nashville, and one of three likely points the rebel commander could have chosen in his invasion. For the science minded Buell-McClellan defense, Sparta was a possible trap for the Union army, a position in which one could be stranded by the enemy without any means of supply. The defense repeatedly asserted that with Union troops at Sparta, Bragg would have taken advantage of a fork in the road at Spencer, fourteen miles from the Union position, turned quickly to the left and, marching by a different route through McMinnville, could have captured the main Union supply depots at Murfreesborough and Nashville before the displaced Sparta troops had a chance to react:

> Question [Buell, Defense]. What advantage would the rebel army have had if it had reached McMinnville while the Army of the Ohio was at Sparta looking for it there, and what would have been the embarrassment of the Army of the Ohio from such a result?
>
> [Answer, General Thomas L. Crittenden, Defense Witness.] With the rebel army at McMinnville, the Army of the Ohio at Sparta would have been deprived of all its sources of supplies by reaching Murfreesborough and Nashville first, I should think. It would have been almost fatal to the Army of the Ohio to have been cut off from Murfreesborough and Nashville by the rebel army in our then condition of supplies.[50]

For the prosecution, however, Sparta was a place to fight, with limited, but sufficient, supplies on hand to meet Bragg's army. Prosecution witness George H. Thomas presented a typical example of this view when cross-examined by Buell:

> [Answer.] I should have concentrated the army sufficiently to have fought at Sparta and urged General Buell to do so. His reply to me was that we had not subsistence enough at Murfreesborough to enable us to do so. . . .
>
> I believe now that the supplies were very limited at Murfreesborough. I did not know at that time anything about the state of supplies, as I was far away on the flank of the army. . . .
>
> Well, I think it was practicable; I think we had supplies enough to have enabled us to have met the enemy, fought, and whipped him. . . .[51]

The defense had a good point, for it highlighted the prosecution's naiveté in desiring to fight a total war without seriously considering limited supplies and the possibility of the rebel army sweeping around

Sparta. At the same time the defense revealed its own limitations, for it failed to demonstrate the same desire to fight that Thomas and the total war prosecution possessed. In this regard, the defense ironically endorsed the actual result, which was the retreat of the Army of the Ohio to Nashville and the establishment of a strong "sphere of offensive," while Bragg's army marched through Sparta, by-passed this "sphere," and moved into Kentucky towards Louisville. It was a courtroom example of the ill-balanced outlook toward war that was the Union command problem.

III. The Escape of the Rebels from Kentucky

Another example of this clash of philosophy between the Grant-Sherman prosecution and Buell-McClellan defense concerned the escape of the rebels from Kentucky after their check at the Battle of Perryville. This escape by Bragg and his army began in the early dawn of October 9, 1862, and ended ten days and two hundred and eighty miles later, with the Confederate Army marching through the Cumberland Gap into East Tennessee. It was a roundabout movement, that moved almost half-circle before arriving at its destination. From Perryville Bragg had moved due north twenty-eight miles to Harrodsburg on October 10th, joining there the army of Kirby Smith; from there he moved fourteen miles east, crossing Dick's River (or Dix River), and arriving at Bryantsville on October 11th and Camp Dick Robinson on October 12th. From this latter point, as Bragg stated, "accordingly all necessary arrangements were made and the troops put in motion by two columns, under Major-Generals Polk and Smith, on October 13, for Cumberland Gap." This latter path led back past Perryville, although fourteen to twenty-eight miles east of the town (see Appendix C for Bragg's retreat route).[52]

While the rebel army was following this circuitous route, Buell was situated at Perryville, spending his time reorganizing the battle-scarred part of his army:

> A good deal of the ammunition of McCook's corps and some in the center corps had been expended in the battle of the 8th, and so much of the means of transportation had been required for provisions that wagons could not be spared for sufficient supply of reserve ammunition on starting from Louisville. This was hurried forward and other matters attended to in the condition of the army which had resulted from the battle.[53]

He was also sending out reconnaissances: "Strong cavalry reconnaissances had been kept out everyday, but on the evening of the 10th I ordered out three brigades of infantry with cavalry to move on the 11th to discover more of the position or movements of the enemy."[54] But mostly he was waiting for the reinforcements of General Sill's division from Frankfort, Kentucky. The time lost by the Union forces gave Bragg the opportunity he needed to make good his retreat, for on the 11th of October Sills arrived, on the 12th Buell moved forward, and by the 14th was pressing the enemy rearguard in its movement toward the Gap. But as Buell stated (with the bogus optimism of a less-than-victorious commander), "no general battle occurred between the two armies, though the enemy was foiled in his object and driven from the State."[55]

Discussion of Buell's pursuit of Bragg (the fourth topic listed under Stanton's order), produced the expected clash between the defense and prosecution about the possibility of the rebel general's escape. The Buell-McClellan defense, with its concern for means and science rather than objective, emphasized the problems Buell faced pursuing the retreating Bragg. It thereby presented a picture of inevitable escape for the rebel army. One defense witness contended that the Army of the Ohio was virtually paralyzed in the pursuit of Bragg because of a need to reorganize and recuperate from the effects of battle, because of darkness, and because of Kirby Smith and the possibility of another battle; this line of reasoning was continuously stressed by the defense.

> The fact that Kirby Smith had reached Harrodsburg and the impesssion that Bragg had received re-enforcements was that we should have another battle. The general confusion, too, that ensues in any army after a battle made some delay necessary. I suppose that these were the reasons why we did not advance at once upon Harrodsburg and ascertain whether the rebels were flying or not; but this is my supposition only. . . .
>
> It was nearly night when Bragg left Perryville. I suppose night would have stopped us from any immediate pursuit, and suppose we did not follow up to Harrodsburg on the next day for the reasons that I have just stated. Kirby Smith was said to be in line of battle at Harrodsburg, and I suppose the commanding general thought it important to rest his army after the battle, and see what its condition really was before he advanced upon the army, which at that time was believed to have inflicted a disaster upon us and not to have been defeated.[56]

Other defense witnesses repeatedly pointed out the necessity of waiting three days for Sills and reinforcements because of the percentage of raw troops in the ranks: "I believe the old troops I had were superior to the troops of the rebel army," testified one major general, but

> my new troops were vastly inferior. There was one regiment of new troops to each brigade, and Jackson's division, consisting of two brigades, were all new troops. . . .
>
> On one side nearly all veteran troops, under perfect discipline; on the other, a portion, the old "army of the Ohio," equally good, but more than one-third of the whole raw and undisciplined.[57]

The defense also contended that even without the head start necessarily given to the rebels Bragg and his army would have escaped. General Thomas L. Crittenden diligently listed all the problems he faced that made it impossible for him, once on the march, to have stopped his adversaries:

> The nature of the country was such as to enable very few men with light guns, such as the cavalry had, always to impede our progress. In addition to other difficulties placed before us with their guns, and taking advantage of extraordinary passes through this broken country, they also obstructed our way by cutting down trees and

> gave us a great deal of work by tearing up the road. . . . The country is barren, and we had some difficulty in keeping the animals from perishing for want of something to eat. There is no road by which the enemy could be pursued except the main road, nor is there any road by which they could have been intercepted.[58]

Buell best summarized the defense attitude, considering only problems and not opportunities, in effect conceding Bragg's inevitable escape from Kentucky:

> There are few circumstances under which a disciplined and well managed army can be forced to a general battle against its will. . . . A disciplined army, moving on its line of communication, can always retreat more rapidly than it can be pursued. . . . The pursuing army, on the other hand, finds the country stripped; it has nothing in advance to rely on; it must carry everything along with the hinderance of enormous trains, and the difficulties are increased with every day's march. . . . The retreating army prepares a front of resistance more rapidly than the pursuer can prepare a front for attack. The strong positions are reconnoitered in advance, on which the requisite force forms as rapidly as on a drill field; while the pursuer, ignorant of the ground and the force that awaits him, must inform himself of both in order to develop a corresponding force, or else find the head of the column beaten back. In the mean time the main body of the retiring army has gained some hours' march.[59]

In contrast to the defense, the Grant-Sherman prosecution reflected only a total war (art and risk) view of the pursuit of Bragg. It was a view which meant ignoring various problems such as topography, in order to support the position that Bragg should not have escaped and that immediate pursuit and battle should have occurred. It proved to be a somewhat fanciful position that concentrated on desire more than fact. General J. B. Steedman, for example, in typical prosecution response, displayed only hindsight in stating that the Union troops moving towards Bragg were constantly held back by high command when they should not have been:

> I am undertaking to show by my testimony that the corps commander placed by General Buell over three divisions of that army would not allow it to move as rapidly as it desired to move upon the enemy, and was very much afraid it would get cut off if it attempted to

> cut off a small body of cavalry and a couple of pieces of artillery that were impeding it on the road. . . . I think if the column on that road [Springfield to Perryville], in which my brigade lay had been permitted to move as rapidly as its division and brigade commanders desired it to move that the enemy would have been punished more than he was. . . .
>
> After the battle the pursuit on one of the roads was something of the same character; that several times during the pursuit our advance was checked and held back by small bodies of cavalry with artillery.[60]

General George H. Thomas, in another example of this impulsive prosecution attitude towards pursuit, bluntly stated that another battle and the prevention of Bragg's retreat could have occurred if the Union army had simply marched to various points east of Perryville and stopped Bragg in his circular march back towards the south and the Cumberland Gap (but in his concentration on battle and the enemy Thomas tended to ignore the impossibility of foreseeing Bragg's return south):

> I think as soon as we could determine whether the enemy was going to retreat across Dick's River we ought to have marched upon Danville or Lancaster or Stanford, whichever we could have effected. . . .
>
> I think, sir, we should have had, in all probability, another battle, depending upon the good management of our army whether it would have been a complete disaster to the enemy or not.[61]

General Alexander McCook, for the prosecution, asked to explain the delay in pursuit, ignored the need for reinforcement and recuperation of troops, claiming there was no reason why the rebels were not "vigorously pursued." "No reason whatever," he complained. "I believe they should have been vigorously pursued next morning at daylight. I will state that my troops, who fought all day without water, could have occupied the part of a reserve very well."[62]

Prosecution witness General Thomas J. Wood, asked to describe events in the Army immediately after Perryville, remembered only the languid, calm atmosphere that settled over the Union camp while Bragg was rapidly escaping:

> I cannot say I knew or heard any movement taking place either that night, next morning, or the next day that could properly be called an effort to renew the battle on the part of the Army of the Ohio. Some movements were ordered in the corps to which my division was attached for an advance toward Perryville during the morning of the 9th, but such advance did not take place until after it was known that the enemy had evacuated the position in and around Perryville, and in fact till I had been in the suburbs of the place myself.[63]

Seeing the rebel escape only as an incomprehensible blunder, the Judge Advocate summarized the prosecution position in a brief review that left out the problems of science presented by the defense, and showed only the total war (art) side of pursuit:

> This blow [Perryville] seems to have paralyzed the Army of the Ohio. No further effort was made to find and attack the enemy from the 8th till the 12th. No advance was even ordered. In the mean time the rebels retreated through Harrodsburg past our forces to Camp Dick Robinson. This was the third time a march of this kind was successful. A pursuit was then ordered that resulted in nothing.[64]

Both sides of the court again reflected in their contrasting views a philosophical failure that was the Union command problem. The Buell-McClellan defense was unable to balance properly the objective of Bragg's army and the need for risk and initiative combined with science in pursuing the enemy. The concentration on problems of topography, raw troops, reinforcements, and the general disadvantages of the pursuer emphasized by this side of the commission, represented a lack of initiative not found in prosecution supporters. Some of the anti-Buell witnesses had shown far more initiative than their commander. Col. R. B. Mitchel, for example, recalled that on the night of the day of the Battle of Perryville he was far ahead of his lines on an elevation overlooking Perryville and shooting across the town at a rebel battery.[65] There was also prosecution witness Col. G. D. Wagner, who marched his brigade at daybreak to an advanced position in sight of the retreating enemy that was to be his corps' objective for the day, and who would have continued to move toward the enemy except, as he explained to the commission, for the lack of proper orders.

> The reason that I did not advance farther that morning into the town and beyond it and undertake to cut off those troops that were retreating was because I was then much farther advanced than I was ordered to go. I had gone about as far as I thought I dared go without being ordered.[66]

Col. A. D. Streight, who testified for the prosecution, felt the same curiosity to find out, while the rest of the Union army slept, what the enemy was up to on the morning after Perryville. His troops also advanced without orders, and was close enough to the enemy to observe its position.[67]

The Grant-Sherman prosecution failed in turn to recognize the science (rules) of war necessary for a successful pursuit of Bragg. The anxiousness of General McCook to "vigorously pursue" the enemy, the plan by General Thomas to march sharply east in order to gain another battle with Bragg's Army, or General Steedman's impatience at being enchained by high command, still did not take into account certain practical concerns. General Lovell H. Rousseau, for the defense, underlined this need for practicality in his conception of Bragg as a "lion in the jungle"; the concept reflected the necessity of caution and science in pursuit. To Rousseau, the enemy was more than just a defeated foe to be pounced on--he was rather a wounded foe who always had the advantage of determining the point of attack. "I had the impression," Rousseau warned,

> from the repeated assurances of Bragg and the boasts of seccessionists of the State, as well as from the numbers that were joining him, that he did not intend to leave the State without a general battle. I felt that we might come upon General Bragg any day between Bardstown and the mountains just where he might choose to select his

> line of battle; and I felt another thing, too, that approaching Bragg was like hunting a "lion in the jungle." He had the best army for its numbers that I ever saw.[68]

IV. General Buell's Conciliatory Policy

In one instance the charges against Buell did not relate to the battlefield. Pursuing Edwin Stanton's fifth point, "to inquire and report upon such matters touching the military operations aforesaid as in the judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to the Service,"[69] the Commission also dealt with the conciliatory policy towards the rebel citizenry practiced by the Army of the Ohio. It was a topic that perhaps best underlines, in its own subtle way, the difference between the art and science philosophies of the two sides of the commission.

To the science (rules) orientated defense--with its secondary concern for the enemy and objective--a peaceful, noncombatant enemy was like a wayward child in need of efficient, structured rehabilitation through fairness and example, rather than a crude slap of retribution. It was this attitude that Russell Huston, a resident of Tennessee, probably best summarized in contending that the Federal restoration of the Union would have to be more than mere physical conquest of the South. "I take the object of the United States," he testified,

> to be to restore the Union; not merely a physical conquering or reannexing of territory in which the people are in rebellion, but, as far as it may be in the power of the Government to effect it to restore the affection of the people to the Government. . . . I should say that such a course should be pursued as would effect the other purpose of restoring the love of the people for their country and Government. This may be accomplished to some extent, as I think, while the armies are passing through the country, but not by unnecessary harshness. I speak in reference to quiet and peaceable citizens.[70]

In support of this conciliatory policy, the defense repeatedly referred to the common law rights of the noncombatant in "civilized" warfare: "Is it usual among civilized nations to hold the inhabitants of the country responsible for it ["it" referred to raids on the Louisville-Nashville-Decateur Railroad]? . . . Not that I know of. I think noncombatants are respected in their rights of property among civilized people."[71] This view was supported by the contention that organized bands, not the majority of the inhabitants, were responsible for attacks on the army's lines:

> I will state that in this part of the country the depredations they have committed have been committed against the desire of the people, so far as I know, and I know the people are complaining very bitterly of this kind of conduct, for they said, "If our lines are cut and destroyed the army in the State will subsist off the people, off the country; whereas if the lines are left open they will get their supplies from the North." I have heard this argument frequently by people who were not Union people.[72]

The harsh Confederate policy towards Union citizens in East Tennessee was another point used by the defense to illustrate Buell's lenient policy towards the rebel inhabitant. Buell's supporters contended "that their [Unionists in East Tennessee] bitterness for the rebel authorities is very intense, and has been increased by the manner in which they have been treated by those authorities."[73] A large number of defense witnesses also painted somewhat mawkish pictures of the reaction of the rebel citizen to a policy of kindness and consideration. Colonel Marc Mundy, for instance, described the rebel citizen as one who became not only a loyal Unionist, but a loyal Christian under this charitable treatment:

> When I put a stop to the depredations the teamsters as well as the citizens found I was in earnest about it. I found that the citizens were freely disposed to give me notice of those who were interrupting our railroad and telegraphic communication; they freely supplied my hospitals with necessities gratuitously, and behaved generally as a loyal and Christian people.[74]

The prosecution, in its total war concern for objectives and results with little regard for science, advocated a more severe policy toward the rebel citizen. As the Judge Advocate bluntly stated, this policy assumed "that a people freely sympathizing with the enemy and giving aid and comfort to the rebels have no rights which the Government is bound to respect."[75] It was not a policy which meant pillage, murder, and arson, as the defense liked to think, but instead, as prosecution witnesses testified, meant simply that war was war, with the rebel citizens' rights definitely secondary to those of the Union army. For example, prosecution witness General J. B. Steedman stated that for the short time needed to meet Bragg's invasion of Tennessee he would have lived off the country and if necessary forced the people to supply his army;

> Of course I have no official information as to the number of rations at the disposal of General Buell at points between Nashville and Huntsville or Nashville and Decherd, along the line of the road, that were available; but I am confident that, for the short time that it would have been necessary to subsist the army anywhere in Tennessee to have whipped Bragg the army could have lived on the country. . . .
>
> I would send a quartermaster out, with all the transportation of his regiment or of the brigade, to get supplies; direct him to order the negroes of the rebel citizens to hitch up their wagons--the same wagons they hitched up for the rebels--and haul such provisions as they had to camp. I could compel them to do it if they refused. In other words, I would coerce them to do precisely for us what they had done voluntarily for the rebels.[76]

The Judge Advocate, Donn Piatt, went on to emphasize the point. After hearing that it would require ten thousand men to keep a certain supply road open, he hinted through the questioning of a defense witness that the best method to preserve the road was simply to threaten to burn out inhabitants living near it;

> Question [Prosecution]. Would not that road have been protected between Bowling Green and Nashville under those circumstances if the

> inhabitants had been notified that for every interruption their country would be laid to waste right and left?
>
> [Answer, Defense Witness, Major W. H. Sidell.] That question involves so many considerations that I do not know how I can answer it categorically. It is not possible to decide what effect the declaration of such a policy would have throughout the State of Kentucky.
>
> Question. Would it preserve the road?
>
> [Answer.] I think it would have a conservative effect on the road.[77]

A major argument in support of this harsher policy, repeatedly stressed by other prosecution witnesses, was that the rebel inhabitant was generally hostile. He burned bridges and destroyed railroad lines: "I always believed that all the citizens in that section of the country were engaged in annoying our trains. I know that some of them burned our railroad bridges. We never had a sufficient cavalry force down there to guard all that line."[78] The rebel citizen also wantonly shot Union soldiers:

> He was shot out of a house. I found his body lying there. I tried to burn the fields. Every person ran away from there; there was none but women left, no men. I cannot fix the place, general, it was where we had to leave the pike. The bridge had been burned down, so we had to go off the road, and I found the man; he had not been shot more than five minutes. It was in September. . . .
>
> At McMinnville it was a nightly occurrence to have pickets shot at within two or three miles out of town.[79]

The hostility of the local inhabitants had a direct connection to the subsistence problem:

> Question [Prosecution]. Do you think that Middle Tennessee was competent in the month of October to supply from the country the army we had operated there?
>
> [Answer, Witness, John G. Chandler.] I think it could have supplied an army of our strength, particularily a friendly army, or an army not in hostile country, where everything is concealed and information cannot be obtained as to where supply is.[80]

The prosecution generally concluded that the defense's soft policy tended to make the rebel citizen, if anything, more set against the Union than a harsher policy would have, since it betrayed weakness.

> Question [Prosecution]. So far as you have observed has not the effect of the policy that makes war upon the rebel in arms and gives the same protection to the man who sympathizes openly with the rebellion that it does to the good citizen been to convince the rebels that it arose rather from weakness than from our sense of justice?
>
> [Answer, Prosecution Witness, W. G. Brownlow.] Yes, sir; this has been the result of my observation. They attribute our forebearance toward them to cowardice and think that we are afraid of them. It disheartens and discourages the Unionists. I heard them complain at Nashville even of Governor Johnson's forebearing and conciliatory course toward the rebels. . . .
>
> Question. In disaffected districts, occupied first by one army and then another, has not the effect of the two policies, that is, the policy exercised by our Government heretofore [defense] and that of the rebels, been to make it much safer for a man to be a rebel sympathizer than to sympathize with the Union?
>
> [Answer.] I have heard a leading and influential Union man assert that. I could not say of my own knowledge how it is. It is a very common remark, however, among the Unionists in Tennessee and Kentucky.[81]

These two views of the conciliatory policy, representing a subject matter different from specific battlefield activity--what Clausewitz called "war proper"[82]--seemed especially effective in capturing the essence of the Union command problem. The defense's lenient policy toward the rebel citizen reflected a naiveté directly related to its preference for the science and rules of waging war and hence to the Buell-McClellan brand of generalship. This naiveté was exposed, in one instance, when the Judge Advocate questioned the practicality of distinguishing the "good" citizen from the "bad" one in a time of rebellion, intimating that the line was too fine for reliable judgment; but the defense witness was able to make only a befuddled response. (His questions are in reference to Buell's conciliatory policy as Commander of the Army of the Ohio, listed under Order 13A, and in essence the defense's policy):[83]

> Question [Judge Advocate]. Why do you make a distinction between the man who carries the arms and the man who furnishes the arms and the sustenance for him?
>
> [Answer by Defense Witness, Russell Huston.] It is very rarely to be found in the history of any wars that I have read of that war has been made upon peaceable citizens, men and women, who have no arms in their hands, but the business is to fight the men that have arms; this it seems to me, makes the distinction itself. . . . I should certainly make a wide distinction between those two classes of persons. . . .
>
> Question. Does this distinction that you speak of obtain in rebellion?
>
> [Answer.] I think it ought to, when the object is to restore the greatest portion of the country to its loyalty. . . .
>
> Question. As the conciliatory policy you speak of that was inaugurated by the commander of the Army of the Ohio depends upon the application of the order referred to, please tell us from your experience who were designated as peaceable citizens, who were to be protected, not to be molested, in their persons and property.
>
> [Answer.] I do not know of any specific designation outside of this order and others that I may have seen. I put a construction on it myself, and supposed it meant persons who staid [sic] at home and attended to their business and did or said nothing against the Government in any shape or form.
>
> Question. I ask you from your experience, and not from your construction of that order, whether citizens openly avowing disunion sentiments, having sons in the rebel army and having until our army arrived there, furnished those sons with subsistence, and willingly supported the rebel Government, were included in that order as persons not to be molested in their persons and property?[84]

(The defense is implying that the part of Buell's Order dealing with the "peaceable citizen" actually punished only the rebel citizen who was openly caught giving comfort and aid to the Confederate cause, considering everyone else--those not caught--"peaceable.")

> [Answer.] I have no particular experience as to that matter. I remember no particular case now. But I would regard a man talking secession openly as not a peaceable citizen; and I do not include such when I speak of a conciliatory policy.
>
> Question. If your recollection furnishes no instance in illustration of this sentence in the order, who were considered peaceable citizens and who were not, your observation has been somewhat limited, has it not?
>
> [Answer.] I have been in Nashville most of the time since the Federal army arrived there and do not know of any arrests under this order. I do not know whether there was anything to be observed or not; at all events I observed but little.[85]

The prosecution's vigorous war policy, however, was not in turn completely right. What was lacking was the legitimate concern its counterpart had for the rebel citizen, a concern that may not have been entirely practical but was still important in a war that to a large extent included the masses rather than just fighting armies. The prosecution's policy toward the rebel citizen was practical and promised results, but it was also too callous in its tendency to lump all rebel citizenry together as one "people freely sympathizing with the enemy and giving aid and comfort to the rebels."[86] It failed to consider a problem that Buell and one of the defense witnesses described as the rebel civilian who was loyal in heart but not by necessity:

> Question [General Buell]. Do you not believe that there is a very considerable portion of the population of the Southern States, at least of some of them, who would be very glad to place themselves again under the protection of the Constitution if the power of the rebel Government and its means of coercion did not render it impossible for them to do so?
>
> [Answer, Defense Witness, G. W. Lane.] I do, sir.
>
> Question. Is it true that those people who are at heart loyal to the Union are almost universally supporters of the rebellion?
>
> [Answer.] Yes sir; I believe there are a great many men (I speak more especially of my own section), who are loyal at heart, but who are professed secessionists; a state of things brought about by the fact that their families and property, depend upon their conforming to the requirements of the Confederate Government.

> Question. Are or are not justice, the security of constitutional rights, and other results following from our institutions the considerations which have given rise to and have preserved this loyal sentiment in the people of the South toward the Constitution and the Government?
>
> [Answer.] Yes sir; I should say unhesitatingly that it was.
>
> Question. What, then, would be likely to be the effect of the policy and conduct upon these people which should violate all these principles? I do not speak now with reference to the people of the South more than to people everywhere.
>
> [Answer.] The violation of justice and constitutional guaranties would in this case and everywhere be calculated to excite and enrage a loyal people, and I would go further, and say that it would be well calculated to estrange them from their Government.[87]

To evaluate the Buell Commission as a microcosm of the Union command problem one needs first to consider certain basic factors which made it an ideal arena in which to examine differing philosophies of war. One factor was the anger and contempt shown Buell by Governors Andrew Johnson and Oliver P. Morton, for it led to the Federal Government's desire to appease these politicians by using the vaguely investigative military commission instead of a court-martial or court of inquiry to try a military commander. There was also Stanton's decision to allow a defense that represented the "old army" views of Buell as opposed to the total war position of the prosecution. These elements permitted the Commission to serve as one of the few instances during the war where the two different philosophical schools among Union commanders came together in a general discussion of their military ideals, a discussion that revealed the lack of balance in each that was the essence of the Union command problem.

Beyond these basic points, the Commission served to summarize uniquely the battlefield faults of the two philosophical groups of Union command. Discussing the march to Chattanooga, the invasion of

Kentucky, the pursuit of Bragg, and the conciliatory policy, the prosecution sought only the objective with little regard for science. It indicated not only the art (risk) outlook needed in war that was noteworthy in the Grant-Sherman commander, but also the tendency to overemphasize warfare of momentum, of unscientific élan that was also a part of this type of Union general. In short, each topic underlined the essential philosophies of the Grant-Sherman general as they were revealed at Vicksburg, Kenesaw Mountain, Shiloh and many other major battles, as well as the relation of these positions to Jomini's and Saxe's "art-science" balance of war.

On the other hand, the defense illustrated only the science of war, with little regard for objectives and the enemy. It displayed not only the administrative, calculating, bloodless, efficient science that was a creditable trademark of generals like Buell and McClellan, but also their tendency to use science on the field as an end in itself and as a barrier against the enemy, rather than a flexible, efficient tool in moving towards the enemy and achieving military objectives as Jomini and Saxe's "art-science balance" theory had prescribed. In short, each topic captured the essence of the Buells and McClellans at Yorktown, Nashville, Chattanooga, Perryville, and most of the early major encounters of the war.

CHAPTER FOUR FOOTNOTES

[1] Lew Wallace, Lew Wallace: An Autobiography, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers Pub., 1906), 2:641-45.

[2] Ibid., pp. 642-645. Wallace also served on the special courts trying the accomplices of John Wilkes Booth in the murder of Lincoln, and the commander of the notorious Andersonville prison, Henry Wise.

[3] Secretary of War Stanton's order to the government board members of the Buell Military Commission, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (70 vols. in 128, Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 6; hereinafter cited as O.R.

[4] U.S., Department of War, The Military Laws of the United States, 3d ed. (Washington: George Templeman, 1846), pp. 23, 27, 120-121, 36-38; U.S., Department of War, Revised Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1861 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., Pub. 1862), pp. 499-516.

[5] James B. Fry, The Operations of the Army Under Buell from June 16th to October 30th 1862 and the Buell Commission (New York: D. Van Nostrand, Pub., 1884), p. 113.

[6] U.S., Congress, Senate, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, S. Doc. 1, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., 1846, pp. 55-56.

[7] U.S., Dept. of War, Revised Military Regulations, 1861, pp. 514 (Court of Inquiry), 124-27, 509-13 (Court-Martial).

[8] Ibid., p. 125.

[9] Ibid., p. 510.

[10] Court-Martial order for the trial of Jacob P. Wilson, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVIII, Pt. I, 12.

[11] Court order for the trial of General Fitz-John Porter, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 2, supplement, 825.

[12] U.S., Dept. of War, Revised Regulations, 1861, p. 513.

[13] Court order calling for a court of inquiry against General Scully, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. I, 352.

[14] Court order calling for a court of inquiry against C. F. Hopkins concerning Saint John's Bluff, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XIV, Pt. I, 142.

[15] Court order calling for a court of inquiry concerning the Petersburg mine explosion, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XL, Pt. I, 42-43.

[16] O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 544.

[17] Ibid., p. 6.

[18] See, for example, Buell to McClellan, December 8, 1861, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 482. This incident is mentioned above (Chapter II).

[19] Chicago Daily Times, November 19, 1862.

[20] Francis F. McKinney, "The Trial of General Buell," Michigan Alumnus Quarterly Review 64 (March 1958):165.

[21] Fry, Operations of Buell, p. 116.

[22] Wallace, Autobiography, 2:643. Another commission member, General O. C. Ord, substantiated Wallace's account of the Judge Advocate's remark in a closed session (excluding Buell) during the proceedings, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 597.

[23] O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 6-7; "General Buell will be ordered there and have permission to appear and produce and examine witnesses before the Commission."

[24] Ibid., p. 544.

[25] Ibid., pp. 21-22. In his Autobiography, forty years later, Wallace still failed to understand what Stanton was doing in allowing Buell to defend himself, and still found it possible to elaborate on Buell's presence: "General Buell's status before the Commission was peculiar. There was no charge against him of any kind, not even of a failure in command. We were not to investigate him, but a series of operations conducted by him. We were not a court; he was not a defendent; yet the most extraordinary features of the whole proceeding were the use he made of his privileges of appearance before us, and the lawyer like capacity he unexpectedly developed." Wallace, Autobiography, 2:644.

[26] O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 688.

[27] The Commission dealt with two other topics in accordance with Stanton's order. One concerned Buell and the disappointing Battle of Perryville, while the other analyzed Bragg's capture of the Union garrison at the small town of Munfordsville. They were topics that promised to be most controversial and thus most effective in reflecting the "art-science" difference between the prosecution and defense. Once the facts were discerned, however, both topics proved to generate little argument.

[28] Paris (Ky.) Western Citizen, 3 January 1862.

[29] O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 6.

[30] Ibid., p. 474.

[31] Ibid., pp. 390-91.

[32] Ibid., p. 516.

[33] Ibid., p. 602.

[34] Ibid., pp. 571-72.

[35] Ibid., p. 574.

[36] Ibid., p. 13.

[37] Ibid., p. 671.

[38] Ibid., p. 548-49.

[39] Ibid., pp. 176-79.

[40] Ibid., p. 156.

[41] Ibid., p. 709.

[42] Ibid., p. 381.

[43] "I should think that by putting the troops on half rations there would probably have been enough for the purpose indicated" [this purpose being to meet Bragg as he descended from the Cumberland Mountains into Tennessee]. Ibid., p. 168.

[44] "It is a singular fact that in the opinion of the defense a road is always open to the rebels, who need no transportation and are not dependent upon the ordinary laws of subsistence; while to us there seems to be but one road, and that is through disaster to our base." Ibid., p. 20.

[45] Ibid., p. 617 (Darr); p. 202 (Thomas and Prosecution). Questioned by Buell, Thomas later admitted that Kentucky offered extensive resources, middle Tennessee not quite as much, but still seemingly enough to get by: "The supply of some things in Tennessee was quite abundant--green corn, and there is some cattle; not a great deal of wheat, as far as I could learn; but a very abundant supply of all these in Kentucky." Ibid., p. 204.

[46] Ibid., p. 134.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid., p. 167.

[49] Ibid., pp. 451-52, 171.

[50] Ibid., p. 521.

[51] Ibid., pp. 182-83.

[52] Ibid., p. 1093.

[53] Ibid., p. 53.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., p. 54.

[56] Ibid., p. 565.

[57] Ibid., pp. 51, 126.

[58] Ibid., p. 539.

[59] Ibid., p. 56.

[60] Ibid., p. 143.

[61] Ibid., p. 185.

[62] Ibid., p. 103.

[63] Ibid., p. 177.

[64] Ibid., p. 20.

[65] Ibid., p. 94.

[66] Ibid., p. 236.

[67] Ibid., p. 148.

[68] Ibid., p. 347.

[69] Ibid., p. 6.

[70] Ibid., p. 497.

[71] Ibid., p. 270.

[72] Ibid., p. 269.

[73] Ibid., p. 500.

[74] Ibid., p. 636.

[75] Ibid., p. 635.

[76] Ibid., pp. 139-40.

[77] Ibid., p. 256.

[78] Ibid., p. 327.

[79] Ibid., pp. 328-29.

[80] Ibid., p. 282.

[81] Ibid., pp. 674-75. Brownlow was a clergyman and a vehement Tennessee Unionist, much embittered toward the Confederacy by his imprisonment early in the war.

[82] Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. O. J. Matthijs Jolles (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1950), p. 63.

[83] Buell's Order 13A is in Appendix D.

[84] O.R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 502-03.

[85] Ibid., p. 503.

[86] Ibid., p. 635.

[87] Ibid., p. 481.

CONCLUSION

This study may be somewhat misleading, for it seems to imply that all Union generals suffered from one of the two defects discussed so extensively. But we can put the Union command problem in better perspective by acknowledging that it did not apply to all Northern generals. Not all fit neatly into either the incomplete Grant-Sherman category or the Buell-McClellan category. Some Union generals actually did come close to Jomini's and Saxe's ideal, although such a commander was a rarity in the Union army. He was then and remains an inconspicuous figure, due to his subordination to Grant, Buell, or other generals of higher command. This subordination was due to failure to capture the public eye, leading a smaller command, and achievements that--although successful--were overshadowed by the accomplishments and failures of his better known superiors.

George W. Morgan is a prime example. His name is not commonly associated with the Civil War, yet his three-month campaign in the Spring and Summer of 1862 against a well entrenched rebel force situated in the Cumberland Mountains reflected a brand of generalship that was superior in "completeness" to that found in most of the Union army. It was a "complete" campaign because Morgan adequately employed an equal combination of "natural artistry" (the initiative, audacity, and daring not found in books) that was the positive trademark of a Ulysses S. Grant, and the "scientific awareness" (the rules and the methodology of war), also needed in a commander, that was characteristic of a Don Carlos Buell.

Moving against the enemy in the Cumberland Gap, Morgan demonstrated the systematic science of war as well as Buell could have done, for he overcame his early inclination to storm one part of the enemy position and achieve quick victory. He decided instead to attempt a safer flanking movement when the enemy position was sufficiently bolstered to cause an unnecessary sacrifice of life if attacked from the front:

> I reached Cumberland Ford on the 11th April and made a reconnaisance of the enemy's position at Cumberland Gap. It was evident that the enemy had grouped too many works on their left and depended too much on the natural strength of their right. Six hundred yards to the right of Fort Pitts I observed a knob which commanded that fort and Fort Mallory, and I was satisfied that that hill once in our possession, and occupied by seige guns, the gap was ours. I made a requisition for and obtained two 20 and two 30 pounder Parrott guns. . . .
>
> Before the arrival of our seige guns Engineer Lea, of the rebel forces, constructed a strong work, protected by rifle pits, upon the summit, to the right of Fort Pitts, and convinced that the position could only be carried with immense loss of life, with keen regret I abandoned all idea of attacking the place from the front, and resolved to execute a flank movement and force the enemy to abandon his position. . . .[1]

The decision to outflank the enemy in this case, however, was also characteristic of the "natural artistry" and audacity of a Grant, for the decision required an acceptance of the harsh necessity of hauling one's army up and down a mountain in order to gain the enemy's rear. Specifically, the movement required Morgan to move his army to the west of Cumberland Gap and into Powell's Valley, a route that would cut off the enemy's line of retreat to Knoxville and at the same time make him vulnerable to attack. It was a route that was also inconceivable for the passage of an army, being "generally used as bridal-paths" up to that time and through which nothing heavier than "small wagons lightly laden had been known to pass."[2] In his final report, Morgan described the hardship his army experienced in pushing through such a wilderness, at the same time reflecting the boldness which made him a natural artist of war:

> I have advanced upon a road so narrow that two wagons cannot pass each other. The guns had to be drawn over several hills by block and tackle. A retrograde movement would be next to impossible. . . . For miles a road had to be constructed as the column advanced. . . . The obstacles are great, but will be overcome. . . . at many places the narrow roads, walled in by mountains, had become torrents, and sometimes the horses were obliged to swim. . . . Men were on half rations. To have three days ration ahead was a joy. . . .
>
> It was amusing to witness the astonishment of the people at the passage of enormous cannon over roads regarded by them as difficult and dangerous for lightly-laden wagons. . . .
>
> The ropes and pulleys were in constant use or readiness, and the men were obliged to be constantly on the alert, for the ascents were not only steep, but along places where, were the gun carriages once over turned, they would have fallen over precipitous rocks varying in height from 100-150 feet. . . . In many instances were the turns in the road more than at right angles, and this up steep side long ascents, rendering it almost impossible to turn with teams. . . .
>
> The road had become much worn out and rutted, loose stones fallen into the track and filled it in places, which had to be removed, and which rendered it almost impossible for horses to get a foothold. . . . The 30 pound guns being so heavy, weighing 8000 pounds, were left at the top of the mountains, as the descent was too difficult to think for one moment of moving them down in the night.[3]

However, the science of war was not forgotten by Morgan in this unorthodox move across the Cumberland Mountains, for the methodology, efficiency, and organization that characterized the fundamental principles of war were clearly evident. Proper reconnaissance was observed in daily parties that were sent out to observe the enemy around and on the Gap; sometimes this reconnaissance lasted as long as a day and a half.[4] Other reconnaissance observed and measured the surface of the land ahead of the army.[5] In order to prevent enemy reinforcement of the Gap from Knoxville and to "annoy the enemy's rear," a small partisan regiment was also organized and sent far ahead of the main army.[6] Morgan's plan also included a proper feint, as the textbooks suggested;

three regiments moved fifteen miles west of the main army's route (Roger's Gap) towards Big Creek Gap in the hope of confusing the enemy as to Morgan's primary objective.[7] Roads through the mountain were rebuilt to permit the army's passage, and then were carefully blocked again as a precaution against possible enemy entrapment from the rear after the army had passed by.[8] The problem of protecting supply lines, seemingly an impossible task when traveling over a mountain, with its narrow roads and valleys, was fully considered and dealt with, and considering the shortage of manpower, the solution was rather efficient. "I now determined," wrote Morgan,

> to withdraw my entire force from Cumberland Ford, and to cause the sides of the Pine Mountain to be mined, so that a hundred thousand tons of rock and trees could be hurled into the valley should the enemy attempt to strike at our line of supplies.[9]

Scientific warfare was also illustrated by Morgan's careful preparation for attack after crossing the mountain and gaining the enemy's rear. He even considered and used (in one of the first times in war) field wire for telegraphic communication between brigades in case communication would otherwise be hampered by mountain fog on the day of the attack:

> Heavy fogs, which sometimes last half a day, render signals useless. I want sent to Quartermaster Brown, at Lexington, 30 miles of telegraph field cordage, with reel, to be there by the 8th instant. . . .
>
> The field wire asked for is to extend from the center to the flank of my line of battle, and possibly to the rear of the enemy. If the day were certain to be clear the wire would not be necessary, but if there be fog, it will be to secure concert of action. The tortuous character of the mountain defiles renders a great length necessary. . . . I wish to be prepared for every event.[10]

This combination of science and natural artistry demonstrated by Morgan's careful moving of his army over a mountain, outflanking the enemy, and properly preparing for battle, resulted in a victory that although not particularly momentous as far as affecting the outcome of the war, was, for those who took proper notice, dazzling in its audacity and initiative and efficient in its scientific methodology. In short, in terms of my thesis, it was truly a complete campaign.

Morgan's effort also illustrated a successful combination that the majority of the generals of the Union army were simply unable to attain. It is hard to imagine Buell or McClellan, Rosecrans or Meade, displaying the initiative, the risk, the boldness, the natural artistry that eventually allowed Morgan to inform the Secretary of War that "the enemy evacuated this American Gibraltar this morning at 10 o'clock."[11] It is just as inconceivable to find in Grant or Sherman the scientific awareness of war that would allow them to state after a campaign, as Morgan did,

> Well, the Gap is ours, and without the loss of a single life. I have since carefully examined the works, and I believe that the place could have been taken in a ten days' struggle from the front, but to have done so I should have left the bones of two-thirds of my gallant comrades to bleach upon the mountain side.[12]

However General Morgan, and other Union generals like him, did not alleviate the Union command problem; there simply were too few such men. Instead, he only accentuates the problem illustrated by the Buell Commission. Perhaps Morgan's most important service is to draw attention to what in final analysis is another dimension of the Civil War--the philosophical temperament of generals who inadequately controlled the destinies of thousands.

In its outcome the Buell Commission merely underlines the tragedy of the Civil War. Beginning with a sordid purpose, to convict in order to satisfy vengeful politicians, and continuing with proceedings that reflected the limited military philosophy prevalent in Union command, it led to a somber result in the destruction of General Buell's military career. His career was destroyed not because of a verdict, for there was no verdict; as if realizing that a mistake had been made in ordering the formation of the court, Secretary of War Stanton simply forgot the matter. Instead, Buell, with the same sense of insulted pride that had found him walking stiffly in and out of the courtroom and bristling with resentment during the proceedings,[13] was unable to accept the events that had transpired. Kept waiting without orders for a year after the commission's close, then discharged from his volunteer commission, he ended his own army career by resigning his regular commission as well.[14]

The effect of the Buell Commission on the conduct and final outcome of the Civil War was inconsequential, yet its importance continues to our own time. For the problem created by these two incomplete military philosophies are reflective of two types of generals and two differing modes of the conduct of war. Thus, the problem is a constant, changing only in degree from one war to another, and offers an understanding of war in general. In the world wars of the twentieth century for example, such generals as Ferdinand Foch, George Patton, Sir John French, and Bernard Montgomery revealed viewpoints that were similar to that of their Grant-Sherman, Buell-McClellan predecessors. The similarity is more than superficial. Foch, for example, was a major perpetrator of the concept of élan, of warfare of momentum with little regard for science, in World War I. His statement to his troops during the Battle of the Marne, when the situation was desperate and called for retreat ("Attack, whatever happens! The Germans are at the extreme limit of their efforts. . . . Victory will come to the side that outlasts the other!")[15] was remarkably similar to Grant's words fifty-two years before at Shiloh. After being badly mauled on the first day of battle, Grant ordered his men (as Sherman recalled) "to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win."[16] In World War II George Patton understood this kind of warfare in his original use of armor as a major tool of attack, and in his conclusion that the need to go by the book and protect one's flanks was grossly over-inflated:

> Forget this Goddamn business of worrying about flanks. We must guard our flanks, but not to the extent that we don't do anything else. Some Goddamned fool once said that flanks must be secured, and since then sons of bitches all over the world have been going crazy guarding their flanks. We don't want any of that in the Third Army. Flanks are something for the enemy to worry about, not us.[17]

In World War I British commander Sir John French represented the Buell-McClellan type of the American Civil War. Barbara Tuchman describes him as a commander who feared battle and risk and who found excuses for not moving by concentrating on the book, science, and logistics of war:

> From the moment he landed in France Sir John French began to exhibit a preference for the "waiting attitude," a curious reluctance to bring the BEF to action, a draining away of the will to fight. . . .
>
> But the sweat that comes from fear cannot be controlled, and Sir John was now gripped by fear of losing his army and with it his name and reputation. His troops were not, as he pretended, a broken army unfit for further effort. By their own account they were in no mood to give up.[18]

In World War II Bernard Montgomery was the same type of general: "He was always talking of 'quick' actions, yet he was a slow-motion general.

He was always planning the entrapment and destruction of the enemy but repeatedly permitted him to escape by failing to close the trap."[19]

The Buell Commission thus underlines the tragedy of all wars by focusing on improper balance of military philosophy prevalent in military command. In this regard it offers an important insight into the madness of war.

CONCLUSION FOOTNOTES

[1] Morgan to Col. J. B. Fry, Buell's Chief of Staff, June 22, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. I, 57.

[2] Ibid., p. 58.

[3] Quoted passages from Morgan's report and that of other officers on the Cumberland Gap Campaign, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. I, 53, 58, 65-66. It is interesting to note that a newspaper reporter, recording an interview with Buell in late 1861 before he went west to take command, found him to view the prospect of marching through the Cumberland Gap to East Tennessee too frightening to consider: "The mountaineous character of the country through which the Gap had to be reached, the roughness of the roads to that place and beyond, rendering the conveyance of artillery so difficult and slow, and subjecting one's army, at every mile, to formidable resistance, were dwelt upon, and the direction of the advance discouraged." Cincinnati Enquirer, 2 November 1861.

[4] Morgan to Stanton, April 30, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. I, 55.

[5] "On yesterday I sent out Carter and DeCourcy, with considerable force, to enable my acting topographical engineers to make a thorough reconnaissance--take heights, distances, & c." Morgan to Stanton, April 29, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, 142.

[6] Morgan to Stanton, May 24, 1862, ibid., p. 213.

[7] Morgan to Buell's Chief of Staff, J. B. Fry, June 22, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. I, 58.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Morgan to Stanton, May 3, 4, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, 160, 163.

[11] Morgan to Stanton, June 19, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. I, 56.

[12] Morgan to Buell's Chief of Staff, J. B. Fry, June 22, 1862, ibid., p. 61.

[13] Wallace, in his autobiography, offers a glimpse of Buell's proud bearing during the trial, and in doing so creates a feeling for

what the general went through: "At table he and Mrs. Buell sat by themselves. Upon notice of a session begun, he would walk in and seat himself without a bow of recognition or a good morning; upon adjournment, he would gather his papers together, tuck his sword under his arm, and exit, his chin a little elevated, his eyes studiously to the front." Wallace, Autobiography, 2:644.

[14] Report on the Career of Don Carlos Buell, June 12, 1894, "The Generals Papers," Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Appointment, Commission, and Personal Branch, File # 2055ACP1886, Military Records Division, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[15] Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Dell Books, 1969), p. 484.

[16] W. T. Sherman, Personal Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, 2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1891), 1:273.

[17] Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1964), p. 463.

[18] Tuchman, Guns, pp. 247, 421.

[19] Farago, Patton, pp. 301-02.

APPENDICES

MAP
TO
ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS
OF
THE ARMY UNDER BUELL
June 10th to Aug. 21st, 1862


INDIANA
ILLINOIS
OHIO
KENTUCKY
WEST VA.
MO.
ARK.
TENN.
NORTH CAROLINA
S. C.
GEORGIA
ALABAMA
MISS.
Cincinnati
Covington
Vernon
Madison
New Albany
Louisville
Georgetown
Cynthiana
Frankfort
Paris
Lexington
Mt. Sterling
Ashland
Charleston
Evansville
Henderson
Brandenburg
Garnettsville
Bardstown
Harrodsburg
Perryville
Richmond
Danville
Prestonburg
Uniontown
Owensborough
Elizabethtown
Hodgenville
Lebanon
Crab Orchard
Booneville
Carbondale
Cape Girardeau
Cairo
Mammoth Cave
Munfordville
Mt. Vernon
Hazard
London
Manchester
Smithland
Paducah
Ft. Holt
Ft. Jefferson
Blandville
Columbus
Belmont
Hickman
Mayfield
Hopkinsville
Ft. Donelson
Ft. Henry
Bowling Green
Glasgow
Columbia
Somerset
Logan's Cross Roads
Mill Springs
Burkesville
Barboursville
New Madrid
Island No. 10
Fulton
Union City
Tiptonville
Dover
Clarksville
Gallatin
Tompkinsville
La Fayette
Hartsville
Cumberland Gap
Bean's Sta.
Blountsville
Bull's Gap
Greeneville
Paris
Dyersburg
Johnsonville
Nashville
Brentwood
Lebanon
Carthage
LaVergne
Liberty
Smithville
Sparta
Knoxville
Strawberry Plains
Kingston
Campbell's Sta.
Maryville
Plum Run Bend
Ripley
Humboldt
Franklin
Spring Hill
Murfreesboro
McMinnville
Hoover's Gap
Ft. Pillow
Jackson
Columbia
Mt. Pleasant
Manchester
Asheville
Memphis
Bolivar
Purdy
Clifton
Shelbyville
Tullahoma
Athens
Etowah
Savannah
Pittsburg Ldg.
Pulaski
Fayetteville
Decherd
Jasper
Cleveland
Chattanooga
La Grange
Grand Junction
Shiloh
Collierville
Hernando
Holly Springs
Corinth
Ashland
Iuka
Florence
Athens
Stevenson
Bridgeport
Tuscumbia
Decatur
Huntsville
Wabash R.
Ohio R.
Green R.
Cumberland R.
Tennessee R.
Duck R.
Harpeth R.
Stone's R.
Clinch R.
Holston R.
Mississippi R.
Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Memphis & Ohio R.R.
Memphis & Charleston R.R.
Central Alabama R.R.
E. Tenn. & Ga. R.R.
E. Tenn. & Virginia R.R.
0 25 50
Miles

APPENDIX A

MAP
TO
ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS
OF
BRAGG AND BUELL IN KENTUCKY
AND TENNESSEE,
Aug. 21st to Oct. 8th, 1862


INDIANA
KENTUCKY
OHIO
ILLINOIS
MO.
WEST VA.
TENN.
ARK.
MISS.
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
NORTH CAROLINA
S.C.
Cincinnati
Covington
Vernon
Madison
New Albany
Louisville
Georgetown
Frankfort
Cynthiana
Paris
Lexington
Mt. Sterling
Ashland
Charleston
Evansville
Henderson
Brandenburg
Garnettsville
Bardstown
Harrodsburg
Richmond
Prestonburg
Carbondale
Uniontown
Owensborough
Elizabethtown
Perryville
Danville
Lebanon
Crab Orchard
Booneville
Hazard
Cape Girardeau
Cairo
Mammoth Cave
Hodgenville
Munfordville
Mt. Vernon
London
Manchester
Ft. Holt
Smithland
Ft. Jefferson
Blandville
Columbus
Paducah
Hopkinsville
Bowling Green
Columbia
Glasgow
Somerset
Logan's Cross Roads
Mill Springs
Burkesville
Barboursville
Belmont
Hickman
Mayfield
Ft. Donelson
Ft. Henry
New Madrid
Island No. 10
Fulton
Dover
Clarksville
Tompkinsville
Lafayette
Gallatin
Hartsville
Cumberland Gap
Blountsville
Bean's Sta.
Bulls Gap
Greeneville
Tiptonville
Union City
Paris
Nashville
Lebanon
Carthage
Stones R.
Dyersburg
Johnsonville
Brentwood
LaVergne
Liberty
Knoxville
Strawberry Plains
Campbell's Sta.
Maryville
Plum Run Bend
Ripley
Humboldt
Harpeth R.
Franklin
Duck R.
Smithville
Murfreesboro
Sparta
Kingston
Spring Hill
McMinnville
Hoover's Gap
Ft. Pillow
Jackson
Columbia
Mt. Pleasant
Manchester
Shelbyville
Athens
Etowah
Asheville
Memphis
Bolivar
Purdy
Clifton
Savannah
Pittsburg Ldg.
Tullahoma
Decherd
Fayetteville
Pulaski
Jasper
Cleveland
Chattanooga
La Grange
Grand Junction
Shiloh
Collierville
Hernando
Holly Springs
Corinth
Ashland
Iuka
Florence
Athens
Stevenson
Bridgeport
Tuscumbia
Decatur
Huntsville
Ohio R.
Wabash R.
Green R.
Cumberland R.
Tennessee R.
Mississippi R.
Clinch R.
Holston R.
Memphis & Ohio R.R.
Memphis & Charleston R.R.
Nashville R.R.
0
25
50
Miles
BUELL
BRAGG

APPENDIX B

MAP
TO
ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS
OF
BRAGG AND BUELL IN KENTUCKY
AND TENNESSEE,
Oct. 8th to Nov. 2nd, 1862



INDIANA
ILLINOIS
OHIO
KENTUCKY
WEST VA.
MO.
ARK.
TENN.
MISS.
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
NORTH CAROLINA
S. C.
WABASH R.
OHIO R.
MISSISSIPPI R.
CUMBERLAND R.
TENNESSEE R.
DUCK R.
HARPETH R.
STONES R.
CLINCH R.
HOLSTON R.
CLINCH MT.
GREEN R.
NASHVILLE R.R.
LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE R.R.
MEMPHIS & OHIO R.R.
MEMPHIS & CHARLESTON R.R.
CENTRAL ALABAMA R.R.
E. TENN. & GA. R.R.
E. VIRGINIA R.R.
Cincinnati
Covington
Vernon
Madison
New Albany
Louisville
Georgetown
Frankfort
Cynthiana
Paris
Lexington
Mt. Sterling
Ashland
Charleston
Evansville
Henderson
Brandenburg
Garnettsville
Bardstown
Harrodsburg
Perryville
Richmond
Danville
Lebanon
Crab Orchard
Mt. Vernon
London
Manchester
Booneville
Hazard
Prestonburg
Uniontown
Owensborough
Elizabethtown
Hodgenville
Mammoth Cave
Munfordville
Carbondale
Cape Girardeau
Cairo
Ft. Holt
Ft. Jefferson
Blandville
Columbus
Paducah
Smithland
Belmont
Hickman
Mayfield
Ft. Henry
Ft. Donelson
Hopkinsville
Bowling Green
Glasgow
Columbia
Somerset
Logan's Cross Roads
Mill Springs
Burkesville
Barboursville
Tompkinsville
New Madrid
Island No. 10
Fulton
Union City
Dover
Clarksville
Gallatin
La Fayette
Hartsville
Cumberland Gap
Bean's Sta.
Bulls Gap
Blountsville
Greeneville
Tiptonville
Paris
Dyersburg
Johnsonville
Nashville
Brentwood
Lebanon
Carthage
LaVergne
Liberty
Smithville
Sparta
Knoxville
Strawberry Plains
Campbell's Sta.
Maryville
Kingston
Plum Run Bend
Ripley
Humboldt
Franklin
Spring Hill
Murfreesboro
McMinnville
Hoover's Gap
Columbia
Mt. Pleasant
Jackson
Ft. Pillow
Shelbyville
Manchester
Tullahoma
Decherd
Athens
Etowah
Asheville
Memphis
Bolivar
Purdy
Clifton
Savannah
Shiloh
Pittsburg Ldg.
La Grange
Grand Junction
Collierville
Pulaski
Fayetteville
Jasper
Cleveland
Chattanooga
Hernando
Holly Springs
Ashland
Corinth
Iuka
Florence
Athens
Stevenson
Bridgeport
Tuscumbia
Decatur
Huntsville
0 25 50
Miles
BUELL
BRAGG

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D**

GENERAL BUELL'S ORDER 13A

GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 13a.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Nashville, Tenn., February 26, 1862.

The general commanding congratulates his troops that it has been their privilege to restore the national banner to the capital of Tennessee. We believe that thousands of hearts in every part of the State will melt with joy to see that honored flag reinstated in a position from which it was removed in the excitement and folly of an evil hour; that the voice of her people will soon proclaim its welcome, and that their manhood and patriotism will protect and perpetuate it. The general does not deem it necessary, though the occasion is a fit one, to remind his troops of the rule of conduct they have hitherto observed and are still to pursue. We are in arms not for the purpose of invading the rights of our fellow-countrymen anywhere, but to maintain the integrity of the Union and protect the Constitution, under which its people have been prosperous and happy. We cannot, therefore, look with indifference on any conduct which is designed to give aid and comfort to those who are endeavoring to defeat these objects; but the action to be taken in such cases rests with certain authorized persons, and is not to be assumed by individual officers or soldiers. Peaceable citizens are not to be molested in their persons and property. Any wrongs to either are to be promptly corrected and the offenders brought to punishment.

To this end all persons are desired to make complaint to the immediate commander of officers and soldiers so offending, and if justice be not done promptly, then the next commander, and so on till the wrong is redressed. If the necessities of the public service should require the use of private property for public purposes fair compensation is to be allowed. No such appropriation of private property is to be made except by the authority of the highest commander present. [sic] and any other officer or soldier who shall presume to exercise such privilege shall be brought to trial. Soldiers are forbidden to enter the residences or grounds of citizens on any plea without authority. No arrests are to be made without the authority of the commanding general, except in case of actual offense against the authority of the Government, and in all such cases the fact and circumstance will immediately be reported in writing to headquarters through the intermediate commanders. The general reminds his officers that the most frequent depredations are those which are committed by worthless characters, who straggle from the ranks on the plea of not being able to march, and where the inability really exists it will be found in most instances that the soldier has overloaded himself with useless and unauthorized articles. The orders already published on this subject must be enforced. The condition and behavior of a corps are sure indications of the efficacy and fitness of its officers. If any regiments shall be found to disregard that propriety of conduct which belongs to soldiers as well as citizens, they must not expect to occupy the post of honor, but may rest assured that they will be placed in positions where they cannot bring shame on their commands and the cause they are engaged in. The Government supplies with liberality all the wants of the soldier. The occasional depredations and hardships incident to rapid marches must be borne with patience and fortitude. Any officer who neglects to provide for his troops or separates himself to seek his own comfort will be held to a rigid accountability.

By order of General Buell:

JAMES B. FRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

A. Published Books

Aten, Henry J. History of the Eighty-Fifth Regiment, Illinois Volunteer Infantry. Hiawatha, Kansas: Regimental Association, 1901.

Clausewitz, Karl Von. Principles of War. Translated by L. J. Matthijs Jolles. New York: Random House, Inc., 1943.

________. On War. Translated by O. J. Matthijs Jolles. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1950.

Fry, James B. The Operations of the Army of the Ohio Under Buell From June 16th to October 30th 1862 and the Buell Commission. New York: D. Van Nostrand, Pub., 1884.

Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 2 vols. New York: C. L. Webster & Co., 1885.

Halleck, Henry W. Elements of Military Art and Science. 3d ed. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1863.

Jomini, Henri. The Art of War. New ed. Translated by G. H. Mendall and W. P. Craighill. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862.

Lincoln, Abraham. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Edited by Roy P. Basler. 8 vols. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953.

McClellan, George B. McClellan's Own Story. New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1887.

Mahan, Dennis Hart. An Elementary Treatise on Advanced Guard, Outpost, and Detachment Service of Troops, with the Essential Principles of Strategy and Grand Tactics for the Use of Officers of the Militia and Volunteers. New ed. New York: John Wiley & Son Pub., 1870.

Meade, George Gordon. Life & Letters of George Gordon Meade. 2 vols. New York: Scribners & Sons, 1913.

Saxe, Maurice comte de. The Art of War. London: J. Davis, 1811.

Sheridan, Philip H. Personal Memoirs of Philip H. Sheridan. 2 vols. New York: Charles W. Webster & Co., 1888.

Sherman, W. T. _Personal Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman_. 2 vols. New York: Charles W. Webster & Co., 1891.

Wallace, Lew. _Lew Wallace: An Autobiography_. 2 vols. New York: Harper and Brothers Pub., 1906.

Welles, Gideon. _The Diary of Gideon Welles_. Edited by Howard K. Beale. 3 vols. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1960.

B. Newspapers

Chicago Daily Tribune, 10 September; 23 October 1862.

Cincinnati Daily Times, 15, 22 July; 19 November 1862.

Cincinnati Enquirer, 4, 23 February; 16 March; 10 April; 2, 8 August; 5 December 1862.

Cincinnati Gazette, 21 December 1861; 2 June; 19 July 1862.

Indianapolis Daily Journal, 24 September 1861.

Indianapolis Journal, 22 September 1862.

Louisville Daily Journal, 5 December 1862.

New York Daily Tribune, 2 July 1861; 18, 22, 26 February; 14, 21 April; 12, 23 July; 13 October 1862.

New York World, 6 September 1862.

Paris (Kentucky) _Western Citizen_, 3 January; 7 November 1862.

St. Paul and Minneapolis Pioneer Press, 7 December 1884.

C. Articles

Buell, Don Carlos. "Shiloh Reviewed." In _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_, pp. 487-539. Edited by Clarence Buel and Robert Underwood Johnson. 4 vols. Vol. 1: _From Sumter to Shiloh_. New York: Century Co., 1887.

D. Published Government Documents

U.S. Congress. House. 37th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1861-1862. _Congressional Globe_, vol. 31-32.

________. Committee on Military Affairs. _Records in the Case of Major General Don Carlos Buell_. H. Rept. 97, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1872.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Annual Report of the Secretary of War. S. Doc. 1, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., 1846.

________. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. S. Doc. 108, pt. 1, 37th Cong., 3rd sess., 1862.

U.S. Department of War. The Military Laws of the United States. 3d ed. Washington, D.C.: George Templeman, 1846.

________. Revised Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1861. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., Pub., 1862.

________. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 70 vols. in 128. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901.

E. Unpublished Government Documents

Washington, D.C. National Archives. The Military Records Division. Record Group 94. Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Appointment, Commission, and Personal Branch. "The General's Papers." File # 2055ACP1886. Report on the Career of Don Carlos Buell.

II. Secondary Sources

A. Published Books

Ambrose, Stephen E. Duty, Honor, Country. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.

________. Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962.

Catton, Bruce. A Stillness at Appomattox. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955.

________. "The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant." In Grant, Lee, Lincoln and the Radicals, pp. 3-30. Edited by Grady McWhiney. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964.

Donald, David. Lincoln Reconsidered. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.

Donald, David, and Randall, J. G. The Civil War and Reconstruction. 2d ed., revised. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1969.

Dornbusch, Charles. Military Bibliography of the Civil War. 3 vols. New York: New York Public Library, 1971-72.

Farago, Ladislas. Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1964.

Fleming, Thomas J. West Point: The Men and Times of the United States Military Academy. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1969.

Foulke, William Dudley. The Life of Oliver P. Morton. 2 vols. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1899.

Fuller, J. F. C. Grant & Lee. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957.

Gary, Wood. The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads. New York: Viking Press, 1942.

George, Mary Karl. Zachariah Chandler: A Political Biography. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1969.

Lamers, William M. The Edge of Glory: A Biography of General William Rosecrans. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1961.

Lewis, Lloyd. Sherman: Fighting Prophet. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932.

Long, E. B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 1861-1865. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971.

Mitchel, F. A. Ormsby Knight Mitchel. New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1887.

Nevins, Allan. The War for the Union. Vol. 1: The Improvised War 1861-1862. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1959.

Nevins, Allan; Robertson, James I.; and Wiley, Bell I., eds. Civil War Books: A Critical Bibliography. 2 vols. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967-69.

Quimby, Robert S. The Background of Napoleonic Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957.

Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969.

Williams, Kenneth P. Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War. 5 vols. New York: McMilliam Company, 1949-59.

Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.

________. "The Military Leadership of North and South." In Why the North Won the Civil War, pp. 23-47. Edited by David Donald. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960.

Young, John Russell. Around the World with General Grant. 2 vols. New York: The American News Co., 1879.

B. Articles

Jones, Archer. "Jomini and the Strategy of the American Civil War: A Reinterpretation." Military Affairs 34 (December 1970):127-31.

McKinney, Francis F. "The Trial of General Buell." Michigan Alumnus 64 (March 1958):163-68.

C. Unpublished Dissertations

Chumney, James R. "Don Carlos Buell: Gentleman General." Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1964.